GPGI share price today

GPGI, Inc.'s share price was $12.78 at the close on 4 November 2026. It has been falling for 10 weeks. That is 18.3% below its average price over the last 200 trading days. In the last 52 weeks it traded between $11 and $25, and at that close it sat 11% of the way up from that low.

A share price tends to move through four phases: moving sideways (stage 1), rising (stage 2), stalling near a high (stage 3) and falling (stage 4). Today GPGI, Inc. is in stage 4. The phase helps read everything below.

Over the past 13 weeks it has done worse than the S&P 500, and it has been behind for 8 weeks running.

Over the last 6 years the share price moved +30% while the S&P 500 moved +116%, so it is behind the index over that whole period. It was last ahead over 13 weeks in the week of 11 September 2026. The chart above shows the 13-week comparison for every week.

This page treats a rise as over when the price closes below its 200-day average on two Fridays in a row.

GPGI, Inc. pays no dividend. In the last 12 reported quarters it declared no dividend per share, so there is no payout history to chart and no yield to show. Companies like this usually keep their earnings in the business, so the cash-flow sections show where that cash goes.

GPGI is not in the Nasdaq 100, the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones 30, and is not on the US tech stocks list.

GPGI, Inc. earned ₹0.0 B of net profit in the Mar 2025 quarter, +261.8% on the same quarter a year earlier. The full FY25 year was a loss of ₹0.1 B. That is 36.0% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹0.0 B. 2 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Net profit is what is left after every cost, interest and tax. Earnings per share, dividends and book value all grow from it.

Why profit moved: revenue changed −42.5% on a year earlier and the margin moved −19.9 percentage points. Sales did the work while the margin got thinner.

On average over the last four quarters, profit changed −339.1% and revenue −5.2%. Profit is growing slower than sales: rising costs are taking part of the growth.

This company reports in its home currency, not US dollars, so the money charts are left out here. The figures in the text are in that currency (₹); nothing is converted.

GPGI, Inc. reported ₹0.1 B of revenue in the Mar 2025 quarter, −42.5% on the same quarter a year earlier. Over 4 years it has grown −31.3% a year on average. The last full year, FY25, came in at ₹0.1 B. The last four reported quarters add to ₹0.4 B.

Revenue is everything the company billed its customers in the period.

FY25 revenue was ₹0.1 B, −85.8% on the year before.

Recent pace: the last four quarters grew −5.2% on average, against −31.3% a year over the longer run, so this year is growing faster than its own long-run rate.

Is growth speeding up? Revenue over the last 12 months grew −5.8%, against −1.7% a year over the last 8 quarters (rolling over).

This company reports in its home currency, not US dollars, so the money charts are left out here. The figures in the text are in that currency (₹); nothing is converted.

GPGI, Inc.'s operating margin was 10.0% in the Mar 2025 quarter, 19.9 percentage points lower than the same quarter a year ago. Across 5 years it has been between −23.0% and 33.9%. The latest quarter is within that range.

Operating margin is what is left from every ₹100 of sales after the costs of running the business, before interest and tax. It shows pricing power and cost control.

Why the margin moved: operating margin changed −19.9 percentage points on the year while gross margin changed −5.1 points. So the drop came mostly from costs below the gross margin, such as staff and overheads, measured against sales.

Over the last 3 years, 670% of GPGI, Inc.'s reported profit came in as cash from its operations, so the profit is backed by cash. In FY25 its operations used ₹0.0 B of cash, against −₹0.1 B of profit. After null of spending on assets, free cash was ₹0.0 B: it spent more than its operations brought in.

The profit and loss account shows what was earned. The cash-flow statement shows the cash that actually came in. Comparing operating cash flow with profit is one of the best checks that a profit is real.

Cash-flow figures here are yearly, because quarterly cash statements are not published, so this section changes once a year.

Why: the cash figure is clear, but the day counts behind it are not in our data, so we show it without guessing the reason.

What to look at next: it spends almost nothing on new assets, so the cash goes on running the business. The next section shows the spending figures.

This company reports in its home currency, not US dollars, so the money charts are left out here. The figures in the text are in that currency (₹); nothing is converted.

GPGI, Inc. does not report the customer, stock and supplier day counts a cash cycle needs, so this section looks at its spending on assets instead. It spent ₹0.0 B on assets over the last 3 years. Nothing is estimated in place of the missing day counts, so no cash-cycle chart is drawn.

Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid. Debtor days: how long customers take to pay. Inventory days: how long stock sits. The cash cycle: the whole loop, in days of sales.

Spending on assets: ₹0.0 B over the last 3 years.

In short: almost nothing is being spent on new assets, so the cash goes on running the business.

This company reports in its home currency, not US dollars, so the money charts are left out here. The figures in the text are in that currency (₹); nothing is converted.

GPGI, Inc. has no P/E right now, because its earnings are negative. The revenue and margin sections are where a turn would show first. The P/E comes back here once profit turns positive.

P/E is the share price divided by a year's profit per share: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee of yearly profit.

GPGI, Inc.'s business trend cannot be read yet. There are fewer than eight usable quarters of growth figures, so there is not enough history to read the trend. This is based on 11 quarters of 2 measures, with some gaps.

Every business is somewhere on a path of getting better or worse, and this section names where. The last 12 quarters of growth in revenue, profit and earnings per share, plus the return the business earns on its capital, are read as lines. Getting worse: the lines are falling. Turning around: a low point has just formed and the last few quarters are rising from it. Getting better: the rise from the low has lasted. Growing steadily: steady growth with healthy returns. Slowing from a peak: still high, but slowing. When the lines disagree the result is mixed; too little history means no reading. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the steady yearly rate that would turn the starting value into the latest one. It is the fairest way to compare growth over different periods. If the 1-year figure is much bigger than the 10-year one, recent growth is running faster than the long-run trend. A dash means there is no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss, where a growth rate means nothing.

Why it matters: with too little history, we say so rather than guess a direction.

The latest quarter’s profit includes a one-off item bigger than the normal business, so the profit line is shown but does not count in this reading.

The return-on-capital line is not shown: net worth is negative, so a return on capital means nothing. The balance sheet is in distress, and this reading uses the growth lines alone.

One or more growth lines have an extreme jump caused by comparing with a near-zero or loss-making quarter. Those jumps are capped before reading and drawn at the edge of the chart, so one odd quarter does not decide the result.

There are fewer than eight usable quarters, so this page does not guess a direction from so little history.

Compound annual growth rate (%)

Compound annual growth rate over each period, %. Revenue, profit and EPS come from yearly figures; the stock price row is price growth over the same periods. A dash means no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss.

GPGI, Inc. earned a ROE of −56% in FY25. Its return on capital used (ROIC) is left out: on sales this small it reads 165%, a number that says nothing useful about the business. It comes from a −227.3% net margin and 0.12× asset turnover (sales divided by assets).

Return on equity (ROE) is the profit the business earns on its shareholders’ money. We do not have the full capital split, so ROE is the longest history we can draw here.

Why the return is what it is (FY25): a −227.3% net margin × 0.12× asset turnover × 2.13× leverage (assets divided by equity) ≈ −58.1% on equity. The margin does its share; borrowing is a big part of it.

GPGI, Inc.'s net worth is negative: it owes more than it owns, so a debt-to-equity ratio means nothing here. Year by year, that ratio went from −0.96 in FY21 to −1.41 in FY24. So the returns on this page come from the business, not from borrowed money.

Debt-to-equity shows how much of the business is paid for with borrowed money. Lower is safer, and the direction matters as much as the level.

This company reports in its home currency, not US dollars, so the money charts are left out here. The figures in the text are in that currency (₹); nothing is converted.

19.9% of GPGI, Inc.'s tradable shares are in short positions, which are bets that the price will fall, so a large group of traders is betting against it. At normal trading volumes, closing those positions would take about 19.1 days. US companies do not publish a quarter-by-quarter list of owners, so this page uses short interest instead.

There is no quarter-by-quarter list of owners here, so we look at short interest: the share of tradable shares held in short positions, which gain if the price falls.

It is a single reading at one point in time; we do not have its history.

Why it is at this level: the figure does not say who has the short positions or why, so we show the level without guessing the story.

For GPGI, Inc., the Z-score is 6.94. A Z-score above about 3 is safe and below about 1.8 signals danger, so this is well clear of danger. It estimates how far the balance sheet is from trouble; it is not a forecast of failure.

The Z-score estimates how far a company is from balance-sheet trouble. Above about 3 is safe; below about 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not used for banks and lenders.

Why it matters: a Z-score of 6.94 is well clear of the danger zone, so the balance sheet is not the risk here.

There is no score against its industry: GPGI, Inc. is not among the largest members shown in this industry comparison for Metal Fabrication.

The score ranks a company within its industry: each measure is scored against the other members. Without that group there is no score, so none is shown.

No sector comparison is shown here, not among the largest members shown in this industry comparison.

GPGI is the 6th largest of 12 Metal Fabrication companies on Sector Alpha by market value (scores of 4 November 2026). Just above it: Mueller Industries, Inc., Commercial Metals Company and ESAB Corporation. Just below it: Worthington Enterprises, Inc., Ryerson Holding Corporation and Proto Labs, Inc.

Metal Fabrication companies close in size

3. Mueller Industries, Inc. $12 billion
4. Commercial Metals Company $7.3 billion
5. ESAB Corporation $4.9 billion
6. GPGI, Inc. $3.7 billion
7. Worthington Enterprises, Inc. $3.2 billion
8. Ryerson Holding Corporation $1.6 billion
9. Proto Labs, Inc. $1.6 billion

All 12 Metal Fabrication companies, largest first

Companies close in size in other industries

1571. Independence Realty Trust, Inc. $3.7 billion · REIT - Residential
1572. Madison Square Garden Entertainment Corp. $3.7 billion · Entertainment
1573. GPGI, Inc. $3.7 billion
1574. ACADIA Pharmaceuticals Inc. $3.7 billion · Biotechnology
1575. Aya Gold & Silver Inc. $3.7 billion · Silver

Sector Alpha, written by code from the published numbers. Data as of 4 November 2026.

Every chart on this page is drawn by code from the published figures, with no forecasts and no price opinions.

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