PSP Projects Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

PSP Projects Ltd trades at ₹846, in a confirmed uptrend and 14 weeks into that stage. That is −1.5% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 52% of a 52-week range of ₹609 to ₹1,069. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (6 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 14 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹846 it trades −1.5% versus its 200-day average and sits at 52% of its 52-week range (₹609–₹1,069).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 9.3 years the stock moved +289% while the NIFTY 500 moved +171% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (6 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-07-31) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

PSP Projects Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 27 June 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: Not stated in the research file. Our fortnightly research layers last read it on 19 July 2026.

Our read, 27 June 2026. A Gujarat-anchored EPC company riding an Adani-fuelled order tsunami — thesis lives or dies on whether trough OPM recovers to the guided seven to eight percent as the project mix normalises.

What is proven. A Gujarat-anchored EPC company riding an Adani-fuelled order tsunami — thesis lives or dies on whether trough OPM recovers to the guided seven to eight percent as the project mix normalises.

What is not proven yet. OPM fails to recover above 6.5% for two consecutive quarters in FY27 despite revenue scaling above 4,000 Cr — meaning the margin trough is structural (Adani economics permanently sub-seven percent) rather than execution-phase transient; or Adani-group projects experience a documented payment delay extending receivables above 120 days on a project above 500 Cr, signalling the client-concentration risk has crystallised.

🚨 What would change our mind. OPM fails to recover above 6.5% for two consecutive quarters in FY27 despite revenue scaling above 4,000 Cr — meaning the margin trough is structural (Adani economics permanently sub-seven percent) rather than execution-phase transient; or Adani-group projects experience a documented payment delay extending receivables above 120 days on a project above 500 Cr, signalling the client-concentration risk has crystallised.

🚨 Layer 1 read, 19 July 2026 — DROP. Fresh margin-trough EPC turn on an Adani order tsunami — but the OPM recovery is still a promise, not a print. PSP is at the 7th-percentile margin trough (OPM 5.4%) so the 75x trailing PE is optical — at mid-cycle 12.5% OPM the normalised PE is 19.3x at the 46th percentile, and the ₹13,447 Cr order book (+85%) plus interest-cost elimination are real levers. The problem is the engine has not turned: earnings_curve is FLAT, the latest quarter's OPM is still 5%, cyclicality reads STRUCTURAL_DECLINE, and management guided margin DOWN 8-9%→7-8% and cut the Adani order floor without acknowledgment. With Adani now 67% of the book and FII+DII down 1543bps, the recovery is credible but unconfirmed — P2, ranked low.

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Per the timeline: OPM crossing 7% for two consecutive FY27 quarters with revenue above ₹1,000 Cr and receivables normalising below ₹400 Cr would confirm the trough is transient and flip this toward P1/DEPLOY; conversely OPM failing to clear 6.5% for two quarters despite revenue above ₹4,000 Cr — meaning the sub-7% Adani economics are structural — or an Adani payment delay pushing receivables above 120 days would break the thesis and force a DROP.

What the company does. Order book at 13,447 Cr (85% YoY) provides multi-year revenue cover; 67% is Adani work where Adani supplies materials, eliminating commodity price risk on two-thirds of the backlog. OPM collapsed from 12% to 5-7% on project-mix shift and early-stage mobilisation costs; at mid-cycle OPM the trailing PE of 70x collapses to 19x — in the 46th percentile of its ten-year range. Interest cost elimination — 45 Cr FY26 toward nil, CFO committed within two to three quarters — adds directly to PAT; combined with OPM recovery this creates a PAT step-change not yet in the P&L.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: ROCE 8% — low-quality business with poor capital returns The research reads it further: ROCE at 8% is a trough reading driven by compressed EBIT (the same OPM trough as C002) on a rising asset base from FY26 capex of 191 Cr per C013; through-cycle ROCE of approximately 35% per the durability atoms in the bundle and ROCE of 9% in FY25 and 10% in FY24 per C011 confirm this is a cyclical low, not the structural level

Lever 8 · Demerger or value unlock — BUILDING. FY26 interest of 45 Cr guided to nil within two to three quarters as 814 Cr of interest-free Adani mobilisation advances replace bank borrowings — a direct 33 Cr PAT uplift at the 27% effective tax rate. What proves it keeps working: Interest Cost Elimination. It stops working if Adani mobilisation advance flows slow or reverse — either Adani pauses project execution or PSP is forced to borrow for working capital as receivables extend beyond 120 days.

