LendingTree share price today

LendingTree, Inc.'s share price was $38.35 at the close on 4 November 2026. That is 2.1% above its average price over the last 200 trading days. In the last 52 weeks it traded between $25 and $68, and at that close it sat 32% of the way up from that low.

A share price tends to move through four phases: moving sideways (stage 1), rising (stage 2), stalling near a high (stage 3) and falling (stage 4). The phase helps read everything below.

Over the past 13 weeks it has done better than the S&P 500, and it has stayed ahead for 1 week in a row.

Over the last 1 year the share price moved −1% while the S&P 500 moved +23%, so it is behind the index over that whole period. The chart above shows the 13-week comparison for every week.

This page treats a rise as over when the price closes below its 200-day average on two Fridays in a row.

LendingTree, Inc. pays no dividend. In the last 12 reported quarters it declared no dividend per share, so there is no payout history to chart and no yield to show. Companies like this usually keep their earnings in the business, so the cash-flow sections show where that cash goes.

LendingTree is not in the Nasdaq 100, the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones 30, and is not on the US tech stocks list.

LendingTree, Inc. earned $9.6 M of net profit in the Jun 2026 quarter, +8.0% on the same quarter a year earlier. Full-year FY25 profit was $151 M. Over 4 years profit has grown 21.6% a year on average. That is 3.1% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned $8.9 M.

Net profit is what is left after every cost, interest and tax. Earnings per share, dividends and book value all grow from it.

3 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

LendingTree, Inc. reported $313 M of income in the Jun 2026 quarter, +25.3% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 9th quarter in a row with growth on the year before. Over 4 years it has grown 0.4% a year on average. The last full year, FY25, came in at $1.1 B.

For a bank, revenue is everything it earns: interest on its loans plus fees from its businesses.

The last four reported quarters add to $1.3 B.

FY25 revenue was $1.1 B, +24.1% on the year before.

Recent pace: the last four quarters grew +25.5% on average, against 0.4% a year over the longer run, so this year is growing faster than its own long-run rate.

Is growth speeding up? Revenue over the last 12 months grew +25.3%, against +37.8% a year over the last 8 quarters (rolling over).

LendingTree, Inc.'s net margin was 3.1% in the Jun 2026 quarter, 0.4 percentage points lower than the same quarter a year ago. Its latest full-year margin is the highest it has ever reported. Across 5 years it has been between −19.1% and 13.5%. The latest quarter is within that range.

Net margin is what the bank keeps from every $100 of revenue after every cost, provision for bad loans and tax. With big fee businesses in the mix, it is the clearest margin we can read for this bank.

Across 5 years it has been between −19.1% and 13.5%, and FY25's 13.5% is the highest of them.

Why: the net margin move is clear, but the cost details behind it are not in our data, so we show the move without guessing the reason.

When margins are at a record, every ratio built on profit looks better than usual, so watch whether they hold.

LendingTree, Inc. does not report loan-quality figures this page can read, so this section says so rather than guess. No bad-loan figures are filed in a form this page can read, and none are guessed from the profit line. The income, margin and return sections carry what this business does report.

Gross NPA is the share of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what is left after the money the lender has already set aside for those loans. Falling is good; rising is a warning.

Why: loan quality drives a lender, but its details (new bad loans, recoveries, money set aside) are not in our data for this company. The sections around this one carry what we can back up.

LendingTree, Inc.'s revenue was $1.1 B in FY25, +24.1% on the year before, so the loan book is growing. The latest quarter was +25.3% on a year earlier. The net margin on that income is 3.1%, −0.4 percentage points on a year ago.

We read the loan book through revenue: when the book and the businesses grow, revenue grows with them. It is only a rough guide, because interest-rate changes and fee swings can move it a few points in any year.

Interest income stands in for the size of the loan book; changes in interest rates can move it a few points in any year.

In short: a lender grows well when its loan book grows, its margin stays steady and its loans stay clean. Quarterly loan-quality figures are missing here, so revenue growth and margin are the two we watch.

LendingTree, Inc.'s P/BV is 2.1×, in the middle of its own history: higher than 53% of past readings. Its usual P/BV (the middle reading) is 2.0×, over 1 year of weekly prices. This compares the share price with the company’s own past. It does not say what the business is worth.

For a bank or lender we compare the price with book value, the net worth on its balance sheet. P/BV is how many dollars the market pays for each $1 of that net worth. Below 1× means the market values it at less than its net worth.

In short: the multiple is about average against its own past, so the book value trend underneath matters more than the multiple.

LendingTree, Inc.'s business trend cannot be read yet. There are fewer than eight usable quarters of growth figures, so there is not enough history to read the trend. This is based on 12 quarters of 2 measures, with some gaps.

Every business is somewhere on a path of getting better or worse, and this section names where. The last 12 quarters of growth in revenue, profit and earnings per share, plus the return the business earns on its capital, are read as lines. Getting worse: the lines are falling. Turning around: a low point has just formed and the last few quarters are rising from it. Getting better: the rise from the low has lasted. Growing steadily: steady growth with healthy returns. Slowing from a peak: still high, but slowing. When the lines disagree the result is mixed; too little history means no reading. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the steady yearly rate that would turn the starting value into the latest one. It is the fairest way to compare growth over different periods. If the 1-year figure is much bigger than the 10-year one, recent growth is running faster than the long-run trend. A dash means there is no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss, where a growth rate means nothing.

Why it matters: with too little history, we say so rather than guess a direction.

One or more growth lines have an extreme jump caused by comparing with a near-zero or loss-making quarter. Those jumps are capped before reading and drawn at the edge of the chart, so one odd quarter does not decide the result.

There are fewer than eight usable quarters, so this page does not guess a direction from so little history.

Compound annual growth rate (%)

Compound annual growth rate over each period, %. Revenue, profit and EPS come from yearly figures; the stock price row is price growth over the same periods. A dash means no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss.

LendingTree, Inc. earned a return on equity of 53% in FY25. Its lowest yearly reading on file was −99% in FY23. On its assets, every $100 earned about $8.70, before the effect of borrowing. For a lender the balance sheet is the business, so the return on equity and on assets have to be read together.

Two numbers rate a bank: ROE, what it earns on shareholders’ money, and ROA, what it earns on all its assets. An ROE above about 13 to 15% is healthy; below that, net worth grows slowly.

That is above the level a bank needs to grow its net worth steadily.

Why ROE moved: profit grew 21.6% a year over 4 years while net worth grew more slowly. When earnings recover faster than net worth builds up, ROE climbs off its low.

For a bank, borrowing is the raw material of the business, not a warning sign: it borrows money in order to lend it out. Its safety is read through its returns and its loans. Its safety is read from the bad-loan figures and the return on equity instead.

For a manufacturer, debt is a claim on its profits. For a lender it is the stock it trades in, so the usual debt-to-equity test would mislead and is not used here.

7.8% of LendingTree, Inc.'s tradable shares are in short positions, which are bets that the price will fall, so some traders are betting against it. At normal trading volumes, closing those positions would take about 3.3 days. US companies do not publish a quarter-by-quarter list of owners, so this page uses short interest instead.

There is no quarter-by-quarter list of owners here, so we look at short interest: the share of tradable shares held in short positions, which gain if the price falls.

It is a single reading at one point in time; we do not have its history.

Why it is at this level: the figure does not say who has the short positions or why, so we show the level without guessing the story.

For LendingTree, Inc., the Z-score is not used, because it was built for manufacturers, not lenders. For a lender, safety is read from its capital and bad-loan figures instead.

The Z-score estimates how far a company is from balance-sheet trouble. Above about 3 is safe; below about 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not used for banks and lenders.

61.9 out of 100, rank 1 of 5 in Financial Conglomerates, with 67% of the evidence available.

LendingTree, Inc. scores 61.9 out of 100 against the 5 companies it is compared with in Financial Conglomerates, ranking 1. The evidence is balanced: no factor stands out, so another reported quarter is needed before the picture is clearer.

The four parts add up to the total exactly: 22.4 + 17 + 14.2 + 8.3 = 61.9. This is the same number shown on the industry page; it is worked out once for the whole group and read here.

What would change it: The score would fall if ROA turns down or gross NPA rises while the share price lags its sector.

LendingTree ranks 1 of 5 Financial Conglomerates companies on the 4-Factor Sector Score, with 61.9 out of 100.

Missing figures are not scored as bad. They lower the confidence and pull the final score toward the middle. Relative strength counts only when the company has a reading for this week; with no reading, that factor is left out and its 20 points are shared across the other three in proportion. Financial companies use P/BV÷ROE and asset quality; PEG, industrial OPM and ROCE are excluded. Under relative strength, one mark per week shows the last 12 weeks: a mark is filled where the company led S&P 500 by 5% or more over the 13 weeks ending that week, which is the same test used everywhere on this site. Price stage places the company on the same six-step path the industry is placed on (basing, turning, breaking out, leader, fading, asleep), read from how many weeks running it has led S&P 500 and whether that lead is growing or shrinking. It describes where the share price stands, not the direction of earnings, and it is not a recommendation; it is left blank for a company whose weekly history is too short or too stale to read.

The figures in this ranking come from the industry comparison: results through the Sep 2026 quarter, and the P/E at that quarter's end. The sections above use the latest weekly price, so a P/E or return there can differ a little from the one here. The stage words in this ranking (such as losing its lead or breaking out) describe the lead over the index, not the price phase in the price section.

Related companies: Financial Conglomerates, all 5 compared on one page.

LendingTree is the 5th largest of 6 Financial Conglomerates companies on Sector Alpha by market value (scores of 4 November 2026). Just above it: ORIX Corporation, Freedom Holding Corp., Voya Financial, Inc. and Hilltop Holdings Inc. Just below it: BRC Group Holdings, Inc.

Financial Conglomerates companies close in size

1. ORIX Corporation $40 billion
2. Freedom Holding Corp. $11.9 billion
3. Voya Financial, Inc. $9.5 billion
4. Hilltop Holdings Inc. $2.1 billion
5. LendingTree, Inc. $539 million
6. BRC Group Holdings, Inc. $154 million

All 6 Financial Conglomerates companies, largest first

Companies close in size in other industries

2976. Assembly Biosciences, Inc. $406 million · Biotechnology
2977. Kamada Ltd. $405 million · Drug Manufacturers - Specialty & Generic
2978. LendingTree, Inc. $405 million
2979. Verra Mobility Corporation $404 million · Information Technology Services
2980. Dingdong (Cayman) Limited $404 million · Grocery Stores

Sector Alpha, written by code from the published numbers. Data as of 4 November 2026.

Every chart on this page is drawn by code from the published figures, with no forecasts and no price opinions.

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