Satin Creditcare Network Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd trades at ₹217, in a confirmed uptrend and 20 weeks into that stage. That is +7.4% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 59% of a 52-week range of ₹140 to ₹269. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (7 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 20 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹217 it trades +7.4% versus its 200-day average and sits at 59% of its 52-week range (₹140–₹269).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.5 years the stock moved −14% while the NIFTY 500 moved +273% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (7 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-07-24) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd's story is worth watching against the markers our research file set on 14 August 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: Early expansion with defensive provisioning after a deep credit-loss cycle. Marker count: 2 met, 5 partly met, 5 missed, 3 not due yet, 3 no data, 3 flagged.

From the numbers. Bad loans 2.2%, provision cover 85%, group assets +27%, quarterly profit ₹123 crore against ₹45 crore.

From the price. ₹232 against a 50-day line of ₹244 and a 200-day line of ₹182 — a pullback inside a longer uptrend, momentum weak at 34.

From the research. The repair is real, but ₹127 crore of write-offs cleaned 58% of the remaining bad-loan book.

🚨 Where they disagree. The numbers and the price broadly agree that the credit cycle has turned: profit is up 173% on the year and the stock sits well above its 200-day line. The research will not sign off yet for two reasons the screens cannot see. First, the fall in bad loans is part borrower recovery and part balance-sheet clean-up — ₹127 crore was written off in the quarter, 58% of what remained. Second, management percentages do not reconcile against the absolutes management itself disclosed, on Assam and on debt. Price and profit say turned; the research says turned and not yet proven.

What is proven. The core repair is real. Standalone bad loans fell to 2.2% in June 2026 from 3.7% a year earlier; loans overdue from day one fell to 3.0% from a 6.8% peak; slippages nearly halved; provision cover rose to 85%; group assets under management grew 27%; and consolidated profit rose to ₹123 crore from ₹45 crore a year earlier even after a ₹36 crore extra provision.

What is not proven yet. The through-cycle quality is not proven. The June quarter still used ₹127 crore of write-offs, reported credit cost was 3.06%, the four largest states were 61% of the parent book, Assam floods are a live insurance test, housing bad loans rose to 3.3%, and management cut formal group growth guidance immediately after a 27% growth quarter without a clear economic reconciliation.

🚨 What would change our mind. The recovery is broken if reported standalone credit cost exceeds 4.0% or loans overdue from day one rise above 4.5% for two quarters. It becomes much stronger if reported return on equity stays above 15% for two quarters while bad loans remain below 3.0% and subsidiary bad-loan ratios improve.

Layer 1 read, 22 August 2026 — KEEP. Satin's credit repair is real and operating — but bad loans were partly written off, not collected. Satin quarterly profit went from Rs 14 Cr at the microfinance trough to Rs 123 Cr in June 2026, and I checked it is genuine: the whole swing sits in financing profit, which went from a 3% margin to 22-24%, with other income never above Rs 5 Cr, so this is the provision line unwinding after tighter underwriting pushed loan rejections to 67%. Bad loans at 2.2% with 85% cover read well, but our own August research found Rs 127 Cr written off in that quarter — 58% of what remained — and the bridge behind it has never been published, which is why the record calls it WATCH. At 0.86 times book the stock is cheap against a 15.1% annualised return on equity, but that multiple is its own…

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Reported standalone credit cost above 4.0%, or day-one overdue loans above 4.5%, for two consecutive quarters — the record own break condition, and at that point the repair is not holding through the 20-25% book growth being layered on top. Sharpened for this layer: because I could not verify the bad-loan ratio in our own data, the single observation that would flip me is the published bad-loan bridge showing the Rs 127 Cr of write-offs were pushed through to hold the 2.2% headline rather than…

Layer 2 read, 22 August 2026 — ADVANCE. The sector trough is turning, but Satin still owes us the bad-loan bridge. Satin's reported bad loans and credit cost have improved, while the external fallback curve shows the microfinance sector moving from losses back to positive profit and capital withdrawing rather than flooding. This routing call disagrees with the standing FY27-Q1 WATCH verdict only enough to send Satin to L3: the record's M2 evidence is good, but its missing write-off bridge and subsidiary returns still block a buy.

What would change Layer 2’s mind. Flip ADVANCE to DROP if reported standalone credit cost exceeds 4.0% or day-one overdue loans exceed 4.5% for two consecutive quarters, the standing record's break condition.

Layer 3 read, 22 August 2026 — BENCH. The credit repair is real, but floods and a missing bad-loan bridge block deployment. Reported bad loans and collection measures improved, and the social-triggered search confirms that direction. Fresh Assam floods keep the weather risk active, while the standing record's FY27-Q1 WATCH still requires the full write-off bridge and notes repeated guidance changes.

What would change Layer 3’s mind. A published bad-loan bridge showing that the Rs 127 Cr June-quarter write-off was used mainly to hold reported GNPA at 2.2% would flip BENCH to DROP.

The test written in advance. Credit-loss repair holds through rapid growth — reported standalone credit cost <= 3.5% for FY27 and no quarter above 4.0% by FY27-Q4 results.

The test written in advance. Fresh borrower stress does not return — loans overdue from day one and standalone GNPA PAR1 <= 4.0% and GNPA < 3.0% by each of FY27-Q2 and FY27-Q3.

The test written in advance. Returns improve without relying on adjusted profit — reported standalone ROE >= 15% for two consecutive quarters by FY27-Q4 results.

Where the story stands after the 16 August 2026 check. WATCH.

What the pipeline decided since, and whether this update agrees. The last pipeline read is 19 July 2026 and PREDATES the 14 August dive: Layer 1 KEEP, Layer 2 ADVANCE, Layer 3 DEPLOY, CIO BENCH. Layer 2's stated flip condition was the June-quarter standalone credit cost breaking 3.5%; it came in at 1.97% before the deliberate buffer, so the condition did not trigger and the layers' credit read holds. None of the layers saw the disclosure gaps the scorecard found — the missing bad-loan bridge, the unnamed covenant waivers, the undisclosed subsidiary returns. This update carries no new quarters, no lever changes and no new or retired tests, because none of…

What the company does. The parent lends small, unsecured business loans mainly to rural women organised in joint-liability groups. Field staff assess borrowers, disburse money digitally and collect repayments largely through physical group meetings. The group also makes rural housing and small-business loans through two subsidiaries, while technology and investment-fund businesses are still very small. Profit depends less on loan growth alone than on the gap between lending yield and funding cost, field operating cost, and the share of loans that turn bad.

The dot is where the company is now; the dashed line is the level that would settle the question; a tinted band is where management says it is heading.

🚨 The bad-loan number was cleaned as well as repaired. Bad loans fell to 2.2% while ₹127 crore was written off in the same quarter — 58% of the ₹219 crore that remained. Every other asset-quality measure improved too, so the repair is genuine; but a reader comparing 2.2% to last year’s 3.7% is comparing a cleaned book with an uncleaned one.

🚨 Management percentages do not reconcile against management disclosures. The flood-affected book was described as about 5% of Assam. The disclosed ₹149.83 crore against the disclosed ₹1,475 crore of on-book Assam exposure is 10.2%, and 7.5% against the larger figure mentioned on the call. Separately, ₹9,600 crore of debt was discussed against ₹10,991 crore of consolidated borrowings. Neither gap is explained.

🚨 The credit-cost saving was spent, not banked. Credit cost fell ₹37 crore on the year and branch and employee costs rose ₹37 crore. The profit increase came from lending income. Until the operating-cost ratio falls, scale is being converted into branches rather than into returns.

Lever 16 · Asset quality — ACTIVE. Every percentage point of credit cost saved leaves more pre-tax profit. Credit cost fell from 4.6% in FY25 to 3.8% in FY26 and the June 2026 quarter's clean level was about 2.0% before the extra buffer. What proves it keeps working: Reported credit cost, bad loans, new slippages, loans overdue from day one, write-offs and provision cover every quarter. It stops working if Reported credit cost above 4.0% or loans overdue from day one above 4.5% for two quarters.