Lever 1 · Operating leverage — BUILDING. OPM at the 7th percentile of own ten-year history; projects moving from early-stage mobilisation into MEP and finishing phases where margin accretion from operating leverage is concall-confirmed. What proves it keeps working: OPM Recovery on Project Mix Normalisation. It stops working if Two consecutive quarters of OPM below 6.5% despite revenue above 4,000 Cr annual run-rate, indicating Adani project economics are structurally sub-guided rather than execution-phase transient.

Lever 5 · Regulatory approval — BUILDING. Order book 13,447 Cr (85% YoY) per C004 at a two to three year average project lifecycle provides annualised executable capacity covering the guided FY27 revenue range. What proves it keeps working: Order Book Conversion Momentum. It stops working if FY27 order inflows fall below 5,000 Cr (vs guided 7,000-8,000 Cr per C024), particularly if Adani group pauses project awards — this would signal the revenue growth trajectory beyond FY27 is impaired.

Sources: our stock research file (27 June 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

PSP Projects Ltd reported ₹853 Cr of revenue in the Jun 26 quarter, +64.7% year on year. That is the 4th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 20.9% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹3,149 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹3,484 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹3,149 Cr (+25.4% on the year), capping 10 years at 20.9% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹853 Cr, +64.7% year on year — the 4th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +44.9% growth against the decade's 20.9% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +44.7% over the last 4 quarters against +15.4%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating; TTM profit +247.6% vs −22.3%/yr — accelerating.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

PSP Projects Ltd's operating margin is 6.0% in the Jun 26 quarter, +1.2 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 11 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 6.0% to 15.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Why this happened. OPM declined from 12% in FY23 to 6% in FY26 per C001 and C033 as PSP shifted project mix toward early-stage Adani contracts. Q2 and Q3 FY26 both printed 7% EBITDA per C010, up from the 5% trough, suggesting the recovery is starting. Management guided seven to eight percent for FY27 per C006. Gross margin data per C031 shows GPM held 12-14% throughout the trough, confirming contract-level economics are intact — the compression is in SGA and employee costs from new Adani project hiring that precedes revenue ramp.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 6.0%, +1.2 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 11 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 6.0%–15.0%.

Why the margin moved: operating margin went +1.6 pp year on year while gross margin went −0.1 pp — the gain came mostly below the gross line: operating leverage, with costs spread over a bigger revenue base.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

PSP Projects Ltd earned ₹18.0 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹56.0 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 9.3%. That is 2.1% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹0.0 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹18.0 Cr, null year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹56.0 Cr (+0.0%), and the 10-year compound rate is 9.3%.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +190.0% vs revenue +44.9%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 65% of PSP Projects Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — most of the profit is real cash. In FY26 that was ₹323 Cr of operating cash against ₹56.0 Cr of profit. After ₹191 Cr of capital spending, ₹132 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹323 Cr against reported profit of ₹56.0 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹132 Cr after ₹191 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 65% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

🚨 Why conversion sits at 65%: the cash cycle stretched 159 days between FY21 and FY26 — more of each rupee of profit waits inside the cycle before arriving. Less than 70% of profit arriving as cash is the thing to watch on this page.

Router verdict: conversion is below par and the cash cycle has stretched 159 days — the next section's job is to find where the cash is stuck.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

PSP Projects Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 71 days in FY26, up from −88 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹381 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹3,149 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹8.6 Cr, so roughly ₹613 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 108 days, inventory at 107 days — roughly 3.5 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 71 days, looser than FY21's −88.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 107 days to sell; customers pay about 108 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 143 days — netting out to the 71-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹3,149 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹8.6 Cr — so the 71-day loop keeps roughly ₹613 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹381 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹225 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹1.0 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the working-capital loop is the cash sink the router flagged — watch the cycle, not the P&L.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

PSP Projects Ltd earns a ROCE of 8% in FY26. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by −4.2 percentage points, so growth here is not yet paying for the capital it uses. The wiring behind it is 1.8% net margin on 1.02× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 8%.

🚨 Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 1.8% net margin × 1.02× asset turns × 2.44× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 4.5% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 7.8% − 12.0% = a −4.2 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. Negative — growth at these returns destroys value until the returns recover.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.

PSP Projects Ltd carries total debt of ₹330 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹1,264 Cr as of Mar 26, a debt-to-equity of 0.26 — effectively unlevered. On the annual view that ratio went from 0.15 in FY22 to 0.26 in FY26. The returns elsewhere on this page are therefore earned rather than borrowed.

Mar 26: total debt of ₹330 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹1,264 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.26. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 0.15 (FY22) to 0.26 (FY26). The returns on this page are earned, not borrowed.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters added 8.7 points of PSP Projects Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 68.8% of the company. Domestic institutions moved −7.5 points over the same window, to 2.9%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Promoters: +8.7 points over 8 quarters to 68.8%; Domestic institutions: −7.5 points over 8 quarters to 2.9%; Foreign institutions: −4.9 points over 8 quarters to 2.1%.

Why the register moved: promoters drove it (+8.7 points), absorbed on the other side by domestic institutions (−7.5 points) — steady accumulation by institutions reading the same numbers this page reads.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

PSP Projects Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

Why this happened. PSP entered FY27 with an order book that grew 85% in FY26, with FY26 order inflows of 10,535 Cr per C034. The 13,447 Cr backlog at a two to three year average lifecycle translates to 4,482 to 6,724 Cr of annual executable capacity, encompassing the guided 4,500 to 5,000 Cr FY27 revenue range per C006. The mix has shifted: government projects are 55% of the total per C004, which typically carry better payment terms than pure Adani dependency.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

PSP Projects Ltd trades at 45.7× P/E, at the pricey end of its own range (86th percentile). Its long-run median P/E is 20.2×, measured across 9.3 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Why this happened. PSP's FY26 PAT was 56 Cr on EBITDA of 190 Cr per C001. Interest consumed 45 Cr annually per C005, and the CFO committed explicitly to interest-free status within two to three quarters, citing 814 Cr of interest-free mobilisation advances from Adani that structurally displace bank borrowings per C005. At 27% tax rate, 45 Cr of interest saved is approximately 33 Cr of net PAT — a 59% uplift on FY26 reported 56 Cr. This is the most mechanical catalyst because it is tied to a contractual advance structure rather than a market or pricing variable.

Today's P/E of 45.7× is at the pricey end of its own range (86th percentile), against a long-run median of 20.2× measured over 9.3 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved −1.5% against a +8.2% price move — the price outran earnings, pushing the multiple UP its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +14.0%/yr price move, ~−9.5%/yr came from earnings growth and ~+23.5 pp from the multiple (expanding). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is full against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

Stage: Turning around Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

PSP Projects Ltd reads as turning around on its fundamental arc. Turning around — profit growth swung from −70.7% at the trough to +247.6%, a 3-quarter improving streak, ROCE lifting at 9.4%. The read is built from 12 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why it matters: growth inflections are where re-ratings start — the curves say a turn is forming, so the question becomes whether the next quarters confirm it.

4-Factor Sector Score

55.8/100 — rank 5 of 12 in Construction & Contracting · 84% evidence confidence

PSP Projects Ltd scores 55.8 out of 100 against the 12 companies it is compared with in Construction & Contracting, ranking 5. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 19.3 + 10.8 + 13.8 + 11.9 = 55.8. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What PSP Projects Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

FY27 Revenue Guidance Softened · 30 July 2026. In April 2026, management stated a firm FY27 revenue target of INR4,500 crores. In July 2026, management reframed the outlook as a range of INR4,000 crores to INR4,500 crores, introducing a downside of approximately 11% to the previously stated target without explaining the change.

Adani Project Margin Outlook Reduced · 30 July 2026. In January 2026, management said Adani cost-plus projects should generate EBITDA margins of 8% to 9%. In July 2026, management stated that Adani project EBITDA margins were instead in the 6% to 7% range, a material reduction in project-level profitability without an explanation for the change.

Normalized Employee Cost Assumption Increased · 30 July 2026. In April 2026, management expected employee costs to average 2% to 4%, implying that the cost ratio would decline as revenue increased. In July 2026, management raised the expected average to 4.5% to 4.6%, which could materially pressure the 7% to 8% EBITDA margin outlook; although management attributed the increase to organizational expansion, it did not reconcile the higher steady-state assumption with the prior guidance.

🚨 EBITDA Margin Guidance Downgraded Without Explanation · 30 April 2026. In both the Oct 2025 and Jan 2026 calls, management repeatedly anchored EBITDA margin guidance at 8-9% for FY27 and beyond, framing the range as stable and achievable across multiple analyst exchanges. In the Apr 2026 call, that guidance was revised down to 7-8%, with management's only justification being that they are keeping the number 'conservative' - no new cost driver, operational headwind, or mix shift was cited to explain the step-down, which directly impacts earnings models and valuation multiples built on the 8-9% anchor.

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions