TROOPS share price today

TROOPS, Inc.'s share price was $1.81 at the close on 4 November 2026. That is 31.7% below its average price over the last 200 trading days. In the last 52 weeks it traded between $1 and $5, and at that close it sat 17% of the way up from that low.

A share price tends to move through four phases: moving sideways (stage 1), rising (stage 2), stalling near a high (stage 3) and falling (stage 4). The phase helps read everything below.

Over the past 13 weeks it has done worse than the S&P 500, and it has been behind for 1 week running.

Over the last 1 year the share price moved +178% while the S&P 500 moved +23%, so it is ahead of the index over that whole period. It was last ahead over 13 weeks in the week of 30 October 2026. The chart above shows the 13-week comparison for every week.

This page treats a rise as over when the price closes below its 200-day average on two Fridays in a row.

TROOPS, Inc. pays no dividend. In the last 12 reported quarters it declared no dividend per share, so there is no payout history to chart and no yield to show. Companies like this usually keep their earnings in the business, so the cash-flow sections show where that cash goes.

TROOPS is not in the Nasdaq 100, the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones 30, and is not on the US tech stocks list.

TROOPS, Inc. posted a net loss of $26.9 M in the Dec 2025 quarter. The full FY25 year was a loss of $27.9 M. That loss is 284.3% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier lost $681 K. 11 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Net profit is what is left after every cost, interest and tax. Earnings per share, dividends and book value all grow from it.

TROOPS, Inc. reported $9.5 M of income in the Dec 2025 quarter, +27.0% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 4th quarter in a row with growth on the year before. Over 4 years it has grown 46.8% a year on average. The last full year, FY25, came in at $17.1 M.

For a bank, revenue is everything it earns: interest on its loans plus fees from its businesses.

FY25 revenue was $17.1 M, +69.7% on the year before.

Recent pace: the last four quarters grew +147.9% on average, against 46.8% a year over the longer run, so this year is growing faster than its own long-run rate.

Is growth speeding up? Revenue over the last 12 months grew +265.0%, against +84.6% a year over the last 8 quarters (accelerating).

TROOPS, Inc.'s net margin was −284.3% in the Dec 2025 quarter, 122.8 percentage points lower than the same quarter a year ago. Over the last four quarters it has moved −245.0 percentage points. Across 5 years it has been between −228.4% and −8.9%. The latest quarter is below every full year in that period.

Net margin is what the bank keeps from every $100 of revenue after every cost, provision for bad loans and tax. With big fee businesses in the mix, it is the clearest margin we can read for this bank.

Why: the net margin move is clear, but the cost details behind it are not in our data, so we show the move without guessing the reason.

TROOPS, Inc. does not report loan-quality figures this page can read, so this section says so rather than guess. No bad-loan figures are filed in a form this page can read, and none are guessed from the profit line. The income, margin and return sections carry what this business does report.

Gross NPA is the share of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what is left after the money the lender has already set aside for those loans. Falling is good; rising is a warning.

Why: loan quality drives a lender, but its details (new bad loans, recoveries, money set aside) are not in our data for this company. The sections around this one carry what we can back up.

TROOPS, Inc.'s revenue was $17.1 M in FY25, +69.7% on the year before, so the loan book is growing. The latest quarter was +27.0% on a year earlier. The net margin on that income is −284.3%, −122.8 percentage points on a year ago.

We read the loan book through revenue: when the book and the businesses grow, revenue grows with them. It is only a rough guide, because interest-rate changes and fee swings can move it a few points in any year.

Interest income stands in for the size of the loan book; changes in interest rates can move it a few points in any year.

In short: a lender grows well when its loan book grows, its margin stays steady and its loans stay clean. Quarterly loan-quality figures are missing here, so revenue growth and margin are the two we watch.

TROOPS, Inc.'s P/BV is 4.5×, in the middle of its own history: higher than 45% of past readings. Its usual P/BV (the middle reading) is 5.0×, over 1 year of weekly prices. This compares the share price with the company’s own past. It does not say what the business is worth.

For a bank or lender we compare the price with book value, the net worth on its balance sheet. P/BV is how many dollars the market pays for each $1 of that net worth. Below 1× means the market values it at less than its net worth.

Why the multiple is low: this lender earns about −48% a year on its equity. A lender that earns less on its net worth is valued lower for each dollar of it, and that gap usually closes only if returns improve.

In short: the multiple is about average against its own past, so the book value trend underneath matters more than the multiple.

TROOPS, Inc.'s business trend cannot be read yet. There are fewer than eight usable quarters of growth figures, so there is not enough history to read the trend. This is based on 10 quarters of 2 measures, with some gaps.

