Lupin Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Lupin Ltd trades at ₹2,235, in a confirmed uptrend and 36 weeks into that stage. That is −1.0% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 54% of a 52-week range of ₹1,931 to ₹2,496. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (2 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 36 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹2,235 it trades −1.0% versus its 200-day average and sits at 54% of its 52-week range (₹1,931–₹2,496).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.5 years the stock moved +29% while the NIFTY 500 moved +284% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (2 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-07-31) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

Lupin Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 17 May 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: CYCLE_BOTTOM_TO_EARLY_EXPANSION. Still open: Tolvaptan generic penetration below 40% today but sole-generic exclusivity expiry September 2026 will drive high single-digit to low double-digit US revenue erosion in FY27 on a ₹1.318B base.

Our read, 17 May 2026. A pharma turnaround fully repriced at 3rd-percentile PE — FY26 proved execution; FY27 is the margin-reset year before the biosimilar ramp compounds.

From the numbers. PE at 3rd percentile of 10-year range (21.1x vs median 29.8x) — CYCLE_BOTTOM / GOLDEN_SETUP. Earnings-driven compression: EPS ₹116 FY26 vs ₹71 FY25 vs ₹42 FY24 while price has not re-rated. FIIs steadily buying from…

From the price. Price stage 2, week 36 — below its 200-day line, relative strength falling.

From the research. A pharma turnaround fully repriced at 3rd-percentile PE — FY26 proved execution; FY27 is the margin-reset year before the biosimilar ramp compounds.

🚨 Where they disagree. PE at 3rd percentile of 10-year range (21.1x vs median 29.8x) — CYCLE_BOTTOM / GOLDEN_SETUP. Earnings-driven compression: EPS ₹116 FY26 vs ₹71 FY25 vs ₹42 FY24 while price has not re-rated. FIIs steadily buying from 14.99% (Sep 2023) to 22.04% (Dec 2024). The near-term FY27 compression is already priced into guidance; re-rating catalyst is biosimilar FY28 step-up.

What is proven. A pharma turnaround fully repriced at 3rd-percentile PE — FY26 proved execution; FY27 is the margin-reset year before the biosimilar ramp compounds.

What is not proven yet. Tolvaptan generic penetration below 40% today but sole-generic exclusivity expiry September 2026 will drive high single-digit to low double-digit US revenue erosion in FY27 on a ₹1.318B base.

Layer 1 read, 19 July 2026 — KEEP. Real earnings engine but at the FY26 peak — FY27 is a guided down-year, so hold not chase. Lupin's per-share earnings genuinely tripled (EPS ₹42→₹116.65) and the 12-quarter engine is still improving (OPM 18%→33%), which is why the PE sits at the 3rd percentile — a de-rating, not a knife. But FY26 is the earnings peak: management guides a deliberate FY27 margin reset to ~25% EBITDA with the Tolvaptan patent cliff certain in Sep-2026 [C031/C034], so the easy part of the move is behind it.

What would change Layer 1’s mind. A boom-exit case (not a keep) would fire if FY27 US revenue erosion post-Tolvaptan runs deeper than the guided high-single/low-double digit AND biosimilar revenue fails to double off $70M — i.e. the F_BEAR double-cliff with EBITDA below 23% — because then FY27-28 earnings fall and the de-rating stops being 'compounder' and becomes 'peaked cyclical'.

Layer 2 read, 19 July 2026 — ADVANCE. Held pharma compounder — external sector tailwind confirms the thesis holds even though the valuation cushion is gone. This is an existing holding at its FY26 earnings peak with a guided-down FY27 (EBITDA reset ~25%) — the low 3rd-percentile PE reflects that coming reset, not a cheap trough. But externally the sector wind is a net TAILWIND with MODERATE_HIGH conviction (defensive domestic growth + US generics/CDMO inflection + rupee tailwind), and the sector run is genuinely earnings-led (profit +78% vs multiple +13%) [sector_timeline C1/C2]. No external negative finding flips the held thesis, so it advances.

What would change Layer 2’s mind. A NEW external negative would flip this to DROP: the US pharma tariff being APPLIED to Indian generics (not paused), OR an FDA escalation on Ankleshwar/Pithampur (R3) surfacing in a Tier-1 source, OR the sector_wind turning HEADWIND — any of which removes the offsetting catalyst behind the TOPPING sector.