Lever 10 · New geographies — ACTIVE. New branches and larger loans expand the book and spread central costs, provided collections stay strong. Group assets grew 27% and disbursement 56% in the June 2026 quarter, but active clients grew only 3%, so most growth came from higher balances per borrower. What proves it keeps working: FY27 group asset growth of 20-25%, balance per borrower by vintage, new-branch customer counts, collection efficiency and state-level overdue loans. It stops working if Growth falls below 20% without an asset-quality benefit, or the 392 branches added in FY26 do not reach roughly 1,000 customers and profitability within nine months.

Lever 1 · Operating leverage — BUILDING. Branches and collection teams were built before their loan books matured. As those branches season, operating cost as a share of assets should fall and return on equity should rise. What proves it keeps working: Operating expense to assets at or below 6.3%, cost-to-income below 45%, and reported return on equity above 15%. It stops working if Operating expense stays near 7% of assets or cost-to-income returns above 50% despite loan growth.

Lever 4 · Paying down debt — ACTIVE. A diversified lender base and lower marginal borrowing rates widen the spread between lending yield and funding cost. Marginal borrowing cost fell 37 basis points year on year to 10.52%. What proves it keeps working: Standalone net interest margin near 14.4-14.5%, marginal borrowing cost, lender concentration, liquidity and rating changes. It stops working if Net interest margin falls below 13.5%, borrowing cost rises materially, or liquidity stress forces expensive short-term funding.

What this research does not know. No common consolidated bad-loan series across the group; No full bad-loan bridge from opening to closing balance; The Assam insurance claim has not yet been accepted or paid; The pending covenant waivers name no lender, covenant, amount or cure date; Subsidiary returns are not separately disclosed; The June 2026 industry comparison was not yet published.

Sources: Official Q1 FY27 earnings presentation (30 July 2026); Official Q1 FY27 earnings-call transcript (31 July 2026); Official Q4 FY26 earnings presentation (12 May 2026); Official Q4 FY25 earnings presentation (8 May 2025); Official Q2 FY23 earnings presentation (28 October 2022); Official earnings-call transcripts from September 2023 through June 2026 (14 August 2026); FY26 annual report (14 August 2026); Independent May 2026 credit-rating rationale (7 May 2026); +8 more. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue For a bank, revenue is everything the franchise earns — interest on the loan book plus fee and other income.

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd reported ₹762 Cr of income in the Jun 26 quarter, +8.4% year on year. That is the 5th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 9 years it has compounded at 16.4% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹3,143 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹3,210 Cr.

Why this happened. Lending income rose ₹103 crore on the year as the book grew 27% and pricing held. The top line also carries a presentation gap: management showed ₹827 crore of adjusted total income against ₹762 crore statutory.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹3,143 Cr (+22.2% on the year), capping 9 years at 16.4% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹762 Cr, +8.4% year on year — the 5th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +21.5% growth against the decade's 16.4% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +20.7% over the last 4 quarters against +15.4%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating; TTM profit +225.4% vs −4.9%/yr — accelerating.

FY26-Q4. Strong recovery from lower credit cost and 19% asset growth, helped by an unusually heavy quarter for loan-sale and treasury income.

FY27-Q1. Profit rose 173% year on year as net interest income increased and credit losses fell, but dropped 24% from the prior quarter because loan-sale income normalised and a ₹36 crore extra provision was built.

Why-sources: our stock research file (14 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net margin Net margin — what the bank keeps of every ₹100 of revenue after every cost, provision and tax. It is the cleanest single margin we can read for a lender.

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd's net margin is 16.1% in the Jun 26 quarter, +9.7 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 10 fiscal years the net margin has ranged −1.0% to 19.5%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Why this happened. The interest spread held near 14.4% while the marginal cost of borrowing fell to 10.5%. The spread is not the problem; the cost of running branches is — higher branch and employee costs absorbed the entire ₹37 crore credit-cost benefit this quarter.

The latest quarter's net margin is 16.1%, +9.7 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 10 fiscal years the net margin has ranged −1.0%–19.5%.

Why: the numbers show the net margin move clearly, but the cost lines behind it sit below what we hold — so we state the move without inventing its driver.

FY26-Q4. Strong recovery from lower credit cost and 19% asset growth, helped by an unusually heavy quarter for loan-sale and treasury income.

FY27-Q1. Profit rose 173% year on year as net interest income increased and credit losses fell, but dropped 24% from the prior quarter because loan-sale income normalised and a ₹36 crore extra provision was built.

Why-sources: our stock research file (14 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd earned ₹123 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +173.3% year on year. It is the 4th consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹332 Cr. The 9-year compound rate is 33.3%. That is 16.1% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹45.0 Cr.

Why this happened. Profit rose 173% on the year to ₹123 crore, and fell 24% against March because March carried unusually heavy loan-sale income. A ₹36 crore extra provision was taken deliberately in the quarter, so the reported figure is after choosing to hold something back.

Jun 26 profit was ₹123 Cr, +173.3% year on year — the 4th consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹332 Cr (+78.5%), and the 9-year compound rate is 33.3%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +8.4% and the margin +9.7 pp — the quarter was margin-led: most of the profit growth came from keeping more of each sale.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +310.4% vs revenue +21.5%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

Pandemic repair to clean-cycle peak · FY23-Q2 → FY24-Q4. Pandemic clean-up continued: ₹209 crore of already-provided loans were written off in the quarter, while collection recovery supported a positive profit. The loan book and collections recovered after the pandemic, lifting income while credit losses began normalising.

🚨 Over-indebtedness and state disruption drive a credit-loss trough · FY25-Q1 → FY25-Q4. Stress began as heat, elections, harvest timing and floods hurt collections; bad loans and early arrears rose despite 23% asset growth. Credit stress spread across five states; bad loans rose to 3.5%, slippages hit ₹121 crore, and provisions plus collection staff costs cut profit 58% year on year.

Credit repair becomes early expansion · FY26-Q1 → FY27-Q1. A seasonal setback inside the repair: early arrears rose after heat and rain, while a 4.84% credit cost and high field spending restrained profit. Profit improved modestly as arrears stabilised, but credit cost and branch expenses remained high and market-value accounting made income noisy.

Why-sources: our stock research file (14 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Asset quality — the ladder Gross NPA is the slice of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what remains after the money already set aside against those loans. Falling is healing; rising is damage arriving.

Loan-book quality history is not available for Satin Creditcare Network Ltd, so this section names the gap rather than estimating a ratio. No gross or net non-performing-asset series is filed in a form this page can read, and none is inferred from the profit line. The income, margin and return sections above carry the evidence this business does report.

🚨 Why this happened. Bad loans fell to 2.2%, net bad loans to 0.3%, provision cover rose to 85% and current-bucket collection was 99.9% — every measure improved together, which is what a genuine repair looks like. But ₹127 crore was written off during the quarter, 58% of the remaining ₹219 crore, so part of the improvement is the book being cleaned rather than the borrower recovering.

We do not hold quarterly loan-book quality numbers for this bank, so this section states that plainly rather than working around it.

Why: loan-book quality is the engine room of a bank, and its drivers — slippages, recoveries, provisioning — sit below what we hold for this name; the sections around it carry the reads we can stand behind.

The loan book We read the loan book through revenue — when the book grows, revenue grows with it. It is a rough proxy, and we say so: rate moves and fee swings can shift it a few points in any one year.

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd's revenue grew +22.2% in FY26 to ₹3,143 Cr, so the book is growing. The latest quarter ran +8.4% year on year. The net margin on that income is 16.1%, +9.7 percentage points against a year ago. Interest income is a proxy for the book; rate moves can shift it a few points in any one year.

Why this happened. Non-microfinance businesses are now 19% of the group book. The small-business arm grew 134% on the year with bad loans improving to 3.5%, but ₹294 crore was disbursed across only 50 green loans in the quarter, which is meaningful concentration. Housing finance is flat and its bad loans worsened from 3.0% to 3.3%.

FY26 revenue was ₹3,143 Cr, +22.2% on the year, and the latest quarter ran +8.4% year on year. The net margin on that revenue is 16.1% this quarter (+9.7 pp YoY) — growth with a widening margin on it.

