CreditAccess Grameen Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd trades at ₹1,424, in a confirmed uptrend and 16 weeks into that stage. That is +3.6% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 61% of a 52-week range of ₹1,157 to ₹1,593. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (1 week and counting).

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 16 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹1,424 it trades +3.6% versus its 200-day average and sits at 61% of its 52-week range (₹1,157–₹1,593).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 8.0 years the stock moved +250% while the NIFTY 500 moved +129% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (1 week and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-09-04) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 17 May 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: EARLY_EXPANSION. Still open: Rs 39 Cr provision taken in Q4 FY26; management cautioned prolonged fuel/gas disruption could cascade into rural income; ~segment of borrowers with remittance income exposed.

Our read, 17 May 2026. Post-credit-cycle recovery rerating — PAT inflecting from trough at 14th-percentile P/BV with management credibility under the microscope.

From the numbers. P/BV compressed 42% from Mar 2024 peak of 4.5x to current 2.6x. 14th percentile of 10-year range. Trough was 2.2x (Dec 2024). GOLDEN_SETUP per PE cycle agent: earnings inflecting (FY26 PAT +46.5%, FY27 guided 61-102%…

From the price. Price stage 2, week 16 — above its 200-day line, relative strength falling.

From the research. Post-credit-cycle recovery rerating — PAT inflecting from trough at 14th-percentile P/BV with management credibility under the microscope.

🚨 Where they disagree. P/BV compressed 42% from Mar 2024 peak of 4.5x to current 2.6x. 14th percentile of 10-year range. Trough was 2.2x (Dec 2024). GOLDEN_SETUP per PE cycle agent: earnings inflecting (FY26 PAT +46.5%, FY27 guided 61-102% PAT growth), P/BV below median at 0.81x, smoothed YoY growth +15.9%. FII buying active. Pattern: earnings-driven multiple compression during credit cycle stress — price didn't fully recover yet with EPS trajectory now inflecting.

What is proven. Post-credit-cycle recovery rerating — PAT inflecting from trough at 14th-percentile P/BV with management credibility under the microscope.

What is not proven yet. Rs 39 Cr provision taken in Q4 FY26; management cautioned prolonged fuel/gas disruption could cascade into rural income; ~segment of borrowers with remittance income exposed.

The test written in advance. West Asia Geopolitical Disruption — Income Shock to Borrowers — West Asia Geopolitical Disruption — Income Shock to Borrowers Q1 FY27 credit cost print vs 3-4% guided; West Asia conflict escalation news by the next result.

The test written in advance. Retail Mix Target Over-Ambitious — Execution Risk at 24-25% FY27 — Retail Mix Target Over-Ambitious — Execution Risk at 24-25% FY27 Q1 FY27 retail AUM absolute amount and share %; target is ~19-20% if evenly ramped by the next result.

The dot is where the company is now; the dashed line is the level that would settle the question; a tinted band is where management says it is heading.

Lever 5 · Regulatory approval — BUILDING. Multi-lender AUM concentration collapsed from 25.3% (Aug 2024) to 3.3% (Mar 2026); GNPA at 3.17% vs 4.76% peak — the structural cause of FY25-FY26 credit losses is eliminated. What proves it keeps working: Credit Cycle Normalization — NPA Trough Passed. It stops working if Q1 FY27 credit cost print vs 3-4% guided; West Asia conflict escalation news.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix — BUILDING. Retail AUM share: 2.9% (FY25) → 6.8% (Q1 FY26) → 11.1% (Q2 FY26) → 14.1% (Q3 FY26) → 18.1% (FY26 exit) — guided 24-25% by FY27 end; 2-3x leverage per customer vs base MFI loan. What proves it keeps working: Retail Finance Mix Expansion (MFI-to-individual graduation). It stops working if Q1 FY27 credit cost print vs 3-4% guided; West Asia conflict escalation news.

Lever 14 · A bigger market to sell into — BUILDING. 7% MFI market share by customer count, targeting 23.5 Cr low-to-middle income households by 2030; 38-43% of new additions are new-to-credit — expanding formal credit access. What proves it keeps working: TAM Expansion — 23.5 Crore Household Addressable Market. It stops working if Q1 FY27 credit cost print vs 3-4% guided; West Asia conflict escalation news.