Layer 3 read, 19 July 2026 — DEPLOY. Clean management sweep + only FDA-remediation at MEDIUM — the real risks are the pre-announced FY27 Tolvaptan/Mirabegron reset, not hidden. L3 clears LUPIN: no stock-specific SEBI/fraud red flag surfaced and the 9-type taxonomy tops out at MEDIUM on FDA remediation (Ankleshwar Form 483, offset by cleared Nagpur/Goa). The two HIGH Timeline risks — the September-2026 Tolvaptan sole-generic expiry and the Mirabegron Feb-vs-May credibility gap — are earnings-specific and largely already reflected in the openly-guided ~470bps FY27 EBITDA step-down [timeline R1/R2/R4]. Management earns PASS on a proven beat-and-raise record and a ₹4,636 Cr net-cash sheet [timeline scores.management, capital-allocation 8/10].

What would change Layer 3’s mind. A THIRD said-vs-delivered contradiction beyond Mirabegron (e.g. FY27 EBITDA landing materially below the guided ~25% without the Tolvaptan/R&D explanation holding), OR an FDA escalation of Ankleshwar Form 483 to a Warning Letter that delays biosimilar/ANDA approvals — either would flip mgmt to WATCHLIST and escalate regulatory risk to HIGH.

The test written in advance. Tolvaptan Patent Cliff (September 2026) — high-margin US revenue erosion — Tolvaptan Patent Cliff (September 2026) — high-margin US revenue erosion Q2 FY27 US revenue post-September Tolvaptan expiry vs management base case by the next result.

The test written in advance. Mirabegron Competitive Timeline Inconsistency (management credibility gap) — Mirabegron Competitive Timeline Inconsistency (management credibility gap) Q1 FY27 concall — does management clarify the Mirabegron settlement timeline? Any third-party market entry announcement? by the next result.

The test written in advance. FDA Regulatory Risk (Ankleshwar Form 483, Pithampur Unit 2 remediation) — FDA Regulatory Risk (Ankleshwar Form 483, Pithampur Unit 2 remediation) Any EIR or Warning Letter from Ankleshwar; Pithampur Unit 2 resolution timeline by the next result.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix — BUILDING. Gross margin 73.3% (+410 bps) driven by product mix improvement — US complex injectables growing faster than base, in-licensed share reduced to 6% from 12%. What proves it keeps working: Complex Injectable + Biosimilar Mix Shift (structural gross margin). It stops working if Q2 FY27 US revenue post-September Tolvaptan expiry vs management base case.

Lever 1 · Operating leverage — BUILDING. Biosimilar revenue ~$70M expected to double or triple in FY27; Pegfilgrastim on-body filing FY27 launch FY28; Ranibizumab H2 FY27 with pre-filled syringe differentiation. What proves it keeps working: US Biosimilar Ramp (Pegfilgrastim doubling + Ranibizumab Europe). It stops working if Q2 FY27 US revenue post-September Tolvaptan expiry vs management base case.

Lever 10 · New geographies — BUILDING. Vizufarma acquisition closed Q4 FY26 (50-60M Euro revenues, 25% EBITDA target) — Italy and Spain opened; combined ophthalmology second-largest therapy area; portfolio leverage to Latin America and SE Asia. What proves it keeps working: European Specialty Expansion (Vizufarma integration + ophthalmology anchor). It stops working if Q2 FY27 US revenue post-September Tolvaptan expiry vs management base case.

Lever 15 · Market-share gains — BUILDING. India prescription FY26 ₹8,114 Cr (+10.6%, 1.1x IPM); Semanext (Semaglutide) ranked 2/3 in 9 days; chronic mix 66% targeting 70%; oral tablet FY27 to complete GLP-1 portfolio. What proves it keeps working: India Prescription Outperformance + Semaglutide / GLP-1 Entry. It stops working if Q2 FY27 US revenue post-September Tolvaptan expiry vs management base case.

Sources: our stock research file (17 May 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Lupin Ltd reported ₹8,277 Cr of revenue in the Jun 26 quarter, +32.1% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 7.0% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹27,958 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹29,968 Cr.

Why this happened. Vizufarma adds Italy and Spain (zero prior presence) to existing UK, Germany, France footprint. Ophthalmology growing double-digit annually. Management expects Vizufarma to exceed 100M Euro within 2-3 years through respiratory, biosimilar, immunosuppressant cross-sell into Italy/Spain infrastructure. Q1 FY27 integration begins. The acquisition was delayed from the CY2025 commitment (closed Q4 FY26 vs Nov 2025 guidance) — a credibility note.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹27,958 Cr (+23.1% on the year), capping 10 years at 7.0% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹8,277 Cr, +32.1% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +28.1% growth against the decade's 7.0% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +28.2% over the last 4 quarters against +20.0%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating; TTM profit +49.2% vs +55.8%/yr — rolling over.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Lupin Ltd's operating margin is 30.0% in the Jun 26 quarter, +2.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 1.3% to 29.0%. The current quarter is running above every full year in that window.

Why this happened. The structural driver of the entire Lupin thesis. FY26 gross margins expanded 410 bps to 73.3% not because of pricing but because of the portfolio shift — Tolvaptan and Mirabegron complex exclusivities, Risperdal Consta (Nanomi platform, CGT exclusive), and reduction of low-margin in-licensed products from 12% to 6% of revenue. This is irreversible. Even as Tolvaptan erodes, Pegfilgrastim (biosimilar, $70M doubling/tripling), Ranibizumab (pre-filled syringe differentiation over competitors), and Dalbavancin 505(b)(2) maintain the complex-product share. R&D at 7.5% of sales, 70% directed to complex pipeline, is the reinvestment sustaining this mix shift.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 30.0%, +2.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 1.3%–29.0%, and FY26's 29.0% is the top of that band — a record year.

Why the margin moved: operating margin went +2.0 pp year on year while gross margin went +3.0 pp — the gain came mostly from the gross line: input costs and pricing.

Worth repeating from the valuation section: cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap — a record margin flatters every ratio built on top of it.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Lupin Ltd earned ₹1,417 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +16.1% year on year. It is the 12th consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹5,355 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 9.0%. That is 17.1% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹1,221 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹1,417 Cr, +16.1% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹5,355 Cr (+62.0%), and the 10-year compound rate is 9.0%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +32.1% and the margin +2.0 pp — the quarter was margin-led: most of the profit growth came from keeping more of each sale.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +53.6% vs revenue +28.1%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 132% of Lupin Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY26 that was ₹7,334 Cr of operating cash against ₹5,355 Cr of profit. After ₹3,150 Cr of capital spending, ₹4,184 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹7,334 Cr against reported profit of ₹5,355 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹4,184 Cr after ₹3,150 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 132% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 132%: the cash cycle tightened 68 days between FY21 and FY26 — cash that used to wait in the cycle now reaches the bank sooner.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 1.6× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Lupin Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 181 days in FY26, down from 249 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹6,159 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹27,958 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹76.6 Cr, so roughly ₹13,864 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 86 days, inventory at 303 days — roughly 10.0 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 181 days, tighter than FY21's 249.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 303 days to sell; customers pay about 86 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 208 days — netting out to the 181-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹27,958 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹76.6 Cr — so the 181-day loop keeps roughly ₹13,864 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹6,159 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹3,742 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹1,016 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

Lupin Ltd earns a ROCE of 30% in FY26. That is up from a trough of −7% in FY22. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by +14.3 percentage points, so growth here adds value rather than only size. The wiring behind it is 19.2% net margin on 0.73× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 30%, recovered from a FY22 trough of −7% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 19.2% net margin × 0.73× asset turns × 1.70× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 23.8% on equity. Margin is doing the heavy lifting; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 26.3% − 12.0% = a +14.3 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. A spread this wide means every rupee reinvested creates more than a rupee of value — the engine compounds.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.

Lupin Ltd carries total debt of ₹6,616 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹22,513 Cr as of Jun 26, a debt-to-equity of 0.29 — effectively unlevered. On the annual view that ratio went from 0.34 in FY22 to 0.29 in FY26. The returns elsewhere on this page are therefore earned rather than borrowed.

Jun 26: total debt of ₹6,616 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹22,513 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.29. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 0.34 (FY22) to 0.29 (FY26). The returns on this page are earned, not borrowed.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Foreign institutions added 3.1 points of Lupin Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes foreign institutions to 22.4% of the company. Domestic institutions moved −2.1 points over the same window, to 24.6%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Foreign institutions: +3.1 points over 8 quarters to 22.4%; Domestic institutions: −2.1 points over 8 quarters to 24.6%; Promoters: −0.1 points over 8 quarters to 46.9%.