Every business is somewhere on a path of getting better or worse, and this section names where. The last 12 quarters of growth in revenue, profit and earnings per share, plus the return the business earns on its capital, are read as lines. Getting worse: the lines are falling. Turning around: a low point has just formed and the last few quarters are rising from it. Getting better: the rise from the low has lasted. Growing steadily: steady growth with healthy returns. Slowing from a peak: still high, but slowing. When the lines disagree the result is mixed; too little history means no reading. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the steady yearly rate that would turn the starting value into the latest one. It is the fairest way to compare growth over different periods. If the 1-year figure is much bigger than the 10-year one, recent growth is running faster than the long-run trend. A dash means there is no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss, where a growth rate means nothing.

Why it matters: with too little history, we say so rather than guess a direction.

The latest quarter’s profit includes a one-off item bigger than the normal business, so the profit line is shown but does not count in this reading.

One or more growth lines have an extreme jump caused by comparing with a near-zero or loss-making quarter. Those jumps are capped before reading and drawn at the edge of the chart, so one odd quarter does not decide the result.

The return figures here are yearly, not quarterly. They show level and direction only; they can support the growth lines but never decide the reading alone.

There are fewer than eight usable quarters, so this page does not guess a direction from so little history.

Compound annual growth rate (%)

Compound annual growth rate over each period, %. Revenue, profit and EPS come from yearly figures; the stock price row is price growth over the same periods. A dash means no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss.

TROOPS, Inc. earned a return on equity of −57% in FY25. That is its lowest yearly reading on file. On its assets, every $100 earned about −$13.57, before the effect of borrowing. For a lender the balance sheet is the business, so the return on equity and on assets have to be read together.

Two numbers rate a bank: ROE, what it earns on shareholders’ money, and ROA, what it earns on all its assets. An ROE above about 13 to 15% is healthy; below that, net worth grows slowly.

That return is below the level a bank needs to grow its net worth quickly, which helps explain why its multiple is where it is.

Why: the ROE chart shows the move, but the deposit-cost and bad-loan details behind it are not in our data.

For a bank, borrowing is the raw material of the business, not a warning sign: it borrows money in order to lend it out. Its safety is read through its returns and its loans. Its safety is read from the bad-loan figures and the return on equity instead.

For a manufacturer, debt is a claim on its profits. For a lender it is the stock it trades in, so the usual debt-to-equity test would mislead and is not used here.

6.2% of TROOPS, Inc.'s tradable shares are in short positions, which are bets that the price will fall, so some traders are betting against it. At normal trading volumes, closing those positions would take about 17.1 days. US companies do not publish a quarter-by-quarter list of owners, so this page uses short interest instead.

There is no quarter-by-quarter list of owners here, so we look at short interest: the share of tradable shares held in short positions, which gain if the price falls.

It is a single reading at one point in time; we do not have its history.

Why it is at this level: the figure does not say who has the short positions or why, so we show the level without guessing the story.

For TROOPS, Inc., the Z-score is not used, because it was built for manufacturers, not lenders. For a lender, safety is read from its capital and bad-loan figures instead.

The Z-score estimates how far a company is from balance-sheet trouble. Above about 3 is safe; below about 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not used for banks and lenders.

There is no score against its industry: TROOPS, Inc. is not among the largest members shown in this industry comparison for Credit Services.

The score ranks a company within its industry: each measure is scored against the other members. Without that group there is no score, so none is shown.

No sector comparison is shown here, not among the largest members shown in this industry comparison.

TROOPS is the 41st largest of 42 Credit Services companies on Sector Alpha by market value (scores of 4 November 2026). Just above it: Regional Management Corp., CPI Card Group Inc., High Templar Tech, Medallion Financial Corp. and Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. Just below it: X Financial.

Credit Services companies close in size

36. Regional Management Corp. $353 million
37. CPI Card Group Inc. $327 million
38. High Templar Tech Limited $276 million
39. Medallion Financial Corp. $228 million
40. Consumer Portfolio Services, Inc. $222 million
41. TROOPS, Inc. $221 million
42. X Financial $191 million

All 42 Credit Services companies, largest first

Companies close in size in other industries

3258. SEACOR Marine Holdings Inc. $250 million · Marine Shipping
3259. The E.W. Scripps Company $249 million · Broadcasting
3260. TROOPS, Inc. $249 million
3261. PAMT CORP $249 million · Trucking
3262. trivago N.V. $248 million · Internet Content & Information

Sector Alpha, written by code from the published numbers. Data as of 4 November 2026.

Every chart on this page is drawn by code from the published figures, with no forecasts and no price opinions.

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