Diebold Nixdorf share price today

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated's share price was $57.98 at the close on 4 November 2026. It has been moving sideways for 13 weeks. That is 22.5% below its average price over the last 200 trading days. In the last 52 weeks it traded between $55 and $89, and at that close it sat 9% of the way up from that low.

A share price tends to move through four phases: moving sideways (stage 1), rising (stage 2), stalling near a high (stage 3) and falling (stage 4). Today Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated is in stage 1. The phase helps read everything below.

Over the past 13 weeks it has done worse than the S&P 500, and it has been behind for 15 weeks running.

Over the last 3.2 years the share price moved +189% while the S&P 500 moved +76%, so it is ahead of the index over that whole period. It was last ahead over 13 weeks in the week of 24 July 2026. The chart above shows the 13-week comparison for every week.

This page treats a rise as over when the price closes below its 200-day average on two Fridays in a row.

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated pays no dividend. In the last 12 reported quarters it declared no dividend per share, so there is no payout history to chart and no yield to show. Companies like this usually keep their earnings in the business, so the cash-flow sections show where that cash goes.

Diebold Nixdorf is on one of our US lists: US tech stocks.

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated earned $16.2 M of net profit in the Jun 2026 quarter, +27.6% on the same quarter a year earlier. Full-year FY25 profit was $97.5 M. That is 1.7% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned $12.7 M. 3 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Net profit is what is left after every cost, interest and tax. Earnings per share, dividends and book value all grow from it.

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated reported $931 M of revenue in the Jun 2026 quarter, +1.7% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 4th quarter in a row with growth on the year before. Over 4 years it has grown −0.6% a year on average. The last full year, FY25, came in at $3.8 B.

Revenue is everything the company billed its customers in the period.

The last four reported quarters add to $3.9 B.

FY25 revenue was $3.8 B, +1.5% on the year before.

Recent pace: the last four quarters grew +5.3% on average, against −0.6% a year over the longer run, so this year is growing faster than its own long-run rate.

Is growth speeding up? Revenue over the last 12 months grew +5.4%, against +0.7% a year over the last 8 quarters (accelerating).

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated's operating margin was 8.3% in the Jun 2026 quarter, 0.4 percentage points higher than the same quarter a year ago. Its latest full-year margin is the highest it has ever reported. Across 5 years it has been between 0.7% and 8.8%. The latest quarter is within that range.

Operating margin is what is left from every $100 of sales after the costs of running the business, before interest and tax. It shows pricing power and cost control.

Across 5 years it has been between 0.7% and 8.8%, and FY25's 8.8% is the highest of them.

Why the margin moved: operating margin changed +0.4 percentage points on the year while gross margin changed −0.2 points. So the gain came mostly from costs below the gross margin, such as staff and overheads, measured against sales.

When margins are at a record, every ratio built on profit looks better than usual, so watch whether they hold.

Over the last 2 years, 3% of Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated's reported profit came in as cash from its operations, a gap worth watching. In FY25 it brought in $301 M of operating cash against $97.5 M of profit. After $37.4 M of spending on assets, $263 M was left over as free cash.

The profit and loss account shows what was earned. The cash-flow statement shows the cash that actually came in. Comparing operating cash flow with profit is one of the best checks that a profit is real.

Cash-flow figures here are yearly, because quarterly cash statements are not published, so this section changes once a year.

Why: the cash figure is clear, but the day counts behind it are not in our data, so we show it without guessing the reason.

What to look at next: the main use of cash is spending on assets. The next section checks what that spending is building.

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated does not report the customer, stock and supplier day counts a cash cycle needs, so this section looks at its spending on assets instead. It spent $79.7 M on assets over the last 3 years. Averaged over those years that is 0.7% of FY25 revenue a year.

Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid. Debtor days: how long customers take to pay. Inventory days: how long stock sits. The cash cycle: the whole loop, in days of sales.

Nothing is estimated in place of the missing day counts, so no cash-cycle chart is drawn.

Spending on assets: $79.7 M over the last 3 years.

In short: the cash is going into new capacity, not getting stuck in the daily cycle. The question is whether the new capacity earns.

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated's P/E is 26.9×, with too little history to compare. This compares the share price with the company’s own past. It does not say what the business is worth.

P/E is the share price divided by a year's profit per share: how many dollars the market pays for each dollar of yearly profit.

Where the price move came from: over 3 years the price moved +44.3% a year; about −50.7% a year came from earnings growth and about +95.0 percentage points from the multiple (the market paying more). The split is approximate (price return minus earnings growth). It shows how much of the move came from the market paying a different multiple.

In short: there is too little history to say whether the multiple is high or low for this company, so the earnings trend underneath matters more than the multiple.

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated's business trend cannot be read yet. There are fewer than eight usable quarters of growth figures, so there is not enough history to read the trend. This is based on 12 quarters of 2 measures, with some gaps.

Every business is somewhere on a path of getting better or worse, and this section names where. The last 12 quarters of growth in revenue, profit and earnings per share, plus the return the business earns on its capital, are read as lines. Getting worse: the lines are falling. Turning around: a low point has just formed and the last few quarters are rising from it. Getting better: the rise from the low has lasted. Growing steadily: steady growth with healthy returns. Slowing from a peak: still high, but slowing. When the lines disagree the result is mixed; too little history means no reading. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the steady yearly rate that would turn the starting value into the latest one. It is the fairest way to compare growth over different periods. If the 1-year figure is much bigger than the 10-year one, recent growth is running faster than the long-run trend. A dash means there is no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss, where a growth rate means nothing.

Why it matters: with too little history, we say so rather than guess a direction.

There are fewer than eight usable quarters, so this page does not guess a direction from so little history.

Compound annual growth rate (%)

Compound annual growth rate over each period, %. Revenue, profit and EPS come from yearly figures; the stock price row is price growth over the same periods. A dash means no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss.

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated earned a ROE of 9% in FY25. That is up from a low of −2% in FY24. Its return on capital used (ROIC) is 3.5 percentage points above its cost of capital, so growth here adds value, not just size. It comes from a 2.6% net margin and 0.99× asset turnover (sales divided by assets).

Return on equity (ROE) is the profit the business earns on its shareholders’ money. We do not have the full capital split, so ROE is the longest history we can draw here.

Why the return is what it is (FY25): a 2.6% net margin × 0.99× asset turnover × 3.49× leverage (assets divided by equity) ≈ 9.0% on equity. The margin does its share; borrowing is a big part of it.

The key test, return on capital used minus the cost of capital: 12.3% − 8.8% = +3.5 percentage points. The 8.8% is an estimate of this company's own cost of capital. Read the sign and size of the gap, not the decimals. Positive but thin: it creates value with little room for error.

The 12.3% ROIC above is the latest reading, as reported. The yearly chart below shows FY25 at 15.5%, and the quarterly chart works out each 12-month window from the quarterly figures, so the readings differ by date, not by method.

Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated has total debt of $1.1 B against shareholder equity of $977 M as of Jun 2026, so its debt is 1.14× its equity. Year by year, that ratio went from −2.94 in FY21 to 0.99 in FY25. Keep that borrowing in mind when reading the returns on this page.

Debt-to-equity shows how much of the business is paid for with borrowed money. Lower is safer, and the direction matters as much as the level.

10.6% of Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated's tradable shares are in short positions, which are bets that the price will fall, so a large group of traders is betting against it. At normal trading volumes, closing those positions would take about 12.8 days. US companies do not publish a quarter-by-quarter list of owners, so this page uses short interest instead.

There is no quarter-by-quarter list of owners here, so we look at short interest: the share of tradable shares held in short positions, which gain if the price falls.

It is a single reading at one point in time; we do not have its history.

Why it is at this level: the figure does not say who has the short positions or why, so we show the level without guessing the story.

For Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated, the Z-score is 2.11. A Z-score above about 3 is safe and below about 1.8 signals danger, so this is in the grey area between the two. It estimates how far the balance sheet is from trouble; it is not a forecast of failure.

The Z-score estimates how far a company is from balance-sheet trouble. Above about 3 is safe; below about 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not used for banks and lenders.

Why it matters: a Z-score of 2.11 is in the grey area, neither clearly safe nor clearly in trouble.

There is no score against its industry: Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated is not among the largest members shown in this industry comparison for Software - Application.

The score ranks a company within its industry: each measure is scored against the other members. Without that group there is no score, so none is shown.

No sector comparison is shown here, not among the largest members shown in this industry comparison.

Diebold Nixdorf is the 84th largest of 142 Software - Application companies on Sector Alpha by market value (scores of 4 November 2026). Just above it: Amplitude, Inc., Karooooo and BlackLine, Inc. Just below it: SoundHound AI, Inc., Adeia Inc. and Bitdeer Technologies Group.

Software - Application companies close in size

81. Amplitude, Inc. $2.1 billion
82. Karooooo Ltd. $2 billion
83. BlackLine, Inc. $2 billion
84. Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated $1.9 billion
85. SoundHound AI, Inc. $1.9 billion
86. Adeia Inc. $1.9 billion
87. Bitdeer Technologies Group $1.8 billion

All 142 Software - Application companies, largest first

Companies close in size in other industries

2000. The Gorman-Rupp Company $2 billion · Specialty Industrial Machinery
2001. Blackstone Mortgage Trust, Inc. $2 billion · REIT - Mortgage
2002. Diebold Nixdorf, Incorporated $1.9 billion
2003. Ziff Davis, Inc. $1.9 billion · Advertising Agencies
2004. World Kinect Corporation $1.9 billion · Oil & Gas Refining & Marketing

Sector Alpha, written by code from the published numbers. Data as of 4 November 2026.

Every chart on this page is drawn by code from the published figures, with no forecasts and no price opinions.

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