GMR Airports Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

GMR Airports Ltd trades at ₹98.1, in a confirmed uptrend and 16 weeks into that stage. That is −1.4% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 37% of a 52-week range of ₹89 to ₹114. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (5 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 16 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹98.1 it trades −1.4% versus its 200-day average and sits at 37% of its 52-week range (₹89–₹114).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.5 years the stock moved +794% while the NIFTY 500 moved +267% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (5 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-08-07) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

GMR Airports Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 19 July 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: LOSS_TO_BREAKEVEN_INFLECTION. Our fortnightly research layers last read it on 19 July 2026.

Our read, 19 July 2026. GMR Airports turned PAT-positive in FY26 for the first time in over a decade — driven by Delhi tariff reset and EBITDA up 47% YoY — with Bhogapuram launch, Hyderabad tariff revision, and interest cost compression as three named catalysts for FY27 earnings continuation.

From the numbers. PE of 563 sits at the 75th percentile of own 10-year history, but the metric is not a useful valuation anchor — the trailing EPS base of 0.17 reflects a one-time PAT of 472 Cr that includes a 168 Cr tax credit and…

From the price. Price stage 2, week 16 — below its 200-day line, relative strength falling.

From the research. GMR Airports turned PAT-positive in FY26 for the first time in over a decade — driven by Delhi tariff reset and EBITDA up 47% YoY — with Bhogapuram launch, Hyderabad tariff revision, and interest cost compression as…

🚨 Where they disagree. PE of 563 sits at the 75th percentile of own 10-year history, but the metric is not a useful valuation anchor — the trailing EPS base of 0.17 reflects a one-time PAT of 472 Cr that includes a 168 Cr tax credit and recurrent other-income well above operating earnings. The cycle-normalized EPS bridge produces -0.11 Cr per share using normalized OPM and other-income, making the normalized PE not computable (negative denominator). The relevant cycle signal is the EBITDA trajectory: 1727 Cr FY23, 2972 Cr FY24, 3775 Cr FY25, 5757 Cr FY26 — consistent compounding off a low operating-leverage base driven by traffic recovery and then the tariff reset. The PE percentile rating of 75th is a data…

What is proven. GMR Airports turned PAT-positive in FY26 for the first time in over a decade — driven by Delhi tariff reset and EBITDA up 47% YoY — with Bhogapuram launch, Hyderabad tariff revision, and interest cost compression as three named catalysts for FY27 earnings continuation.

🚨 What would change our mind. Two consecutive quarters of flat or declining EBITDA (at group level) despite Bhogapuram contributing — specifically if quarterly EBITDA falls below the prior year comparable quarter despite the tariff base being in — because that would indicate operating costs are rising faster than tariff-driven revenues, invalidating the operating-leverage case. Additionally, an adverse Hyderabad tariff order that does not incorporate the 600 Cr carried-forward revenue (per C030) would structurally lower the…

🚨 Layer 1 read, 19 July 2026 — DROP. First profitable year in a decade on the Delhi tariff reset — real EBITDA turn, but PE is a broken-denominator artifact and PAT quality is thin. GMR crossed into its first annual profit since the merger (Rs472 Cr vs a Rs817 Cr loss) because the Delhi tariff reset stepped aero revenue up 127% and group EBITDA compounded 47% to Rs5757 Cr with margins expanding three years running. The headline PE 561 is meaningless — it is the arithmetic of a Rs0.29 EPS off a decade of losses, not a peak multiple — but the quarterly PAT is thin (Q4 was 42% one-off tax credit and other income) and management admits H1 FY27 margin pressure, so I keep it P2.

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Two consecutive quarters of flat/declining group EBITDA despite Bhogapuram contributing (per thesis.would_change_my_mind) — that would break the operating-leverage case; equally a Hyderabad tariff order that omits the 600 Cr carried-forward revenue would structurally lower earning power. A clean quarter of operating PAT (ex one-offs) rising would instead lift it toward P1.

The test written in advance. Debt load at 5.5x net debt to EBITDA — zero margin for error — Debt load at 5.5x net debt to EBITDA — zero margin for error by the next result.

