Eastman Kodak Company

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Eastman Kodak Company trades at $8.9, between stages. That is +2.2% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 37% of a 52-week range of $6 to $14. On relative strength it is currently behind the S&P 500 on a trailing-13-week view (7 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is between stages. At $8.9 it trades +2.2% versus its 200-day average and sits at 37% of its 52-week range ($6–$14).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 1.1 years the stock moved +33% while the S&P 500 moved +24% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (7 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-06-18) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Valuation P/E is the price of $1 of annual profit: how many dollars the market pays for each dollar the company earns in a year.

Eastman Kodak Company trades at 12.9× P/E, against too little history to rank. Its long-run median P/E is 13.0×, measured across 0.3 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 12.9× is against too little history to rank, against a long-run median of 13.0× measured over 0.3 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

🚨 Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved −297.8% against a +38.4% price move — the price outran earnings, pushing the multiple UP its own range.

Put together: the multiple is unremarkable against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

Stage: Deteriorating Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Eastman Kodak Company reads as deteriorating on its fundamental arc. Deteriorating — profit and EPS growth are shrinking (profit growth −314.3% latest against +700.0% at its 12-quarter best), ROCE holding at 0.0%. The read is built from 12 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

🚨 Why it matters: falling curves mean every cheap-looking ratio below needs a discount for direction.

4-Factor Sector Score

47.3/100 — rank 17 of 30 in Specialty Business Services · 58% evidence confidence

Eastman Kodak Company scores 47.3 out of 100 against the 30 companies it is compared with in Specialty Business Services, ranking 17. Fill the missing evidence before acting; the ranking is deliberately pulled toward neutral.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 20.6 + 6.8 + 11.3 + 8.6 = 47.3. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Eastman Kodak Company reported $0.3 B of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, +8.0% year on year. That is the 3rd straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 4 years it has compounded at −1.8% a year. The last full year, FY25, came in at $1.1 B. The last four reported quarters add to $1.1 B.

FY25 revenue came in at $1.1 B (+2.9% on the year), capping 4 years at −1.8% compound. The latest quarter (Mar 26) printed $0.3 B, +8.0% year on year — the 3rd consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +3.9% growth against the decade's −1.8% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +3.8% over the last 4 quarters against +0.0%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every $100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Eastman Kodak Company's operating margin is 0.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, +4.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 5 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −4.3% to 0.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 0.0%, +4.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 5 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −4.3%–0.0%.

Why the margin moved: operating margin went +4.0 pp year on year while gross margin went +2.2 pp — the gain came mostly below the gross line: operating leverage, with costs spread over a bigger revenue base.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Eastman Kodak Company posted a net loss of $0.02 B in the Mar 26 quarter. The full FY25 year was a loss of $0.1 B. That loss is 7.4% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier lost $0.01 B. 4 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Mar 26 profit was $−0.0 B, null year on year. On the full year, FY25 printed $−0.1 B (−230.0%).

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit −238.9% vs revenue +3.9%. Profit is growing slower than sales — costs are eating the growth before it reaches the bottom line.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years −45% of Eastman Kodak Company's reported profit arrived as operating cash — a gap worth watching. In FY25 that was $0.5 B of operating cash against $−0.1 B of profit. After $0.0 B of capital spending, $0.5 B was left as free cash.

FY25: operating cash of $0.5 B against reported profit of $−0.1 B, leaving free cash of $0.5 B after $0.0 B of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is −45% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

🚨 Why: conversion is measured cleanly, but the working-capital day-counts behind it sit below what we hold — the move is shown without inventing its driver.

Router verdict: the visible cash user is investment — the next section checks what the spending is buying.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Eastman Kodak Company does not report the debtor, inventory and payable day-counts a cash cycle is built from, so this section reads the investment side instead. Capital spending ran $0.0 B over the last 3 years. Averaged over those years that is 0.0% of FY25 revenue a year.

Working-capital day-counts are not in our numbers for this stock, so this section reads the investment side — where the cash is being put to work.

On the investment side: capital spending of $0.0 B over the last 3 fiscal years.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

Return on equity Return on equity (ROE) is the profit the business earns on its shareholders’ money. With the full capital-employed split not in our numbers, ROE is the cleanest long ladder we can draw here.

Eastman Kodak Company earns a ROE of −18% in FY25. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by +13.0 percentage points, so growth here adds value rather than only size. The wiring behind it is −12.1% net margin on 0.66× asset turns.

FY25 ROE is −18%.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY25): −12.1% net margin × 0.66× asset turns × 2.28× balance-sheet leverage ≈ −18.2% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 27.5% − 14.5% = a +13.0 pp spread. The 14.5% is an estimate of this company's own cost of capital — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. A spread this wide means every dollar reinvested creates more than a dollar of value — the engine compounds.

Dividend

Eastman Kodak Company pays no dividend. Across the last 12 reported quarters it has declared no dividend per share, so there is no payout history to chart and no yield to quote. Companies at this stage typically reinvest earnings rather than distribute them, which makes the cash-flow and reinvestment sections the place that cash shows up.

Eastman Kodak Company does not currently pay a dividend. Across the last 12 reported quarters the company has declared no dividend per share, so there is no payout history to chart and no yield to quote. Companies at this stage typically reinvest earnings instead of distributing them.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.

Eastman Kodak Company carries total debt of $0.3 B against shareholder equity of $0.7 B as of Mar 26, a debt-to-equity of 0.37. On the annual view that ratio went from 0.32 in FY21 to 0.35 in FY25. Read the returns elsewhere on this page with that leverage in mind.

Mar 26: total debt of $0.3 B against shareholder equity of $0.7 B — a debt-to-equity of 0.37. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 0.32 (FY21) to 0.35 (FY25). Read the returns on this page with that leverage in mind.

Ownership There is no quarter-by-quarter holder register to read here, so we read the crowd through short interest — the slice of tradable shares currently sold short, positioned for a fall.

9.6% of Eastman Kodak Company's tradable float is currently sold short — some money is positioned against it. At typical trading volumes those positions would take about 7.4 days to buy back. There is no quarter-by-quarter holder register to read for this filer, so the crowd is read through short interest instead.

The latest reading: 9.6% of the float is sold short, and at typical trading volumes it would take about 7.4 days to buy those positions back. Some money is positioned against it. This is a single point-in-time reading — we do not yet hold its history, so we show no trend chart.

Why it sits there: who is doing the shorting, and why, does not travel with the number — the level is shown without inventing its story.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Eastman Kodak Company: the Z-score reads 1.31. A Z-score above roughly 3 reads as safe and below roughly 1.8 as the distress zone, so this sits inside the distress zone. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure.

🚨 Why it matters: a Z-score of 1.31 is inside the distress zone — the balance sheet is a real risk, not a detail.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score reads 1.31.

Frequently asked questions