JBS N.V. share price today

JBS N.V.'s share price was $12.96 at the close on 4 November 2026. It has been falling for 2 weeks. That is 7.9% below its average price over the last 200 trading days. In the last 52 weeks it traded between $12 and $18, and at that close it sat 21% of the way up from that low.

A share price tends to move through four phases: moving sideways (stage 1), rising (stage 2), stalling near a high (stage 3) and falling (stage 4). Today JBS N.V. is in stage 4. The phase helps read everything below.

Over the past 13 weeks it has done worse than the S&P 500, and it has been behind for 3 weeks running.

Over the last 1 year the share price moved −5% while the S&P 500 moved +29%, so it is behind the index over that whole period. It was last ahead over 13 weeks in the week of 16 October 2026. The chart above shows the 13-week comparison for every week.

This page treats a rise as over when the price closes below its 200-day average on two Fridays in a row.

JBS N.V. has 1 quarter of declared dividends on file, too few for a 12-month total. The most recent declaration was $1.00 for Mar 2026.

A dividend is cash paid out for each share. The 12-month total is the four most recent quarters added together.

JBS N.V. declared a dividend in 1 of the last 12 reported quarters, most recently $1.00 for Mar 2026. That is fewer than four quarters, so no 12-month total is shown.

JBS N.V. is not in the Nasdaq 100, the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones 30, and is not on the US tech stocks list.

JBS N.V. posted a net loss of $102 M in the Jun 2026 quarter. Full-year FY25 profit was $2.0 B. Over 4 years profit has grown −13.9% a year on average. That loss is 0.4% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned $528 M. 1 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Net profit is what is left after every cost, interest and tax. Earnings per share, dividends and book value all grow from it.

Jun 2026 profit was −$102 M, −119.3% on a year earlier. For the full year, FY25 profit was $2.0 B (+14.6% on the year before).

Why profit moved: revenue changed +13.8% on a year earlier and the margin moved −2.5 percentage points. Sales did the work while the margin got thinner.

On average over the last four quarters, profit changed −47.7% and revenue +13.3%. Profit is growing slower than sales: rising costs are taking part of the growth.

JBS N.V. reported $23.9 B of revenue in the Jun 2026 quarter, +13.8% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 4th quarter in a row with growth on the year before. Over 4 years it has grown 8.2% a year on average. The last full year, FY25, came in at $86.2 B.

Revenue is everything the company billed its customers in the period.

The last four reported quarters add to $91.2 B.

FY25 revenue was $86.2 B, +11.7% on the year before.

Recent pace: the last four quarters grew +13.3% on average, against 8.2% a year over the longer run, so this year is growing faster than its own long-run rate.

Is growth speeding up? Revenue over the last 12 months grew +13.4%, against +8.7% a year over the last 8 quarters (accelerating); profit over the last 12 months grew −47.8%, against +16.3% a year (rolling over).

JBS N.V.'s operating margin was 3.1% in the Jun 2026 quarter, 2.5 percentage points lower than the same quarter a year ago. Across 5 years it has been between 1.7% and 10.4%. The latest quarter is within that range.

Operating margin is what is left from every $100 of sales after the costs of running the business, before interest and tax. It shows pricing power and cost control.

Why the margin moved: operating margin changed −2.5 percentage points on the year while gross margin changed −2.7 points. So the drop came mostly from the gross margin, which means input costs and prices charged.

Over the last 3 years, 144% of JBS N.V.'s reported profit came in as cash from its operations, so the profit is backed by cash. In FY25 it brought in $2.9 B of operating cash against $2.0 B of profit. After $2.1 B of spending on assets, $833 M was left over as free cash.

The profit and loss account shows what was earned. The cash-flow statement shows the cash that actually came in. Comparing operating cash flow with profit is one of the best checks that a profit is real.

Cash-flow figures here are yearly, because quarterly cash statements are not published, so this section changes once a year.

Why: the cash figure is clear, but the day counts behind it are not in our data, so we show it without guessing the reason.

What to look at next: the main use of cash is spending on assets. The next section checks what that spending is building.

JBS N.V. does not report the customer, stock and supplier day counts a cash cycle needs, so this section looks at its spending on assets instead. It spent $5.1 B on assets over the last 3 years. Averaged over those years that is 2.0% of FY25 revenue a year.

Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid. Debtor days: how long customers take to pay. Inventory days: how long stock sits. The cash cycle: the whole loop, in days of sales.

Nothing is estimated in place of the missing day counts, so no cash-cycle chart is drawn.

Spending on assets: $5.1 B over the last 3 years.

In short: the cash is going into new capacity, not getting stuck in the daily cycle. The question is whether the new capacity earns.

JBS N.V.'s P/E is 12.3×, near the high end of its own history: higher than 85% of past readings. Its usual P/E (the middle reading) is 8.1×, over 1 year of weekly prices. This compares the share price with the company’s own past. It does not say what the business is worth.

P/E is the share price divided by a year's profit per share: how many dollars the market pays for each dollar of yearly profit.

Why the multiple is where it is: over the past year earnings per share moved +14.6% while the price moved −0.1%. Earnings did better than the price, which pulled the multiple down within its own range.

In short: the multiple is high against its own past, so the earnings trend underneath matters more than the multiple.

JBS N.V.'s business is giving mixed signals. There is no clear direction across the growth lines, with ROCE falling at 10.6%; each line tells part of the story. This is based on 12 quarters of 3 measures, with some gaps.

Every business is somewhere on a path of getting better or worse, and this section names where. The last 12 quarters of growth in revenue, profit and earnings per share, plus the return the business earns on its capital, are read as lines. Getting worse: the lines are falling. Turning around: a low point has just formed and the last few quarters are rising from it. Getting better: the rise from the low has lasted. Growing steadily: steady growth with healthy returns. Slowing from a peak: still high, but slowing. When the lines disagree the result is mixed; too little history means no reading. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the steady yearly rate that would turn the starting value into the latest one. It is the fairest way to compare growth over different periods. If the 1-year figure is much bigger than the 10-year one, recent growth is running faster than the long-run trend. A dash means there is no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss, where a growth rate means nothing.

Why it matters: when the lines disagree, each line above matters more than any single label.

This reading has some gaps: at least one line is short, or the return line is not the quarterly series, so treat it with a little more caution.

Compound annual growth rate (%)

Compound annual growth rate over each period, %. Revenue, profit and EPS come from yearly figures; the stock price row is price growth over the same periods. A dash means no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss.

JBS N.V. earned a ROE of 21% in FY25. That is up from a low of −2% in FY23. We cannot compare its return on capital used with its cost of capital from the data we have. It comes from a 2.3% net margin and 1.91× asset turnover (sales divided by assets).

Return on equity (ROE) is the profit the business earns on its shareholders’ money. We do not have the full capital split, so ROE is the longest history we can draw here.

Why the return is what it is (FY25): a 2.3% net margin × 1.91× asset turnover × 4.74× leverage (assets divided by equity) ≈ 20.8% on equity. The margin does its share; borrowing is a big part of it.

The 10.8% ROIC above is the latest reading, as reported. The yearly chart below shows FY25 at 13.9%, and the quarterly chart works out each 12-month window from the quarterly figures, so the readings differ by date, not by method.

JBS N.V. has total debt of $25.6 B against shareholder equity of $9.1 B as of Jun 2026, so its debt is 2.83× its equity. Year by year, that ratio went from 2.17 in FY21 to 2.52 in FY25. Keep that borrowing in mind when reading the returns on this page.

Debt-to-equity shows how much of the business is paid for with borrowed money. Lower is safer, and the direction matters as much as the level.

12.9% of JBS N.V.'s tradable shares are in short positions, which are bets that the price will fall, so a large group of traders is betting against it. At normal trading volumes, closing those positions would take about 7.3 days. US companies do not publish a quarter-by-quarter list of owners, so this page uses short interest instead.

There is no quarter-by-quarter list of owners here, so we look at short interest: the share of tradable shares held in short positions, which gain if the price falls.

It is a single reading at one point in time; we do not have its history.

Why it is at this level: the figure does not say who has the short positions or why, so we show the level without guessing the story.

For JBS N.V., the Z-score is 2.70. A Z-score above about 3 is safe and below about 1.8 signals danger, so this is in the grey area between the two. It estimates how far the balance sheet is from trouble; it is not a forecast of failure.

The Z-score estimates how far a company is from balance-sheet trouble. Above about 3 is safe; below about 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not used for banks and lenders.

Why it matters: a Z-score of 2.70 is in the grey area, neither clearly safe nor clearly in trouble.

41.3 out of 100, rank 23 of 30 in Packaged Foods, with 81% of the evidence available.

JBS N.V. scores 41.3 out of 100 against the 30 companies it is compared with in Packaged Foods, ranking 23. The valuation scores well, but earnings are not improving yet, so the business does not back up the low multiple so far.

The four parts add up to the total exactly: 12.1 + 9.8 + 14.9 + 4.5 = 41.3. This is the same number shown on the industry page; it is worked out once for the whole group and read here.

What would change it: The score would fall if profit growth turns negative or margins stop improving while the share price lags its sector.

JBS N.V. ranks 23 of 30 Packaged Foods companies on the 4-Factor Sector Score, with 41.3 out of 100.

Missing figures are not scored as bad. They lower the confidence and pull the final score toward the middle. Relative strength counts only when the company has a reading for this week; with no reading, that factor is left out and its 20 points are shared across the other three in proportion. PEG is not shown when the ratio cannot mean anything: the company must be making a profit, its price-to-earnings must be positive, and its three-year earnings growth must fall between 5% and 60%. Dividing a price multiple by a loss, or by growth measured off a tiny base, produces a number that looks precise and tells you nothing. Under relative strength, one mark per week shows the last 12 weeks: a mark is filled where the company led S&P 500 by 5% or more over the 13 weeks ending that week, which is the same test used everywhere on this site. Price stage places the company on the same six-step path the industry is placed on (basing, turning, breaking out, leader, fading, asleep), read from how many weeks running it has led S&P 500 and whether that lead is growing or shrinking. It describes where the share price stands, not the direction of earnings, and it is not a recommendation; it is left blank for a company whose weekly history is too short or too stale to read.

The figures in this ranking come from the industry comparison: results through the Sep 2026 quarter, and the P/E at that quarter's end. The sections above use the latest weekly price, so a P/E or return there can differ a little from the one here. The stage words in this ranking (such as losing its lead or breaking out) describe the lead over the index, not the price phase in the price section.

Related companies: Packaged Foods, all 30 compared on one page.

JBS N.V. is the 4th largest of 39 Packaged Foods companies on Sector Alpha by market value (scores of 4 November 2026). Just above it: The Kraft Heinz Company, General Mills, Inc. and The J. M. Smucker Company. Just below it: McCormick & Company, Incorporated, The Magnum Ice Cream Company N.V. and Hormel Foods Corporation.

Packaged Foods companies close in size

1. The Kraft Heinz Company $30.2 billion
2. General Mills, Inc. $19.2 billion
3. The J. M. Smucker Company $14.1 billion
4. JBS N.V. $13.9 billion
5. McCormick & Company, Incorporated $13.6 billion
6. The Magnum Ice Cream Company N.V. $12.9 billion
7. Hormel Foods Corporation $12.5 billion

All 39 Packaged Foods companies, largest first

Companies close in size in other industries

757. Penske Automotive Group, Inc. $13.9 billion · Auto & Truck Dealerships
758. RPM International Inc. $13.9 billion · Specialty Chemicals
759. JBS N.V. $13.9 billion
760. Five Below, Inc. $13.9 billion · Specialty Retail
761. Embraer S.A. $13.9 billion · Aerospace & Defense

Sector Alpha, written by code from the published numbers. Data as of 4 November 2026.

Every chart on this page is drawn by code from the published figures, with no forecasts and no price opinions.

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