The test written in advance. OPM at 78th percentile — margin-at-peak dig unresolved — OPM at 78th percentile — margin-at-peak dig unresolved by the next result.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: Borrowings rising despite PAT turning positive — alarming leverage increase The research reads it further: Borrowings rose because Bhogapuram construction drew on committed facilities (CWIP rose from 1674 Cr in Mar 2024 to 5433 Cr in Mar 2026 as the airport nears completion). The debt increase is endpoint-loaded on a near-complete asset — once Bhogapuram launches in Q2 FY27, new debt drawdowns stop and depreciation begins offset. The management framing of net debt to EBITDA trajectory (5.5x to below 4x in the management-guided period (C033)) is the correct monitoring metric, not absolute debt.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: OCF/PAT -10.41x suggests operations are massively diverging from earnings — potential accrual inflation or cash drain The research reads it further: The -10.41x 3-year ratio is mechanically distorted by the sign mismatch: OCF was positive (12207 Cr over 3 years) but PAT was negative (-1173 Cr). This is the signature of a capital-heavy infrastructure business where high depreciation and interest charge the P&L while OCF is sustained by EBITDA. The FY26 single-year OCF-to-PAT of 10.35x (C047) is a better read — and it shows OCF running well above PAT because PAT of 472 Cr is artificially low relative to EBITDA (C029) after depreciation (C044) and interest (C043).

Lever 1 · Operating leverage — BUILDING. Delhi aero revenue rose 161% YoY in Q1 FY26 on revised tariffs effective mid-April 2025 — now the single largest EBITDA driver in the portfolio. What proves it keeps working: Delhi tariff reset — aero revenue step-up. It stops working if Delhi concession agreement is challenged or a Supreme Court order reverses the AERA tariff structure — management disclosed the Delhi tariff arbitration matter is pending a Supreme Court hearing and refused to guide on timeline.

Lever 3 · Management change — BUILDING. Bhogapuram is 98.7% complete (Mar 2026) with Q2 FY27 commercial launch guided — expected to contribute 2.25 million passengers on a 9-month basis in FY27. What proves it keeps working: Bhogapuram new airport — commercial launch Q2 FY27. It stops working if Commercial launch delays beyond Q3 FY27 — Bhogapuram had already been delayed once (original Dec 2026 target) and the incremental depreciation and interest from FY27 accumulate regardless of launch timing.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix — BUILDING. Hyderabad refinancing at 7.6% already saved 150 bps; Delhi and GAL refinancing in FY27 targeting 100-150 bps additional savings — a 400-600 Cr annual EBITDA-to-PAT uplift on 40000+ Cr debt. What proves it keeps working: Interest cost reduction — refinancing pipeline FY27. It stops working if Rating upgrade trajectory stalls — if Hyderabad traffic softens materially in H1 FY27 as guided, EBITDA coverage could slip and prevent the AA → AAA step that enables the cheapest refinancing tranches.

Lever 4 · Paying down debt — BUILDING. Non-aero revenues now exceed 50% of consolidated income; duty-free SPP at Delhi rose to 1033 in Q1 FY26 from 1019 in Q1 FY25, with Hyderabad F&B, cargo city, and hotel agreements as the next legs. What proves it keeps working: Non-aero platform scaling — duty-free and adjacency.

Sources: our stock research file (19 July 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

GMR Airports Ltd reported ₹3,967 Cr of revenue in the Jun 26 quarter, +23.8% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 6.0% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹14,807 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹15,569 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹14,807 Cr (+42.2% on the year), capping 10 years at 6.0% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹3,967 Cr, +23.8% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +39.7% growth against the decade's 6.0% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +38.8% over the last 4 quarters against +30.5%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

GMR Airports Ltd's operating margin is 37.0% in the Jun 26 quarter, +1.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 6.0% to 50.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Why this happened. The Delhi tariff reset from mid-April 2025 is the foundational PAT-flip event. Aero revenues at Delhi rose 161% YoY in Q1 FY26 per the concall. This flipped Delhi's Q1 EBITDA to the highest level in 4 years and drove consolidated revenue from 10414 Cr in FY25 to 14807 Cr in FY26 — a 42% increase almost entirely from the tariff step-up rather than traffic growth. The tariff is regulatory, not market-driven, making it durable as long as the concession agreement holds. The TDSAT quashing of AERA's HRAB calculation in July 2025 additionally sets the stage for Delhi to claim under-recovery of aero revenues from control period 1 — a potential further yield uplift not yet in the numbers.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 37.0%, +1.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 6.0%–50.0%.

