Ridgepost Capital share price today

Ridgepost Capital, Inc's share price was $9.68 at the close on 4 November 2026. It has been stalling near its high for 3 weeks. That is 16.2% above its average price over the last 200 trading days.

A share price tends to move through four phases: moving sideways (stage 1), rising (stage 2), stalling near a high (stage 3) and falling (stage 4). Today Ridgepost Capital, Inc is in stage 3. The phase helps read everything below.

In the last 52 weeks it traded between $7 and $11, and at that close it sat 72% of the way up from that low. Over the past 13 weeks it has done better than the S&P 500, and it has stayed ahead for 3 weeks in a row.

Over the last 5 years the share price moved −19% while the S&P 500 moved +69%, so it is behind the index over that whole period. The chart above shows the 13-week comparison for every week.

This page treats a rise as over when the price closes below its 200-day average on two Fridays in a row.

Ridgepost Capital, Inc paid $0.15 per share over the last four reported quarters. The most recent declaration was $0.04 for Jun 2026. At today's price of $9.68 that is a yield of 1.55%, based on dividends already paid, not a forecast.

A dividend is cash paid out for each share. The 12-month total is the four most recent quarters added together.

Ridgepost Capital is not in the Nasdaq 100, the S&P 500 or the Dow Jones 30, and is not on the US tech stocks list.

Ridgepost Capital, Inc earned $8.5 M of net profit in the Jun 2026 quarter, +102.0% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 4th quarter in a row of profit growth. Full-year FY25 profit was $23.0 M. Over 4 years profit has grown 20.8% a year on average. That is 10.5% of the quarter's revenue.

Net profit is what is left after every cost, interest and tax. Earnings per share, dividends and book value all grow from it.

The same quarter a year earlier earned $4.2 M. 2 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

For the full year, FY25 profit was $23.0 M (+16.8% on the year before).

Why profit moved: revenue changed +11.3% on a year earlier and the margin moved +4.7 percentage points. Most of the change came from keeping more of each sale.

On average over the last four quarters, profit changed +107.3% and revenue +5.0%. Profit is growing faster than sales: fixed costs are spread over more sales, so each extra dollar of revenue adds more to profit.

Ridgepost Capital, Inc reported $80.9 M of income in the Jun 2026 quarter, +11.3% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 2nd quarter in a row with growth on the year before. Over 4 years it has grown 18.6% a year on average. The last full year, FY25, came in at $297 M.

For a bank, revenue is everything it earns: interest on its loans plus fees from its businesses.

The last four reported quarters add to $313 M.

FY25 revenue was $297 M, +0.3% on the year before.

Recent pace: the last four quarters grew +5.0% on average, against 18.6% a year over the longer run, so this year is growing slower than its own long-run rate.

Is growth speeding up? Revenue over the last 12 months grew +4.4%, against +9.9% a year over the last 8 quarters (rolling over); profit over the last 12 months grew +102.4%, against +302.5% a year (rolling over).

Ridgepost Capital, Inc's net margin was 10.5% in the Jun 2026 quarter, 4.7 percentage points higher than the same quarter a year ago. Across 5 years it has been between −3.2% and 14.8%. The latest quarter is within that range.

Net margin is what the bank keeps from every $100 of revenue after every cost, provision for bad loans and tax. With big fee businesses in the mix, it is the clearest margin we can read for this bank.

Why: the net margin move is clear, but the cost details behind it are not in our data, so we show the move without guessing the reason.

Ridgepost Capital, Inc does not report loan-quality figures this page can read, so this section says so rather than guess. No bad-loan figures are filed in a form this page can read, and none are guessed from the profit line. The income, margin and return sections carry what this business does report.

Gross NPA is the share of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what is left after the money the lender has already set aside for those loans. Falling is good; rising is a warning.

Why: loan quality drives a lender, but its details (new bad loans, recoveries, money set aside) are not in our data for this company. The sections around this one carry what we can back up.

Ridgepost Capital, Inc's revenue was $297 M in FY25, +0.3% on the year before, so the loan book is growing. The latest quarter was +11.3% on a year earlier. The net margin on that income is 10.5%, +4.7 percentage points on a year ago.

We read the loan book through revenue: when the book and the businesses grow, revenue grows with them. It is only a rough guide, because interest-rate changes and fee swings can move it a few points in any year.

Interest income stands in for the size of the loan book; changes in interest rates can move it a few points in any year.

In short: a lender grows well when its loan book grows, its margin stays steady and its loans stay clean. Quarterly loan-quality figures are missing here, so revenue growth and margin are the two we watch.

Ridgepost Capital, Inc's P/BV is 2.9×, near the low end of its own history: it has been lower only 29% of the time. Its usual P/BV (the middle reading) is 3.2×, over 5 years of weekly prices. This compares the share price with the company’s own past. It does not say what the business is worth.

For a bank or lender we compare the price with book value, the net worth on its balance sheet. P/BV is how many dollars the market pays for each $1 of that net worth. Below 1× means the market values it at less than its net worth.

Why the multiple is low: this lender earns about 7% a year on its equity. A lender that earns less on its net worth is valued lower for each dollar of it, and that gap usually closes only if returns improve.

Why the multiple is where it is: over the past year book value grew while the price moved −8.5%. Price and book value moved together, so the multiple stayed in its range.

Where the price move came from: over 5 years the price moved −5.0% a year; about +24.6% a year came from book-value growth and about −29.6 percentage points from the multiple (the market paying less). The split is approximate (price return minus book-value growth). It shows how much of the move came from the market paying a different multiple.

In short: the multiple is low against its own past, so the book value trend underneath matters more than the multiple.

Ridgepost Capital, Inc's business is giving mixed signals. Growth has been steadily positive, but ROE at 6.2% is below the 12% level needed to call it steady growth. This is based on 12 quarters of 4 measures.

Every business is somewhere on a path of getting better or worse, and this section names where. The last 12 quarters of growth in revenue, profit and earnings per share, plus the return the business earns on its capital, are read as lines. Getting worse: the lines are falling. Turning around: a low point has just formed and the last few quarters are rising from it. Getting better: the rise from the low has lasted. Growing steadily: steady growth with healthy returns. Slowing from a peak: still high, but slowing. When the lines disagree the result is mixed; too little history means no reading. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the steady yearly rate that would turn the starting value into the latest one. It is the fairest way to compare growth over different periods. If the 1-year figure is much bigger than the 10-year one, recent growth is running faster than the long-run trend. A dash means there is no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss, where a growth rate means nothing.

Why it matters: when the lines disagree, each line above matters more than any single label.

Compound annual growth rate (%)

Compound annual growth rate over each period, %. Revenue, profit and EPS come from yearly figures; the stock price row is price growth over the same periods. A dash means no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss.

Ridgepost Capital, Inc earned a return on equity of 6% in FY25. Its lowest yearly reading on file was −2% in FY23. On its assets, every $100 earned about $5.85, before the effect of borrowing. For a lender the balance sheet is the business, so the return on equity and on assets have to be read together.

Two numbers rate a bank: ROE, what it earns on shareholders’ money, and ROA, what it earns on all its assets. An ROE above about 13 to 15% is healthy; below that, net worth grows slowly.

That return is below the level a bank needs to grow its net worth quickly, which helps explain why its multiple is where it is.

Why ROE moved: profit grew 20.8% a year over 4 years while net worth grew more slowly. When earnings recover faster than net worth builds up, ROE climbs off its low.

For a bank, borrowing is the raw material of the business, not a warning sign: it borrows money in order to lend it out. Its safety is read through its returns and its loans. Its safety is read from the bad-loan figures and the return on equity instead.

For a manufacturer, debt is a claim on its profits. For a lender it is the stock it trades in, so the usual debt-to-equity test would mislead and is not used here.

7.8% of Ridgepost Capital, Inc's tradable shares are in short positions, which are bets that the price will fall, so some traders are betting against it. At normal trading volumes, closing those positions would take about 7.0 days. US companies do not publish a quarter-by-quarter list of owners, so this page uses short interest instead.

There is no quarter-by-quarter list of owners here, so we look at short interest: the share of tradable shares held in short positions, which gain if the price falls.

It is a single reading at one point in time; we do not have its history.

Why it is at this level: the figure does not say who has the short positions or why, so we show the level without guessing the story.

For Ridgepost Capital, Inc, the Z-score is not used, because it was built for manufacturers, not lenders. For a lender, safety is read from its capital and bad-loan figures instead.

The Z-score estimates how far a company is from balance-sheet trouble. Above about 3 is safe; below about 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not used for banks and lenders.

There is no score against its industry: Ridgepost Capital, Inc is not among the largest members shown in this industry comparison for Asset Management.

The score ranks a company within its industry: each measure is scored against the other members. Without that group there is no score, so none is shown.

No sector comparison is shown here, not among the largest members shown in this industry comparison.

Ridgepost Capital is the 54th largest of 90 Asset Management companies on Sector Alpha by market value (scores of 4 November 2026). Just above it: Patria Investments, Morgan Stanley Direct Lending Fund and Oaktree Specialty Lending Corporation. Just below it: Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc., Tortoise Energy Infrastructure Corporation and Barings BDC, Inc.

Asset Management companies close in size

51. Patria Investments Limited $1.6 billion
52. Morgan Stanley Direct Lending Fund $1.2 billion
53. Oaktree Specialty Lending Corporation $1.1 billion
54. Ridgepost Capital, Inc $1.1 billion
55. Goldman Sachs BDC, Inc. $1 billion
56. Tortoise Energy Infrastructure Corporation $960 million
57. Barings BDC, Inc. $933 million

All 90 Asset Management companies, largest first

Companies close in size in other industries

2389. Karat Packaging Inc. $1.1 billion · Packaging & Containers
2390. National Presto Industries, Inc. $1.1 billion · Aerospace & Defense
2391. Ridgepost Capital, Inc $1.1 billion
2392. Business First Bancshares, Inc. $1.1 billion · Banks - Regional
2393. Mercantile Bank Corporation $1.1 billion · Banks - Regional

Sector Alpha, written by code from the published numbers. Data as of 4 November 2026.

Every chart on this page is drawn by code from the published figures, with no forecasts and no price opinions.

See the plain-text version of this page.