Why the register moved: rotation — foreign institutions +3.1 points against domestic institutions −2.1 points over 8 quarters, with promoters holding steady — one class of institutions handing the register to the other, not a verdict change by the people closest to the numbers.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Lupin Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

Lupin Ltd trades at 17.2× P/E, about the cheapest it has ever traded. Its long-run median P/E is 28.7×, measured across 10.5 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 17.2× is about the cheapest it has ever traded, against a long-run median of 28.7× measured over 10.5 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

One caveat before moving on: margins are the best this company has ever printed — cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap. If profitability mean-reverts, today's multiple is higher than it looks.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved +62.3% against a +13.9% price move — earnings outran the price, pushing the multiple DOWN its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +18.0%/yr price move, ~+29.1%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−11.1 pp from the multiple (compressing); over 10y, of the +3.5%/yr price move, ~+8.6%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−5.1 pp from the multiple (compressing). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is low against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

Stage: Mixed Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Lupin Ltd reads as mixed on its fundamental arc. Mixed — growth is normalizing off a hyper-growth base: profit growth has eased from +1746.6% at its peak to +49.2% but is still expanding, ROCE lifting at 34.5%. The read is built from 12 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why it matters: when the curves disagree, the per-curve reads above matter more than any single verdict.

4-Factor Sector Score

69.6/100 — rank 3 of 44 in Pharma - Formulators · 93% evidence confidence

Lupin Ltd scores 69.6 out of 100 against the 44 companies it is compared with in Pharma - Formulators, ranking 3. Acceleration candidate, not a confirmed leader: earnings are strong but sector-relative strength is -18.4% and the one-year return is 16.5%. Do not upgrade until sector-relative strength is above zero and another reported period confirms growth.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 29.9 + 19.1 + 16.3 + 4.3 = 69.6. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What Lupin Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

India Growth Target Discrepancy · 13 February 2026. Management continues to reiterate a strategic target of outperforming the India Pharmaceutical Market (IPM) by 1.2 to 1.3 times, yet performance has materially slowed to near-parity with the market. While the November 2025 call reported first-half prescription growth at 1.1 times the IPM, the February 2026 call revealed that the nine-month cumulative growth has dropped to 9.4% against an IPM growth of 9.3%. Earlier call (Nov 2025): “We remain confident that our India formulations business will continue to outperform the IPM by 1.2 to 1.3 times as we have stated in the past... the core prescription business grew by 8.8% YoY during Q2FY26, and 8.7% in H1, handsomely outperforming the IPM growth by 1.2x and 1.1x, respectively.” Later call (Feb 2026): “We remain confident that our India formulation business will continue to outperform IPM by 1.2 to 1.3 times... For the nine-month period, our prescription business has grown 9.4% against IPM growth of 9.3%.”

European Acquisition Timeline Delay · 13 February 2026. The completion of the company's strategic European expansion has been delayed past the timeline previously committed to shareholders. In the November 2025 call, management stated the acquisition of VISUfarma was expected to close by the end of calendar year 2025, but in the February 2026 call, the acquisition (now referred to as Vipharm) was still pending with a revised closing target of the current quarter. Earlier call (Nov 2025): “The planned acquisition of VISUfarma... expected to close by 2025, will enhance both growth and margins, adding diversity across key European markets.” Later call (Feb 2026): “We expect this contribution to increase as we roll out our pipeline of complex products and complete the acquisition of Vipharm, which we expect to close this quarter.”

FY26 EBITDA Margin Guidance Raised · 7 November 2025. In the August 2025 call, management reiterated its full-year EBITDA margin guidance of 24% to 25% for FY26. However, in the November 2025 call, this guidance was raised by 100 basis points to a new range of 25% to 26%. This material upward revision was attributed to higher gross margins and lower fixed costs. Earlier call (Aug 2025): “As previously guided, we expect full-year EBITDA margins to be in the range of 24% to 25%.” Later call (Nov 2025): “We expect full year EBIDA margins to be in the range of 25 to 26% higher than our earlier guidance of 24 to 25%.”

FY27 EBITDA Margin Outlook Weakened · 7 November 2025. When asked about FY27 in the August 2025 call, management expressed optimism for 'continuous margin expansion.' However, in the November 2025 call, after raising the FY26 guidance to 25-26%, management guided for FY27 margins to be 'around 24, 25%'. This implies a potential margin contraction in FY27 from the new FY26 base, contradicting the prior optimistic tone of continuous expansion. Earlier call (Aug 2025): “The fact is we are playing for continuous margin expansion. This is on the back of, in fact, buoyancy on the top line...” Later call (Nov 2025): “we would think that we”.

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions