Airbnb share price today

Airbnb, Inc.'s share price was $176.34 at the close on 4 November 2026. It has been rising for 20 weeks. That is 19.7% above its average price over the last 200 trading days. In the last 52 weeks it traded between $114 and $189, and at that close it sat 83% of the way up from that low.

A share price tends to move through four phases: moving sideways (stage 1), rising (stage 2), stalling near a high (stage 3) and falling (stage 4). Today Airbnb, Inc. is in stage 2. The phase helps read everything below.

Over the past 13 weeks it has done worse than the S&P 500, and it has been behind for 1 week running.

Over the last 5.9 years the share price moved +27% while the S&P 500 moved +109%, so it is behind the index over that whole period. It was last ahead over 13 weeks in the week of 30 October 2026. The chart above shows the 13-week comparison for every week.

This page treats a rise as over when the price closes below its 200-day average on two Fridays in a row.

Airbnb, Inc. pays no dividend. In the last 12 reported quarters it declared no dividend per share, so there is no payout history to chart and no yield to show. Companies like this usually keep their earnings in the business, so the cash-flow sections show where that cash goes.

Airbnb is on 2 of our US lists: Nasdaq 100 companies and S&P 500 companies.

Airbnb, Inc. earned $816 M of net profit in the Jun 2026 quarter, +27.1% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 2nd quarter in a row of profit growth. Full-year FY25 profit was $2.5 B. That is 22.6% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned $642 M.

Net profit is what is left after every cost, interest and tax. Earnings per share, dividends and book value all grow from it.

1 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

For the full year, FY25 profit was $2.5 B (−5.2% on the year before).

Why profit moved: revenue changed +16.5% on a year earlier and the margin moved +1.2 percentage points. Sales did the work, and the margin was about flat.

On average over the last four quarters, profit changed +1.3% and revenue +14.0%. Profit is growing slower than sales: rising costs are taking part of the growth.

Airbnb, Inc. reported $3.6 B of revenue in the Jun 2026 quarter, +16.5% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 12th quarter in a row with growth on the year before. Over 4 years it has grown 19.6% a year on average. The last full year, FY25, came in at $12.2 B.

Revenue is everything the company billed its customers in the period.

The last four reported quarters add to $13.2 B.

FY25 revenue was $12.2 B, +10.3% on the year before.

Recent pace: the last four quarters grew +14.0% on average, against 19.6% a year over the longer run, so this year is growing slower than its own long-run rate.

Is growth speeding up? Revenue over the last 12 months grew +13.6%, against +11.9% a year over the last 8 quarters (stabilising); profit over the last 12 months grew +2.5%, against −25.5% a year (accelerating).

Airbnb, Inc.'s operating margin was 21.0% in the Jun 2026 quarter, 1.2 percentage points higher than the same quarter a year ago. Across 5 years it has been between 9.0% and 23.0%. The latest quarter is within that range.

Operating margin is what is left from every $100 of sales after the costs of running the business, before interest and tax. It shows pricing power and cost control.

Why the margin moved: operating margin changed +1.2 percentage points on the year while gross margin changed +0.1 points. So the gain came mostly from costs below the gross margin, such as staff and overheads, measured against sales.

Over the last 3 years, 131% of Airbnb, Inc.'s reported profit came in as cash from its operations, so the profit is backed by cash. In FY25 it brought in $4.6 B of operating cash against $2.5 B of profit. After null of spending on assets, $4.6 B was left over as free cash.

The profit and loss account shows what was earned. The cash-flow statement shows the cash that actually came in. Comparing operating cash flow with profit is one of the best checks that a profit is real.

Cash-flow figures here are yearly, because quarterly cash statements are not published, so this section changes once a year.

Why: the cash figure is clear, but the day counts behind it are not in our data, so we show it without guessing the reason.

What to look at next: no single use of cash stands out. The next section checks both the cash tied up in daily operations and the spending on assets.

Airbnb, Inc. does not report the customer, stock and supplier day counts a cash cycle needs, so this section looks at its spending on assets instead. Nothing is estimated in place of the missing day counts, so no cash-cycle chart is drawn.

Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid. Debtor days: how long customers take to pay. Inventory days: how long stock sits. The cash cycle: the whole loop, in days of sales.

In short: neither the daily cycle nor new spending is soaking up the cash, so the picture is fairly clean.

Airbnb, Inc.'s P/E is 39.9×, in the middle of its own history: higher than 69% of past readings. Its usual P/E (the middle reading) is 33.8×, over 4.6 years of weekly prices. This compares the share price with the company’s own past. It does not say what the business is worth.

P/E is the share price divided by a year's profit per share: how many dollars the market pays for each dollar of yearly profit.

Why the multiple is where it is: over the past year earnings per share moved −1.9% while the price moved +45.9%. The price did better than earnings, which pushed the multiple up within its own range.

Where the price move came from: over 3 years the price moved +12.9% a year; about −18.9% a year came from earnings growth and about +31.8 percentage points from the multiple (the market paying more). The split is approximate (price return minus earnings growth). It shows how much of the move came from the market paying a different multiple.

In short: the multiple is high against its own past, so the earnings trend underneath matters more than the multiple.

Airbnb, Inc.'s business is getting better. Profit growth hit its low 6 quarters ago at −48.6% and has recovered to +2.5%, with ROCE steady at 29.1%. This is based on 12 quarters of 4 measures.

Every business is somewhere on a path of getting better or worse, and this section names where. The last 12 quarters of growth in revenue, profit and earnings per share, plus the return the business earns on its capital, are read as lines. Getting worse: the lines are falling. Turning around: a low point has just formed and the last few quarters are rising from it. Getting better: the rise from the low has lasted. Growing steadily: steady growth with healthy returns. Slowing from a peak: still high, but slowing. When the lines disagree the result is mixed; too little history means no reading. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the steady yearly rate that would turn the starting value into the latest one. It is the fairest way to compare growth over different periods. If the 1-year figure is much bigger than the 10-year one, recent growth is running faster than the long-run trend. A dash means there is no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss, where a growth rate means nothing.

Why it matters: a lasting rise from a low is what this page is built to show.

Compound annual growth rate (%)

Compound annual growth rate over each period, %. Revenue, profit and EPS come from yearly figures; the stock price row is price growth over the same periods. A dash means no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss.

Airbnb, Inc. earned a ROE of 31% in FY25. That is up from a low of −7% in FY21. Its return on capital used (ROIC) is 5.8 percentage points above its cost of capital, so growth here adds value, not just size. It comes from a 20.5% net margin and 0.55× asset turnover (sales divided by assets).

Return on equity (ROE) is the profit the business earns on its shareholders’ money. We do not have the full capital split, so ROE is the longest history we can draw here.

Why the return is what it is (FY25): a 20.5% net margin × 0.55× asset turnover × 2.71× leverage (assets divided by equity) ≈ 30.6% on equity. The margin does most of the work; borrowing is a big part of it.

The key test, return on capital used minus the cost of capital: 16.8% − 11.0% = +5.8 percentage points. The 11.0% is an estimate of this company's own cost of capital. Read the sign and size of the gap, not the decimals. A gap this wide means each dollar put back into the business creates more than a dollar of value.

The 16.8% ROIC above is the latest reading, as reported. The yearly chart below shows FY24 at 823.3%, and the quarterly chart works out each 12-month window from the quarterly figures, so the readings differ by date, not by method.

Airbnb, Inc. has total debt of $2.5 B against shareholder equity of $7.8 B as of Jun 2026, so its debt is 0.32× its equity. Year by year, that ratio went from 0.51 in FY21 to 0.28 in FY25. Keep that borrowing in mind when reading the returns on this page.

Debt-to-equity shows how much of the business is paid for with borrowed money. Lower is safer, and the direction matters as much as the level.

3.6% of Airbnb, Inc.'s tradable shares are in short positions, which are bets that the price will fall, so some traders are betting against it. At normal trading volumes, closing those positions would take about 3.2 days. US companies do not publish a quarter-by-quarter list of owners, so this page uses short interest instead.

There is no quarter-by-quarter list of owners here, so we look at short interest: the share of tradable shares held in short positions, which gain if the price falls.

It is a single reading at one point in time; we do not have its history.

Why it is at this level: the figure does not say who has the short positions or why, so we show the level without guessing the story.

For Airbnb, Inc., the Z-score is 3.01. A Z-score above about 3 is safe and below about 1.8 signals danger, so this is well clear of danger. It estimates how far the balance sheet is from trouble; it is not a forecast of failure.

The Z-score estimates how far a company is from balance-sheet trouble. Above about 3 is safe; below about 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not used for banks and lenders.

Why it matters: a Z-score of 3.01 is well clear of the danger zone, so the balance sheet is not the risk here.

53.6 out of 100, rank 8 of 14 in Travel Services, with 81% of the evidence available.

Airbnb, Inc. scores 53.6 out of 100 against the 14 companies it is compared with in Travel Services, ranking 8. Relative strength against the index is 15.2%, and revenue and profit growth are weak.

The four parts add up to the total exactly: 16.1 + 19.4 + 4.7 + 13.4 = 53.6. This is the same number shown on the industry page; it is worked out once for the whole group and read here.

What would change it: The score would fall if profit growth turns negative or margins stop improving while the share price lags its sector.

Airbnb ranks 8 of 14 Travel Services companies on the 4-Factor Sector Score, with 53.6 out of 100.

Missing figures are not scored as bad. They lower the confidence and pull the final score toward the middle. Relative strength counts only when the company has a reading for this week; with no reading, that factor is left out and its 20 points are shared across the other three in proportion. PEG is not shown when the ratio cannot mean anything: the company must be making a profit, its price-to-earnings must be positive, and its three-year earnings growth must fall between 5% and 60%. Dividing a price multiple by a loss, or by growth measured off a tiny base, produces a number that looks precise and tells you nothing. Under relative strength, one mark per week shows the last 12 weeks: a mark is filled where the company led S&P 500 by 5% or more over the 13 weeks ending that week, which is the same test used everywhere on this site. Price stage places the company on the same six-step path the industry is placed on (basing, turning, breaking out, leader, fading, asleep), read from how many weeks running it has led S&P 500 and whether that lead is growing or shrinking. It describes where the share price stands, not the direction of earnings, and it is not a recommendation; it is left blank for a company whose weekly history is too short or too stale to read.

The figures in this ranking come from the industry comparison: results through the Sep 2026 quarter, and the P/E at that quarter's end. The sections above use the latest weekly price, so a P/E or return there can differ a little from the one here. The stage words in this ranking (such as losing its lead or breaking out) describe the lead over the index, not the price phase in the price section.

Related companies: Travel Services, all 14 compared on one page.

Airbnb is the 2nd largest of 14 Travel Services companies on Sector Alpha by market value (scores of 4 November 2026). Just above it: Booking Holdings Inc. Just below it: Royal Caribbean Cruises, Carnival Corporation, Viking Holdings, Expedia Group, Inc. and Trip.com Group.

Travel Services companies close in size

1. Booking Holdings Inc. $128.4 billion
2. Airbnb, Inc. $104 billion
3. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. $89.1 billion
4. Carnival Corporation Ltd. $42.1 billion
5. Viking Holdings Ltd $40.7 billion
6. Expedia Group, Inc. $37.9 billion
7. Trip.com Group Limited $26.9 billion

All 14 Travel Services companies, largest first

Companies close in size in other industries

150. HCA Healthcare, Inc. $106.7 billion · Medical Care Facilities
151. Equinix, Inc. $104.4 billion · REIT - Specialty
152. Airbnb, Inc. $104 billion
153. Moderna, Inc. $103.2 billion · Biotechnology
154. The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation $102.7 billion · Banks - Diversified

Sector Alpha, written by code from the published numbers. Data as of 4 November 2026.

Every chart on this page is drawn by code from the published figures, with no forecasts and no price opinions.

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