Why the margin moved: operating margin went +0.2 pp year on year while gross margin went −4.7 pp — the gain came mostly from the gross line: input costs and pricing.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

GMR Airports Ltd earned ₹148 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹472 Cr. That is 3.7% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier lost ₹137 Cr. 7 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Jun 26 profit was ₹148 Cr, null year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹472 Cr (null).

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 2 fiscal years 1,289% of GMR Airports Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY26 that was ₹4,884 Cr of operating cash against ₹472 Cr of profit. After ₹4,260 Cr of capital spending, ₹624 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹4,884 Cr against reported profit of ₹472 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹624 Cr after ₹4,260 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 2 fiscal years the conversion rate is 1,289% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 1,289%: the cash cycle tightened 395 days between FY21 and FY26 — cash that used to wait in the cycle now reaches the bank sooner.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 2.6× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

GMR Airports Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs −278 days in FY26, down from 117 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹13,330 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹14,807 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹40.6 Cr, so roughly ₹−11,278 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 15 days, inventory at 201 days — roughly 6.6 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of −278 days, tighter than FY21's 117.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 201 days to sell; customers pay about 15 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 494 days — netting out to the −278-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹14,807 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹40.6 Cr — so the −278-day loop keeps roughly ₹−11,278 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹13,330 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹5,213 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹5,520 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

GMR Airports Ltd earns a ROCE of 12% in FY26. That is up from a trough of −1% in FY16. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by −3.8 percentage points, so growth here is not yet paying for the capital it uses. The wiring behind it is 3.2% net margin on 0.27× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 12%, recovered from a FY16 trough of −1% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

🚨 Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 3.2% net margin × 0.27× asset turns × −19.86× balance-sheet leverage ≈ −17.2% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is modest — this is an earned return, not a borrowed one.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 8.2% − 12.0% = a −3.8 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. Negative — growth at these returns destroys value until the returns recover.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.

GMR Airports Ltd's net worth is negative — it owes more than it owns — so a debt-to-equity ratio is not meaningful here. On the annual view that ratio went from 13.89 in FY22 to −27.94 in FY26. The returns elsewhere on this page are therefore earned rather than borrowed.

Why this happened. Delhi duty-free concession takeover completed Q1 FY26; Hyderabad duty-free takeover guided for Q2 FY26 and confirmed. Delhi cargo terminal recorded highest-ever monthly tonnage in Dec 2025. GMR Cargo Logistics raised 7.5 billion NCD for cargo city development. Hotel agreements signed: Waldorf (150 rooms) and Hilton (350 rooms) at Delhi; Taj Vivanta (170 key) at Hyderabad. Non-aero income per passenger across the portfolio of Delhi, Hyderabad, and Mopa at 666 vs aero yield of 430. Management targets 15% sustainable non-aero growth as a medium-term objective.

Mar 26: total debt of ₹43,283 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹−1,549 Cr — a debt-to-equity of −27.94. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 13.89 (FY22) to −27.94 (FY26). The returns on this page are earned, not borrowed.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters added 8.1 points of GMR Airports Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 67.2% of the company. Foreign institutions moved −4.2 points over the same window, to 21.7%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

Why this happened. Construction progress: 80% complete Jun 2025, 87.5% Sep 2025, 95.8% Dec 2025, 98.7% Mar 2026. Management guided Q2 FY27 commercial launch, materially ahead of the original December 2026 target. The incremental revenue add from 2.25 million passengers on a 9-month basis in FY27 translates to new aero and non-aero revenue. Depreciation and interest burden: FY27 incremental depreciation 120 Cr (9 months at 4% on 4000 Cr assets) and interest 216 Cr (9 months at 9% on 3200 Cr debt). The airport removes night landing restriction disadvantages of legacy Vizag airport — a structural traffic advantage for the Andhra Pradesh catchment.

