Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd trades at ₹214, in a confirmed uptrend and 14 weeks into that stage. That is +0.0% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 54% of a 52-week range of ₹176 to ₹246. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (2 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 14 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹214 it trades +0.0% versus its 200-day average and sits at 54% of its 52-week range (₹176–₹246).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 1.0 years the stock moved +13% while the NIFTY 500 moved −2% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (2 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-09-11) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 31 May 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: COMPRESSED_WITH_EARNINGS_GROWTH. Our fortnightly research layers last read it on 22 August 2026.

Our read, 31 May 2026. A niche B2B mangalsutra manufacturer delivering FY26 PAT +89% YoY at PE 17.5x (79% of its own median) — bridal entry, job-work-to-outright conversion, and capacity at 4,000 kg add three new growth vectors the market has not yet priced.

From the numbers. PE 17.5x vs 10Y median 22.1x (ratio 0.791) — MEAN_REVERT_OPPORTUNITY persists. FII stake expanded from 3.36% (Dec 2025) to 5.77% (Mar 2026) — +241 bps in one quarter. Promoter stable at 74.8% across all three quarters…

From the price. Price stage 2, week 14 — above its 200-day line.

From the research. A niche B2B mangalsutra manufacturer delivering FY26 PAT +89% YoY at PE 17.5x (79% of its own median) — bridal entry, job-work-to-outright conversion, and capacity at 4,000 kg add three new growth vectors the market has…

🚨 Where they disagree. PE 17.5x vs 10Y median 22.1x (ratio 0.791) — MEAN_REVERT_OPPORTUNITY persists. FII stake expanded from 3.36% (Dec 2025) to 5.77% (Mar 2026) — +241 bps in one quarter. Promoter stable at 74.8% across all three quarters since IPO. EPS moved from Rs 8.47 (FY25) to Rs 11.98 (FY26) — +41% YoY EPS growth while PE compressed from IPO levels, confirming market is pricing in gold-normalization risk rather than earnings deterioration.

What is proven. A niche B2B mangalsutra manufacturer delivering FY26 PAT +89% YoY at PE 17.5x (79% of its own median) — bridal entry, job-work-to-outright conversion, and capacity at 4,000 kg add three new growth vectors the market has not yet priced.

What is not proven yet. FY26 volume +15% YoY while revenue +57% — gold near-doubling did ~75% of the revenue work; a 20%+ gold correction compresses reported revenue to ~Rs 1,500-1,600 Cr TTM range without any demand deterioration.

Layer 1 read, 22 August 2026 — KEEP. Profits quadrupled while the shares got cheaper — cleanest setup here, but growth eats cash faster than it earns. Trailing profit went from about Rs 31 crore to Rs 121 crore in two years while the price-to-earnings multiple FELL from 26.6 to 18.4 and the share rose just 25% in a year — the market has not yet paid for the improvement, which is the exact shape this strategy hunts. The reason is real: organised chains keep opening stores, a mangalsutra sells at every one, and the organised share of revenue went from 34% to about half, with bridal and a switch from job-work to outright sales adding roughly three times the profit per converted client. What holds it at second tier is cash: three years of profit produced NEGATIVE Rs 303 crore of operating cash, because gold has to be paid for on delivery…

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Sharpening the timeline own falsification into the one observation that decides this: the September-2026 quarter free cash flow. Management stood in front of analysts in May and committed to positive free cash flow within about two quarters through the organised-customer shift. If that quarter shows free cash flow still negative WITH payable days still near 2 and receivables above 38, the model is confirmed to consume cash faster than it earns it, the Rs 476 crore of listing money is being…

Layer 2 read, 22 August 2026 — BENCH. Manufacturers have the better sector setup, but Shringar still has to turn profit into cash. FY26 revenue rose 57.1% and profit 89%, but volume grew only 15% as gold prices nearly doubled; this makes the headline growth less powerful than it first looks. The sector favors smaller manufacturers and the capital cycle is supportive, yet the same external record says inventory is not converting to cash, matching Shringar's own negative free cash flow from inventory and receivables.

What would change Layer 2’s mind. A filed Q2 FY27 result showing positive free cash flow would flip this BENCH to ADVANCE; failure after management's stated deadline would harden the negative case.

The test written in advance. Gold Price Dependency — Volume the Key Organic Signal — Gold Price Dependency — Volume the Key Organic Signal Quarterly volume (kg) growth — must sustain above 12% YoY to confirm organic demand independent of gold prices. by the next result.

The test written in advance. Management Governance — Historical SEBI Flag + Intra-Call Inconsistencies — Management Governance — Historical SEBI Flag + Intra-Call Inconsistencies by the next result.

The test written in advance. Negative FCF — Working Capital Expansion Tracking Revenue Growth — Negative FCF — Working Capital Expansion Tracking Revenue Growth by the next result.

Lever 5 · Regulatory approval — BUILDING. Organized retail clients — Tata, Birla, Reliance, Malabar, Kalyan — grew from 34% of FY25 revenue to 49% of FY26 revenue, providing payment discipline (Rs interest penalties for late payment) and repeating volume as each chain adds 50-100 stores annually. What proves it keeps working: Corporate Client Mix Shift (34% FY25 → 49% FY26, target 70-80%). It stops working if Quarterly volume (kg) growth — must sustain above 12% YoY to confirm organic demand independent of gold prices.

Lever 4 · Paying down debt — BUILDING. FY26 EBITDA +72% YoY on revenue +57% YoY — fixed-cost absorption from automation investment (Italian/Turkish/Chinese machinery allowing same 100 artisans to produce 3-4x output) confirmed across 4 quarters. What proves it keeps working: Operating Leverage (EBITDA growing at ~1.1-1.2x revenue growth). It stops working if Quarterly volume (kg) growth — must sustain above 12% YoY to confirm organic demand independent of gold prices.

Lever 3 · Management change — BUILDING. Capacity increased 60% to 4,000 kg in Q4 FY26 with modern machinery installed; FY26 blended utilization 87% confirms demand absorption; full 4,000 kg available for FY27. What proves it keeps working: Capacity Expansion (2,500 kg → 4,000 kg, 87% FY26 utilization). It stops working if Quarterly volume (kg) growth — must sustain above 12% YoY to confirm organic demand independent of gold prices.

Lever 9 · Buyback — BUILDING. Bridal commenced Q4 FY26 with Tanishq; Indriya and Malabar sequential approvals pending; management targets bridal reaching 30-35% of mangalsutra sales by FY27 end, with bridal representing 60% of total jewelry industry. What proves it keeps working: Bridal Jewelry Entry (new segment, Tanishq launched Q4, 30-35% of mangalsutra target by FY27 end). It stops working if Quarterly volume (kg) growth — must sustain above 12% YoY to confirm organic demand independent of gold prices.

Sources: our stock research file (31 May 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd reported ₹548 Cr of revenue in the Jun 26 quarter, +64.6% year on year. That is the 5th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 5 years it has compounded at 34.5% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹2,246 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹2,462 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹2,246 Cr (+57.1% on the year), capping 5 years at 34.5% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹548 Cr, +64.6% year on year — the 5th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +66.8% growth against the decade's 34.5% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd's operating margin is 9.0% in the Jun 26 quarter, −3.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across 6 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 3.7% to 7.0%.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 9.0%, −3.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 6 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 3.7%–7.0%, and FY26's 7.0% is the top of that band — a record year.

🚨 Why the margin moved: operating margin went −3.5 pp year on year while gross margin went −4.2 pp — the loss came mostly from the gross line: input costs and pricing.

Worth repeating from the valuation section: cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap — a record margin flatters every ratio built on top of it.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd earned ₹34.0 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +17.2% year on year. It is the 5th consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹115 Cr. The 5-year compound rate is 54.7%. That is 6.2% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹29.0 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹34.0 Cr, +17.2% year on year — the 5th consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹115 Cr (+88.5%), and the 5-year compound rate is 54.7%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +64.6% and the margin −3.0 pp — the quarter was revenue-led despite a thinner margin.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +79.6% vs revenue +66.8%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years −146% of Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — a gap worth watching. In FY26 that was ₹−282 Cr of operating cash against ₹115 Cr of profit. After ₹19.0 Cr of capital spending, ₹−301 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹−282 Cr against reported profit of ₹115 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹−301 Cr after ₹19.0 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is −146% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

🚨 Why conversion sits at −146%: the cash cycle stretched 69 days between FY21 and FY26 — more of each rupee of profit waits inside the cycle before arriving. Less than 70% of profit arriving as cash is the thing to watch on this page.

Router verdict: conversion is below par and the cash cycle has stretched 69 days — the next section's job is to find where the cash is stuck.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 116 days in FY26, up from 47 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹23.0 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹2,246 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹6.2 Cr, so roughly ₹714 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 38 days, inventory at 80 days — roughly 2.6 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 116 days, looser than FY21's 47.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 80 days to sell; customers pay about 38 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 2 days — netting out to the 116-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹2,246 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹6.2 Cr — so the 116-day loop keeps roughly ₹714 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹23.0 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹10.0 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹0.0 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the working-capital loop is the cash sink the router flagged — watch the cycle, not the P&L.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.⚠ unverified

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd earns a ROCE of 27% in FY26. That is up from a trough of 20% in FY23. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by +3.4 percentage points, so growth here adds value rather than only size. The wiring behind it is 5.1% net margin on 2.52× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 27%, recovered from a FY23 trough of 20% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 5.1% net margin × 2.52× asset turns × 1.32× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 17.0% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is modest — this is an earned return, not a borrowed one.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 15.4% − 12.0% = a +3.4 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. Positive but thin — value creation with little room for error.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.⚠ unverified

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd carries total debt of ₹189 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹678 Cr as of Mar 26, a debt-to-equity of 0.28 — effectively unlevered. On the annual view that ratio went from 0.61 in FY25 to 0.28 in FY26. The returns elsewhere on this page are therefore earned rather than borrowed.

Why this happened. The cost structure is now differentiated from artisanal peers. The automation investment is complete; incremental volume drops to EBITDA above the blended rate. EBITDA margin expanded 61 bps in FY26. The one-time Q4 drag (MCX hedging notional losses, exhibition costs) compressed Q4 EBITDA by -41 bps YoY — but these are identifiable and recurring hedging artifacts, not margin deterioration. PAT impact per overlay: 15%.

Mar 26: total debt of ₹189 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹678 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.28. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 0.61 (FY25) to 0.28 (FY26). The returns on this page are earned, not borrowed.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

No holder of Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd moved a full percentage point over the last two years — the register is quiet. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

Why this happened. Production constraint was the binding limit on volume growth in prior periods. The board-approved expansion was committed in Feb 2026 and executed in Q4 FY26 — on-time delivery noted. Annual production 3,500 kg (3.5 tons) in FY26 achieving 15% volume growth despite gold near-doubling. The new capacity removes the ceiling for FY27 volume ramp and enables the bridal segment launch in parallel with mangalsutra production.

The register over the last two years — .

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

Why this happened. This is the primary structural driver. The organized jewellery retail expansion in India is a multi-year compounding event — mangalsutra is a culturally-mandatory item at every new store opening. Management's target of 70-80% corporate share implies 21-31pp additional mix improvement. The transition matters for both revenue quality (organized retailers honor 12-15 day payment terms vs non-organized 15-20 day slippage) and volume predictability. PAT impact per overlay: 20%.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd trades at 17.1× P/E, near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 24% of the time. Its long-run median P/E is 18.2×, measured across 1.0 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 17.1× is near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 24% of the time, against a long-run median of 18.2× measured over 1.0 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

One caveat before moving on: margins are the best this company has ever printed — cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap. If profitability mean-reverts, today's multiple is higher than it looks.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved +41.4% against a +16.2% price move — earnings outran the price, pushing the multiple DOWN its own range.

Put together: the multiple is low against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

The PEG ratio, which only the second data source carries, is not drawn on this page: its two data sources do not share enough overlapping reported history to be compared. A figure nobody could check is not used to price growth — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

What the price assumes This reading works the multiple backwards. It asks one question: what yearly rate of profit growth is a buyer at the market price already paying for? The number is the growth rate that makes eleven years of profit — six years growing, then five fading — add up to that day's market price, once each year is discounted at 11% a year.

Solved at its 27 August 2026 price, Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd was paying for profit growth of about 9.3% a year. Profit itself has compounded 54.7% a year over the past 5 years. Today the market pays 17.1× P/E, the 24th percentile of its own 1-year range.

What the two numbers say together. The multiple is low against its own past, and the growth the price is paying for is below what this company has actually delivered.

How to hold this number: it is a reading of one day's price, taken on 27 August 2026, not a running figure — every other number on this page, the multiple included, is read off the live quote as of 25 September 2026. A higher price is paying for more growth and a lower price for less, so it moves whenever the price does, and this page does not restate it between measurements.

Stage: No read Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd reads as no read on its fundamental arc. Under eight usable quarters on the growth trio — not enough history for an honest trajectory read. The read is built from 5 quarters across 1 curve, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: with too little history, an honest page says so instead of guessing a trajectory.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Return readings here are annual, not quarterly — read as level and direction only; they can confirm the growth curves but never drive the stage on their own.

Fewer than eight usable quarters on the growth curves — this page will not guess a trajectory from a stub of history.

4-Factor Sector Score

46.6/100 — rank 7 of 11 in Diamond, Gems & Jewellery · 74% evidence confidence

Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd scores 46.6 out of 100 against the 11 companies it is compared with in Diamond, Gems & Jewellery, ranking 7. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 15.2 + 15 + 10 + 6.4 = 46.6. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What Shringar House of Mangalsutra Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 2 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

Bridal Segment Rollout Exaggeration · 27 May 2026. During the prepared remarks of the May 2026 call, management claimed they had already commenced bridal jewelry sales through multiple marquee partners, explicitly naming both Tanishq and Malabar Gold. However, later in the Q&A section of the same call, management contradicted this claim by admitting that sales had only started with Titan (Tanishq) and that they had not yet expanded this new segment to Malabar.

Conflicting Capacity Utilization Figures · 12 February 2026. During the February 2026 call, the CEO explicitly stated that the manufacturing facility is currently operating at approximately 70% capacity utilization. However, in the subsequent Q&A session of the same call, the Chairman contradicted this statement, clarifyng that the 70% figure was actually from the previous year and that the current nine-month utilization rate is lower at 64%. Later call (Feb 2026): “Currently, our manufacturing facility has a total capacity of 2,500 kg and is working at approximately 70% capacity utilization levels, allowing us to produce a wide range of mangalsutras under one roof.” Later call (Feb 2026): “That 70% utilization was from last year”.

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions