BF Investment Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

BF Investment Ltd trades at ₹455, in a confirmed uptrend and 3 weeks into that stage. That is +4.0% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 77% of a 52-week range of ₹342 to ₹488. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (1 week and counting).

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 3 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹455 it trades +4.0% versus its 200-day average and sits at 77% of its 52-week range (₹342–₹488).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.4 years the stock moved +254% while the NIFTY 500 moved +276% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (1 week and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-07-24) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Valuation For a bank we price the book, not the earnings: P/BV is what the market pays for each ₹1 of the bank's net worth. A bank below 1× book is priced below the value of what it owns, net of what it owes.

BF Investment Ltd trades at 0.2× P/BV, near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 12% of the time. Its long-run median P/BV is 0.4×, measured across 9.8 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/BV of 0.2× is near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 12% of the time, against a long-run median of 0.4× measured over 9.8 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

The honest context for that discount: a bank earning about 4% on its equity is worth less per rupee of book, and the market has priced that in rather than overlooked it. The discount closes only if the returns themselves improve.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year book value grew while the price moved −4.2% — price and book moved together, holding the multiple in its range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +3.3%/yr price move, ~+36.4%/yr came from book-value growth and ~−33.1 pp from the multiple (compressing); over 10y, of the +14.3%/yr price move, ~+23.2%/yr came from book-value growth and ~−8.9 pp from the multiple (compressing). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus book-value growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is low against its own past, so the story rests on the book-value line underneath it, not the multiple.

A quarterly PEG curve, which only the second data source carries, is not drawn on this page: its two data sources do not share enough overlapping reported history to be compared. A figure nobody could check is not used to price growth — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

Stage: No read Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

BF Investment Ltd reads as no read on its fundamental arc. Under eight usable quarters on the growth trio — not enough history for an honest trajectory read. The read is built from 10 quarters across 2 curves, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: with too little history, an honest page says so instead of guessing a trajectory.

The latest quarter’s profit carries a one-off item larger than the operating base, so the profit curve is shown but does not vote in the stage call.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Fewer than eight usable quarters on the growth curves — this page will not guess a trajectory from a stub of history.

4-Factor Sector Score

58.0/100 — rank 6 of 33 in Finance & Investments - Others · 73% evidence confidence

BF Investment Ltd scores 58.0 out of 100 against the 33 companies it is compared with in Finance & Investments - Others, ranking 6. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 21.8 + 11.9 + 8 + 16.3 = 58. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if ROA rolls over or gross NPA rises while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Revenue For a bank, revenue is everything the franchise earns — interest on the loan book plus fee and other income.

BF Investment Ltd reported ₹37.0 Cr of income in the Mar 26 quarter, +42.3% year on year. That is the 2nd straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at −22.6% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹76.0 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹75.0 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹76.0 Cr (+20.6% on the year), capping 10 years at −22.6% compound. The latest quarter (Mar 26) printed ₹37.0 Cr, +42.3% year on year — the 2nd consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +16.5% growth against the decade's −22.6% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +21.0% over the last 4 quarters against +32.1%/yr over the last 8 — rolling over; TTM profit +26.0% vs −19.4%/yr — accelerating.

Net margin Net margin — what the bank keeps of every ₹100 of revenue after every cost, provision and tax. It is the cleanest single margin we can read for a lender.

BF Investment Ltd's net margin is 308.1% in the Mar 26 quarter, +319.6 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 11 fiscal years the net margin has ranged 12.6% to 1,668.8%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's net margin is 308.1%, +319.6 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 11 fiscal years the net margin has ranged 12.6%–1,668.8%.

Why: the numbers show the net margin move clearly, but the cost lines behind it sit below what we hold — so we state the move without inventing its driver.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

BF Investment Ltd earned ₹114 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹282 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 7.9%. That is 308.1% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier lost ₹3.0 Cr. 1 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Mar 26 profit was ₹114 Cr, null year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹282 Cr (+27.0%), and the 10-year compound rate is 7.9%.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +367.8% vs revenue +16.5%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

Asset quality — the ladder Gross NPA is the slice of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what remains after the money already set aside against those loans. Falling is healing; rising is damage arriving.

Loan-book quality history is not available for BF Investment Ltd, so this section names the gap rather than estimating a ratio. No gross or net non-performing-asset series is filed in a form this page can read, and none is inferred from the profit line. The income, margin and return sections above carry the evidence this business does report.

We do not hold quarterly loan-book quality numbers for this bank, so this section states that plainly rather than working around it.

Why: loan-book quality is the engine room of a bank, and its drivers — slippages, recoveries, provisioning — sit below what we hold for this name; the sections around it carry the reads we can stand behind.

The loan book We read the loan book through revenue — when the book grows, revenue grows with it. It is a rough proxy, and we say so: rate moves and fee swings can shift it a few points in any one year.

BF Investment Ltd's revenue grew +20.6% in FY26 to ₹76.0 Cr, so the book is growing. The latest quarter ran +42.3% year on year. The net margin on that income is 308.1%, +319.6 percentage points against a year ago. Interest income is a proxy for the book; rate moves can shift it a few points in any one year.

FY26 revenue was ₹76.0 Cr, +20.6% on the year, and the latest quarter ran +42.3% year on year. The net margin on that revenue is 308.1% this quarter (+319.6 pp YoY) — growth with a widening margin on it.

The synthesis: a lender compounds when the book grows while the margin holds and the loan book stays clean — gross NPA is the loan-quality read we carry here.

Returns on equity and assets Two numbers usually rate a lender: ROE — what it earns on shareholder money — and ROA — what it earns on everything it deploys.

A clean annual return-on-equity ladder is not held for BF Investment Ltd. For an insurer especially the standard bank ratios are not the right lens, so this page does not force them onto the filings rather than estimating a series it cannot support. The revenue, margin and ownership sections above and below are the reads this page stands behind.

We do not hold a clean annual return-on-equity series for BF Investment Ltd — for an insurer especially, the standard bank ratios are not the right lens, so this page does not force them. The revenue, margin and ownership sections above and below are the reads we stand behind.

Debt

For a bank, borrowings are raw material, not a warning sign — solvency is read through the returns and the loan book. A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits, so the debt-to-equity lens that works everywhere else misleads on a lender and is not applied here.

A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits; a bank’s borrowings are its inventory — money taken in to be lent out. The debt lens that works everywhere else misleads here, so this page does not apply it. The solvency questions for a bank — is the loan book sound, is the equity earning — are read through the loan-book and returns sections above.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Foreign institutions cut 1.0 points of BF Investment Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes foreign institutions to 0.7% of the company. Domestic institutions moved +0.1 points over the same window, to 0.1%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Foreign institutions: −1.0 points over 8 quarters to 0.7%; Domestic institutions: +0.1 points over 8 quarters to 0.1%; Promoters: +0.0 points over 8 quarters to 74.1%.

🚨 Why the register moved: foreign institutions drove it (−1.0 points) — distribution into the market’s bid.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

BF Investment Ltd: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre. The Z-score was built for manufacturers and is not applied to banks and lenders, so solvency here is read from the capital and asset-quality lines instead.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre.

Frequently asked questions