The register over the last two years — Promoters: +8.1 points over 8 quarters to 67.2%; Foreign institutions: −4.2 points over 8 quarters to 21.7%; Domestic institutions: −0.6 points over 8 quarters to 5.1%.

Why the register moved: promoters drove it (+8.1 points), absorbed on the other side by foreign institutions (−4.2 points) — steady accumulation by institutions reading the same numbers this page reads.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

GMR Airports Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

Why this happened. The Hyderabad tariff revision is the second-most important PAT-lift catalyst after Bhogapuram. Prior management guidance had guided flat tariffs; the Q1 FY27 concall signaled upward yield revision based on expansion capex inclusion and 600 Cr carried-forward regulatory receivable from the prior control period (approximately 1000 Cr NPV). Hyderabad traffic was growing 11.29% in H1 FY26, constrained by 29 million capacity heading to 33 million. A positive tariff determination would be incremental to current run-rate EBITDA at Hyderabad and materially change the earnings trajectory for FY28.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

GMR Airports Ltd trades at 184.0× P/E, against too little history to rank. Its long-run median P/E is 186.0×, measured across 8.8 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 184.0× is against too little history to rank, against a long-run median of 186.0× measured over 8.8 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Put together: the multiple is unremarkable against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

Stage: No read Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

GMR Airports Ltd reads as no read on its fundamental arc. Under eight usable quarters on the growth trio — not enough history for an honest trajectory read. The read is built from 12 quarters across 1 curve, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: with too little history, an honest page says so instead of guessing a trajectory.

The return-on-capital curve is not shown — net worth is negative, so a return on capital is not a meaningful number in any basis. This is a distressed balance sheet, and the stage is read from the growth curves alone.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Fewer than eight usable quarters on the growth curves — this page will not guess a trajectory from a stub of history.

4-Factor Sector Score

50.8/100 — rank 12 of 36 in Miscellaneous · 74% evidence confidence

GMR Airports Ltd scores 50.8 out of 100 against the 36 companies it is compared with in Miscellaneous, ranking 12. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 22.7 + 11.3 + 8.7 + 8.1 = 50.8. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What GMR Airports Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

Hyderabad Traffic Outlook Shifted from Growth to Flat · 13 August 2026. In Nov 2025, management expected Hyderabad traffic to grow 10% to 12% versus the prior year. In Aug 2026, it said FY27 traffic would be flat at 30.5 to 31 million passengers, a material deterioration in the forward growth outlook, although it attributed the weakness to geopolitical disruption and airline route rationalization. Because the periods differ, this is not a same-year guidance revision, but it represents a notable reset in the growth narrative that should be reconciled.

🚨 HRAB Resolution Timeline Has Slipped Materially · 13 August 2026. Earlier calls indicated that the HRAB recalculation and related proceedings could progress within 12 weeks, followed by an expected Supreme Court hearing in December 2025. By Aug 2026, management said hearings were still taking place and projected settlement another 3 to 6 months away. Although appeal risk had been acknowledged earlier, the latest call did not explain why the expected timeline had slipped so materially.

Maintenance Capex Guidance Increased More Than Twofold · 13 August 2026. In Nov 2025, management characterized annual operational capex for Delhi and Hyderabad together as INR500 crore to INR700 crore. In Aug 2026, it guided to INR1,500 crore to INR1,600 crore for the same two airports, more than double the prior upper bound, in addition to separate Nagpur and real-estate capex. Management did not reconcile the sharp increase or identify a new driver, creating a material difference for cash flow and leverage models.

🚨 Delhi Revenue Share Guidance Reversal · 14 February 2026. In the November 2025 call, management advised analysts that the effective revenue share for Delhi Airport would remain below the 46% headline rate (approximately 43-44%) due to specific exclusions allowed under the concession agreement. However, in the February 2026 call, management reversed this guidance, explicitly instructing analysts to use the 46% headline figure for their modeling despite the continuing presence of those exclusions. Earlier call (Nov 2025): “It will not be 46%, but it will be less than that. ... So, we should take this 43%-44% as a revenue share for future projections.” Later call (Feb 2026): “purely from a modeling perspective, you should continue with the 46% headline number. There could be some slight ups and downs due to inclusions or exclusions under the OMDA.”

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

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