The synthesis: a lender compounds when the book grows while the margin holds and the loan book stays clean — gross NPA is the loan-quality read we carry here.

Returns on equity and assets Two numbers rate a bank: ROE — what it earns on shareholder money — and ROA — what it earns on everything it deploys. ROE above ~13–15% earns its keep; below that, growth builds book slowly.

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd earns a return on equity of 12% in FY26. Its trough over the ladder below was −1% in FY21. For a lender the balance sheet is the operating asset, so equity return and asset return have to be read together.

Why this happened. Trailing return on equity is 12.3% and the June quarter annualises to 15.1%. The gap between those two numbers is the whole question: the trailing figure carries the trough, the annualised one carries a quarter helped by a deliberate provision choice and by lower credit cost.

FY26 ROE came in at 12%, recovered from a FY21 trough of −1%. Return on assets is withheld on this page — its two source series disagree for this quarter. That return is below the bar a bank must clear to compound book value quickly — which is also the honest reason the stock trades where it does.

Why ROE moved: profit compounded 33.3% a year over 9 years while the equity base grew more slowly — earnings recovering faster than book value builds is what lifts ROE off a trough.

Debt

For a bank, borrowings are raw material, not a warning sign — solvency is read through the returns and the loan book. A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits, so the debt-to-equity lens that works everywhere else misleads on a lender and is not applied here.

Why this happened. Capital adequacy is 26.7%, undrawn sanctions about ₹2,600 crore, 77 active lenders with the top ten at 52%, and assets maturing in about 18 months against liabilities at about 26 months — a favourable mismatch. The one open item is that the ₹9,600 crore of debt discussed does not reconcile with ₹10,991 crore of consolidated borrowings.

A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits; a bank’s borrowings are its inventory — money taken in to be lent out. The debt lens that works everywhere else misleads here, so this page does not apply it. The solvency questions for a bank — is the loan book sound, is the equity earning — are read through the loan-book and returns sections above.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Foreign institutions cut 2.3 points of Satin Creditcare Network Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes foreign institutions to 4.9% of the company. Domestic institutions moved −0.7 points over the same window, to 6.3%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

Why this happened. Promoter holding is 36.17% with no pledge. Warrants at ₹260 would raise ₹100 crore and dilute existing holders by about 3.5% on full conversion.

The register over the last two years — Foreign institutions: −2.3 points over 8 quarters to 4.9%; Domestic institutions: −0.7 points over 8 quarters to 6.3%; Promoters: +0.0 points over 8 quarters to 36.2%.

🚨 Why the register moved: foreign institutions drove it (−2.3 points), alongside domestic institutions (−0.7 points) — distribution into the market’s bid.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre. The Z-score was built for manufacturers and is not applied to banks and lenders, so solvency here is read from the capital and asset-quality lines instead.

🚨 Why this happened. The concentration risks are the ones to hold: state exposure, a balance per borrower up about 24%, and an insurance test in Assam that has not yet paid. A larger balance per borrower raises earnings today and raises loss severity if rural household income weakens.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre.

Valuation For a bank we price the book, not the earnings: P/BV is what the market pays for each ₹1 of the bank's net worth. A bank below 1× book is priced below the value of what it owns, net of what it owes.

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd trades at 0.8× P/BV, mid-range by its own standards (50th percentile). Its long-run median P/BV is 0.8×, measured across 9.9 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Why this happened. At 0.90 times book the shares are inexpensive against book value but sit near the middle of Satin’s own ten-year range — this is not a deep historical trough. The price appears to assume roughly 14% sustainable return on equity, so value creation from here needs the reported figure above 15%, not one more quarter of high profit growth.

Today's P/BV of 0.8× is mid-range by its own standards (50th percentile), against a long-run median of 0.8× measured over 9.9 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

The honest context for that discount: a bank earning about 12% on its equity is worth less per rupee of book, and the market has priced that in rather than overlooked it. The discount closes only if the returns themselves improve.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year book value grew while the price moved +46.6% — price and book moved together, holding the multiple in its range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +22.8%/yr price move, ~+6.9%/yr came from book-value growth and ~+15.9 pp from the multiple (expanding); over 10y, of the −9.3%/yr price move, ~+10.6%/yr came from book-value growth and ~−19.9 pp from the multiple (compressing). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus book-value growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is unremarkable against its own past, so the story rests on the book-value line underneath it, not the multiple.

What the price assumes This reading works the multiple backwards. It asks one question: what yearly rate of profit growth is a buyer at the market price already paying for? The number is the growth rate that makes eleven years of profit — six years growing, then five fading — add up to that day's market price, once each year is discounted at 11% a year.

Solved at its 26 August 2026 price, Satin Creditcare Network Ltd was paying for profit growth of about −2.0% a year. Profit itself has compounded 33.3% a year over the past 9 years. Today the market pays 0.8× P/BV, the 50th percentile of its own 10-year range.

What the two numbers say together. The multiple is unremarkable against its own past, and the growth the price is paying for is below what this company has actually delivered.

How to hold this number: it is a reading of one day's price, taken on 26 August 2026, not a running figure — every other number on this page, the multiple included, is read off the live quote as of 11 September 2026. A higher price is paying for more growth and a lower price for less, so it moves whenever the price does, and this page does not restate it between measurements.

Stage: Turning around Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd reads as turning around on its fundamental arc. Turning around — profit growth swung from −65.7% at the trough to +225.4%, a 3-quarter improving streak, ROE lifting at 11.6%. The read is built from 11 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why this happened. The price sits above its 200-day line at ₹182 and below its 50-day at ₹244, with momentum weak at 34 and volume showing distribution rather than accumulation. That is a pullback inside a longer uptrend, not a confirmed new breakout — and it agrees with the research, which says the repair is real but not yet proven.

Why it matters: growth inflections are where re-ratings start — the curves say a turn is forming, so the question becomes whether the next quarters confirm it.

4-Factor Sector Score

80.1/100 — rank 1 of 7 in Finance & Investments - Microfinance · 82% evidence confidence

Satin Creditcare Network Ltd scores 80.1 out of 100 against the 7 companies it is compared with in Finance & Investments - Microfinance, ranking 1. Confirmed research leader: earnings, capital efficiency and relative strength agree. Move to management, catalyst and risk diligence.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 30.8 + 19.8 + 17 + 12.5 = 80.1. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if ROA rolls over or gross NPA rises while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Quarterly scorecard

21 markers came out of our Satin Creditcare Network Ltd research file of 14 August 2026, and each results season scores every one of them. 1 quarter scored so far; the latest reads worth watching. A row is permanent: a miss stays on the record after it is fixed.

Click any quarter above to read its full record — the numbers, every marker’s score, and why the numbers moved. A dashed chip is a quarter not yet checked.

M11 — flagged. The bar: Check PAR1, PAR30, GNPA, NNPA, slippages and write-offs together; falling GNPA with another large write-off is only part cure. Where it stands: Exactly the case this marker was written for. Every asset-quality measure improved, and part of the improvement is the book being cleaned rather than the borrower recovering.

M13 — partly met. The bar: Check reported return on assets and return on equity, not only adjusted figures that remove management buffers. Where it stands: Reported figures were given. The buffer means the reported number understates the quarter, which is the honest direction, but the two readings are far apart.

M14 — flagged. The bar: Check statutory total income against management-adjusted income and separate loan-sale, treasury and hedge movements. Where it stands: The gap is explained but it is presented as the headline. Profit after tax is ₹123 crore on both presentations, so the difference is in the top line only.

M16 — partly met. The bar: Check group AUM growth against 20-25% guidance and whether the 392 FY26 branches are reaching about 1,000 customers within nine months. Where it stands: Half readable. The branch-maturity half is the one that would show whether the cost increase is buying anything.

🚨 M17 — missed. The bar: Check housing and small-business subsidiary GNPA, profit and return on assets; growth without better returns is not diversification value. Where it stands: Growth was delivered and returns were not shown, which is the exact shape this marker was written to catch.

M19 — flagged. The bar: Check for any further change to FY27 guidance and require a clear economic explanation, not only a new range. Where it stands: The change came roughly eighty days after it was set, with no stated reason. The cut itself may be prudent; the silence is the flag.

🚨 M20 — missed. The bar: Ask for the full bad-loan bridge: opening bad loans plus slippages minus cash cures, upgrades and write-offs equals closing bad loans. Where it stands: Without it, nobody can separate borrower recovery from the ₹127 crore of write-offs. This is the single disclosure that would settle the quarter's central question.

🚨 M21 — missed. The bar: Ask management to identify the pending covenant waivers, affected lenders and cure dates. Where it stands: Same gap as M9, asked of management directly rather than of the filings.

M3 — partly met. The bar: Returns improve without relying on adjusted profit (reported standalone ROE >= 15% for two consecutive quarters). Where it stands: One of the two quarters. The trailing figure carries the trough, so a second quarter above 15% is what would settle this.

M4 — partly met. The bar: Growth guidance is delivered with collection discipline (consolidated AUM growth and current-bucket collection 20-25% AUM growth and collection >= 99.5%). Where it stands: Collections clear the bar comfortably. Growth is running ABOVE the guided band, which is not a miss but is the direction that historically precedes a credit cycle.

🚨 M6 — missed. The bar: Diversification reduces rather than moves credit risk (housing and small-business GNPA both subsidiary GNPA ratios <= 3.0%). Where it stands: Both miss, and housing moved the wrong way while its assets stayed flat. This is the clearest failed marker of the quarter.

M8 — partly met. The bar: Rapid growth does not hide higher borrower leverage. Where it stands: Delinquency is improving, so the pairing holds for now. The balance increase raises loss severity if rural incomes weaken, and vintage-level delinquency was not published.

🚨 M9 — missed. The bar: Pending covenant waivers are harmless and resolved (covenant waiver status). Where it stands: A waiver mentioned without any of its terms cannot be assessed. This is a disclosure the company can close whenever it chooses.

Said versus delivered

What Satin Creditcare Network Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 6 tracked promises on the record. Scored in our research file, promise by promise. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

🚨 Said 2024-02-02, due five-year operating view — missed. Promised: Five-year credit cost of 1.5-1.75%. What arrived: Credit cost rose to 4.6% in FY25 and remained 3.8% in FY26 on the standalone basis.

🚨 Said 2024-04-30, due FY25 — missed. Promised: At least 25% asset growth was described as having no real challenge. What arrived: FY25 group asset growth was about 8% after the target was cut twice.

Said 2024-11-08, due FY25 close — met. Promised: Revised FY25 group asset growth of 8-10% and credit cost of 4.5-5%. What arrived: Group assets grew about 8% and standalone credit cost was 4.6%.

Said 2025-08-11, due FY26 — flagged. Promised: No FY26 growth guidance was being provided. What arrived: In January 2026 management said a 10-15% growth guide had already been given and remained intact.

Said 2026-01-29, due FY26 close — met. Promised: FY26 credit cost around 4%. What arrived: Standalone credit cost was 3.8% and consolidated credit cost was about 3.55%.

Said 2026-05-12, due FY27 close — flagged. Promised: Group asset growth of 25-30% for FY27. What arrived: The formal range was lowered to 20-25% in July 2026, despite 27% growth in the June quarter, without a clear economic reconciliation.

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Governance

What we checked on how Satin Creditcare Network Ltd is run. 3 items came back clean and 5 are being watched. Read from the company’s own filings and earnings calls; a watch item is a question, not a finding.

Clean (3). FY26 audit and the Q1 limited review were both unmodified; No current company-level fraud or enforcement action found; Promoter holding 36.17% with no pledge.

🚨 On watch (5). Chairman pay about 199 times median employee pay, followed by approval for a higher fixed salary; The chairman and chief executive roles are combined; 12 employee misappropriation cases in FY26 totalling ₹38.63 lakh, of which ₹32.63 lakh was written off; Full warrant conversion dilutes existing holders by about 3.5%; Parent capital continues to fund subsidiaries whose returns are not separately disclosed.

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