Lever 11 · Selling more to existing customers — BUILDING. 11.2 lakh active app users (25% of borrower base); digital collections 22% vs 14% YoY; 30 lakh daily transactions — cost-to-income guided 33-35% FY27 (vs 34.1% Q3 FY26 adjusted). What proves it keeps working: Digital Platform Operating Leverage. It stops working if Q1 FY27 credit cost print vs 3-4% guided; West Asia conflict escalation news.

Sources: our stock research file (17 May 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue For a bank, revenue is everything the franchise earns — interest on the loan book plus fee and other income.

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd reported ₹1,783 Cr of income in the Jun 26 quarter, +21.9% year on year. That is the 4th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 7 years it has compounded at 24.8% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹6,059 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹6,378 Cr.

Why this happened. India's microfinance sector serves an estimated 60-70 million households with significant underpenetration in non-southern states. CreditAccess has 44 lakh borrowers, 2,236 branches, and systematic geographic expansion. 38-43% of quarterly additions are new-to-credit — expanding the credit formal economy, not just churning existing borrowers. Long-term structural tailwind with limited near-term catalytic punch.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹6,059 Cr (+5.3% on the year), capping 7 years at 24.8% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹1,783 Cr, +21.9% year on year — the 4th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +11.8% growth against the decade's 24.8% — the current year is running slower than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +11.8% over the last 4 quarters against +7.6%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating; TTM profit +527.5% vs −10.0%/yr — accelerating.

FY26-Q3. PAT recovery accelerates — accelerated write-offs contradict prior guidance

FY26-Q4. Credit cycle over — clean inflection quarter with ROE 17.8%, guidance credibility tested

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 May 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net margin Net margin — what the bank keeps of every ₹100 of revenue after every cost, provision and tax. It is the cleanest single margin we can read for a lender.

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd's net margin is 27.7% in the Jun 26 quarter, +23.6 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 8 fiscal years the net margin has ranged 5.3% to 28.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Why this happened. Individual loans carry 2-3x higher ticket (Rs 1.7 lakh Unnati vs Rs 25k-35k base MFI), same borrower base, same branch infrastructure. As 6-8% of MFI customers graduate annually to retail products, the revenue-per-customer expands without proportionate cost increase. This is the single most value-creating lever in the business model and is now scaling faster than management's own prior guidance (15% FY28 target already breached in FY26). The FY27 target of 24-25% implies adding ~Rs 4,000+ Cr in retail AUM on top of current ~Rs 5,000 Cr.

The latest quarter's net margin is 27.7%, +23.6 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 8 fiscal years the net margin has ranged 5.3%–28.0%.

Why: the numbers show the net margin move clearly, but the cost lines behind it sit below what we hold — so we state the move without inventing its driver.

FY26-Q3. PAT recovery accelerates — accelerated write-offs contradict prior guidance

FY26-Q4. Credit cycle over — clean inflection quarter with ROE 17.8%, guidance credibility tested

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 May 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd earned ₹493 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +721.7% year on year. It is the 2nd consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹778 Cr. The 7-year compound rate is 13.4%. That is 27.7% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹60.0 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹493 Cr, +721.7% year on year — the 2nd consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹778 Cr (+46.5%), and the 7-year compound rate is 13.4%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +21.9% and the margin +23.6 pp — the quarter was margin-led: most of the profit growth came from keeping more of each sale.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +437.6% vs revenue +11.8%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

FY26-Q3. PAT recovery accelerates — accelerated write-offs contradict prior guidance

FY26-Q4. Credit cycle over — clean inflection quarter with ROE 17.8%, guidance credibility tested

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 May 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Asset quality — the ladder Gross NPA is the slice of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what remains after the money already set aside against those loans. Falling is healing; rising is damage arriving.

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd's gross NPA is 2.18% of the loan book in Jun 26, down from 4.70% a year ago. Net of provisions already set aside, 0.76% remains. That is the 2nd straight quarter of improvement. Across the 12 quarters held here the book has ranged 0.77% to 4.76%.

Jun 26: gross NPA at 2.18% and net NPA at 0.76%, against 4.70% / 1.78% a year ago. Over the 12 quarters we hold, the book's worst reading was 4.76% and its best is 0.77%. The ladder has now improved for 2 consecutive quarters.

The synthesis: profit growth at a bank is only as good as the book behind it, and this book is healing on a multi-quarter streak. A note on depth: quarterly provisioning detail is not in our numbers yet, so this ladder reads levels and trend, not the cost of the cleanup.

Why the ladder moved: recoveries, write-offs and slippages each play a part, and that split sits below what we hold — the numbers show the healing; the driver mix does not travel with them.

The loan book We read the loan book through revenue — when the book grows, revenue grows with it. It is a rough proxy, and we say so: rate moves and fee swings can shift it a few points in any one year.

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd's revenue grew +5.3% in FY26 to ₹6,059 Cr, so the book is growing. The latest quarter ran +21.9% year on year. The net margin on that income is 27.7%, +23.6 percentage points against a year ago. Interest income is a proxy for the book; rate moves can shift it a few points in any one year.

FY26 revenue was ₹6,059 Cr, +5.3% on the year, and the latest quarter ran +21.9% year on year. The net margin on that revenue is 27.7% this quarter (+23.6 pp YoY) — growth with a widening margin on it.

The synthesis: a lender compounds when the book grows while the margin holds and the loan book stays clean — gross NPA is the loan-quality read we carry here.

Returns on equity and assets Two numbers rate a bank: ROE — what it earns on shareholder money — and ROA — what it earns on everything it deploys. ROE above ~13–15% earns its keep; below that, growth builds book slowly.

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd earns a return on equity of 11% in FY26. Its trough over the ladder below was 4% in FY21. For a lender the balance sheet is the operating asset, so equity return and asset return have to be read together.

FY26 ROE came in at 11%, recovered from a FY21 trough of 4%. Return on assets is withheld on this page — its two source series disagree for this quarter. That return is below the bar a bank must clear to compound book value quickly — which is also the honest reason the stock trades where it does.

Why ROE moved: profit compounded 13.4% a year over 7 years while the equity base grew more slowly — earnings recovering faster than book value builds is what lifts ROE off a trough.

Debt

For a bank, borrowings are raw material, not a warning sign — solvency is read through the returns and the loan book. A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits, so the debt-to-equity lens that works everywhere else misleads on a lender and is not applied here.

A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits; a bank’s borrowings are its inventory — money taken in to be lent out. The debt lens that works everywhere else misleads here, so this page does not apply it. The solvency questions for a bank — is the loan book sound, is the equity earning — are read through the loan-book and returns sections above.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Domestic institutions cut 3.6 points of CreditAccess Grameen Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes domestic institutions to 12.7% of the company. Foreign institutions moved +2.6 points over the same window, to 13.5%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Domestic institutions: −3.6 points over 8 quarters to 12.7%; Foreign institutions: +2.6 points over 8 quarters to 13.5%; Promoters: −0.4 points over 8 quarters to 66.2%.

Why the register moved: rotation — foreign institutions +2.6 points against domestic institutions −3.6 points over 8 quarters, with promoters holding steady — one class of institutions handing the register to the other, not a verdict change by the people closest to the numbers.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre. The Z-score was built for manufacturers and is not applied to banks and lenders, so solvency here is read from the capital and asset-quality lines instead.

Why this happened. The key insight from four concalls: the FY25-FY26 credit cycle was driven by over-leveraged borrowers holding >3 MFI loans simultaneously. The RBI guardrails mandated deleveraging. That process is now complete — borrowers with >3 lenders fell from 25.3% of AUM to 3.3% in 18 months. GNPA at 60 DPD is 3.17%, PAR 90 2.28%, both at pre-pandemic baseline levels. Credit cost is guided at 3-4% for FY27 vs 6.74% actual FY26. This creates a ~270-370 bps P&L tailwind on the credit line alone.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre.

Valuation For a bank we price the book, not the earnings: P/BV is what the market pays for each ₹1 of the bank's net worth. A bank below 1× book is priced below the value of what it owns, net of what it owes.

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd trades at 2.9× P/BV, near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 32% of the time. Its long-run median P/BV is 3.2×, measured across 7.3 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/BV of 2.9× is near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 32% of the time, against a long-run median of 3.2× measured over 7.3 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

The honest context for that discount: a bank earning about 11% on its equity is worth less per rupee of book, and the market has priced that in rather than overlooked it. The discount closes only if the returns themselves improve.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year book value grew while the price moved +10.2% — price and book moved together, holding the multiple in its range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +15.6%/yr price move, ~+15.6%/yr came from book-value growth and ~+0.0 pp from the multiple (roughly flat). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus book-value growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is low against its own past, so the story rests on the book-value line underneath it, not the multiple.

What the price assumes This reading works the multiple backwards. It asks one question: what yearly rate of profit growth is a buyer at the market price already paying for? The number is the growth rate that makes eleven years of profit — six years growing, then five fading — add up to that day's market price, once each year is discounted at 11% a year.

Solved at its 13 June 2026 price, CreditAccess Grameen Ltd was paying for profit growth of about 18.6% a year. Profit itself has compounded 13.4% a year over the past 7 years. Today the market pays 2.9× P/BV, the 32nd percentile of its own 7-year range.

What the two numbers say together. The multiple is low against its own past, and the growth the price is paying for is above what this company has actually delivered. A multiple that looks low because earnings fell is not the same thing as a low bar to clear.

How to hold this number: it is a reading of one day's price, taken on 13 June 2026, not a running figure — every other number on this page, the multiple included, is read off the live quote as of 11 September 2026. A higher price is paying for more growth and a lower price for less, so it moves whenever the price does, and this page does not restate it between measurements.

Stage: Turning around Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd reads as turning around on its fundamental arc. Turning around — profit growth swung from −87.1% at the trough to +527.5%, a 3-quarter improving streak, ROE lifting at 9.9%. The read is built from 10 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why it matters: growth inflections are where re-ratings start — the curves say a turn is forming, so the question becomes whether the next quarters confirm it.

4-Factor Sector Score

65.6/100 — rank 2 of 7 in Finance & Investments - Microfinance · 100% evidence confidence

CreditAccess Grameen Ltd scores 65.6 out of 100 against the 7 companies it is compared with in Finance & Investments - Microfinance, ranking 2. Strong business, demanding price: keep it on the quality list, but require either earnings upgrades or valuation compression.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 30.1 + 20.3 + 5.4 + 9.8 = 65.6. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if ROA rolls over or gross NPA rises while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What CreditAccess Grameen Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

Mortgage Profitability Reclassified · 24 July 2026. Management's May 2026 statement identified mortgage as the only retail product that was not profitable at the product level. In Jul 2026, management instead said that only two-wheeler loans were unprofitable as a product line, while also saying mortgage still needed approximately 1,000 crores for full break-even including HO costs. This is a material change in the stated profitability of mortgage and makes the treatment of shared costs unclear.

Borrowing Cost Trajectory Reversed from Continued Decline to Bottom Reached · 8 May 2026. The Oct 2025 call quantified an explicit 50 basis point FY27 borrowing cost benefit, and the Jan 2026 call reiterated projected declines of approximately 10 basis points per quarter for two to three more quarters. Just four months later in the May 2026 call, management declared borrowing costs have reached their bottom at 9.2% and may move slightly higher in FY27, directly reversing the trajectory communicated across both prior calls without a proportionate explanation beyond general global uncertainty.

Contradiction on Write-off Completion · 20 January 2026. In the October 2025 call, management explicitly stated that the accelerated write-off cycle was largely done and that such figures would not be seen in Q3 or Q4. Directly contradicting this assurance, the latest call reports significant accelerated write-offs of 181 crores in Q3. Earlier call (Oct 2025): “We are largely done with the accelerated write-off cycle... So, you will not see these figures in third and fourth quarter. The figures will be much lower.” Later call (Jan 2026): “We wrote off 259 crores worth of loans in Q3, which includes 181 crores of accelerated write-offs pertaining to 180-day non-paying accounts...”

Drastic Shift in Diversification Timeline · 20 January 2026. Management previously guided (in July 2025) that they would reach a 12-15% retail finance portfolio mix by FY28. In the latest call, they revealed they have already reached 14.1% in Q3 FY26 (two years ahead of schedule), driven by slower growth in the core microfinance book. Earlier call (Jul 2025): “What we have guided is around by end of the year 2028, we should reach anywhere between 12%-15%. And we are confident of reaching that number.” Later call (Jan 2026): “The retail channel portfolio continues to scale steadily with its share now at 14.1% of AUM at the end of the third quarter... versus 11.1% in the second quarter... while part of the increase is optically driven by slower normalization in the group book...”

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions