Bank of Maharashtra

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Bank of Maharashtra trades at ₹84.9, in a confirmed uptrend and 65 weeks into that stage. That is +12.6% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 82% of a 52-week range of ₹57 to ₹91. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (11 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 65 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹84.9 it trades +12.6% versus its 200-day average and sits at 82% of its 52-week range (₹57–₹91).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.6 years the stock moved +199% while the NIFTY 500 moved +268% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (11 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-07-10) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

Bank of Maharashtra's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 19 July 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: Not stated in the research file. Still open: See the risks below Our fortnightly research layers last read it on 22 August 2026.

What is proven. See the research file

What is not proven yet. See the risks below

Layer 1 read, 22 August 2026 — KEEP. Still the cleanest PSU bank and still compounding — but the re-rating is done; only book growth pays now.

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Spread falling below 3.65% for two quarters in a row while bad loans stop improving — the spread is already down 10 basis points quarter on quarter and management says deposit cost has not bottomed, so both engines stalling together would leave an 86th-percentile price-to-book with nothing holding it up and would turn this from a hold into an exit.

Layer 2 read, 22 August 2026 — ADVANCE. The operating recovery survives; this is an ADVANCE for holding, not a signal to add. Gross bad loans improved to 1.45% and net bad loans to 0.13%, while the sector's earnings and deposit-cost recovery still supports the hold thesis. The sector also says the re-rating is done and expected-loss rules add a future cost, so ADVANCE means continued review with no fresh add.

What would change Layer 2’s mind. Flip to DROP if expected-credit-loss adoption or weaker recoveries push credit cost above management's 1% guide while bad-loan ratios rise for two quarters.

Layer 3 read, 22 August 2026 — BENCH. The bank is delivering, but selective disclosure and a fully rerated book leave no fresh-add cushion. Recoveries and credit cost still support the operating thesis, while the web sweep found only a non-material RBI penalty. The harder issue is management disclosure: the CLM1 pause and capital-raise change were not communicated cleanly, and the P/BV read is near justified value rather than cheap.

🚨 CIO read, 22 August 2026 — EXIT. EXIT (story_complete) · forward-asymmetry 43/100 · CONTESTED. The loan and bad-loan engine is still improving, but the correct bank valuation lens shows 1.7 times book at the 80th percentile of its own history. A judged 17% EPS path clears the model's 1.1% requirement, but a SPENT rating forces a contest.

The test written in advance. Management Disclosure — Three Documented Material Omissions — Management Disclosure — Three Documented Material Omissions Any regulatory change in sector — cross-check next concall timing vs RBI circulars dated in the prior quarter by the next result.

The test written in advance. Valuation — P/BV at 88th Percentile, Re-Rating Done — Valuation — P/BV at 88th Percentile, Re-Rating Done ROE print below 21% for two consecutive quarters signals P/BV de-rating risk by the next result.

The test written in advance. Deposit Cost Structural Pressure — Household Shift to Mutual Funds — Deposit Cost Structural Pressure — Household Shift to Mutual Funds Cost of deposits exceeding 4.60% for two consecutive quarters while CASA falls below 49% by the next result.

Lever 16 · Asset quality — BUILDING. GNPA fell from 1.85% (Jun 2024) to 1.45% (Jun 2026) over 8 quarters; credit cost 0.99% in Q1 FY27 (vs 1.19% two years ago) — each 10 bps decline in GNPA releases ~Rs 100-150 Cr PAT annually. What proves it keeps working: Asset Quality Compounding — GNPA Decline Funds Credit Cost Reduction. It stops working if GNPA inflects above 1.70% (two consecutive quarters) or slippage ratio exceeds 1.5% — would signal the rapid 27% advance growth is generating hidden quality problems in the new portfolio.

Sources: our stock research file (19 July 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue For a bank, revenue is everything the franchise earns — interest on the loan book plus fee and other income.

Bank of Maharashtra reported ₹8,035 Cr of income in the Jun 26 quarter, +13.9% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 8.4% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹29,282 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹30,262 Cr.

Why this happened. MSME grew 23% YoY in Q1 FY27 and agri 30% — both above the 15-16% recovery target management had deferred three consecutive calls; credit score floor of 681 and CMR 1-5 underwriting contain quality risk during growth re-acceleration.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹29,282 Cr (+17.4% on the year), capping 10 years at 8.4% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹8,035 Cr, +13.9% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +15.9% growth against the decade's 8.4% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +15.8% over the last 4 quarters against +18.4%/yr over the last 8 — stabilising; TTM profit +31.0% vs +29.7%/yr — stabilising.

FY26-Q4. revenue ₹7,755 Cr and profit ₹2,045 Cr as reported.

FY27-Q1. revenue ₹8,035 Cr and profit ₹2,023 Cr as reported.

Why-sources: our stock research file (19 July 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net margin Net margin — what the bank keeps of every ₹100 of revenue after every cost, provision and tax. It is the cleanest single margin we can read for a lender.

Bank of Maharashtra's net margin is 25.2% in the Jun 26 quarter, +3.9 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across 13 fiscal years the net margin has ranged −43.9% to 24.0%. The current quarter is running above every full year in that window.

The latest quarter's net margin is 25.2%, +3.9 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the net margin has ranged −43.9%–24.0%, and FY26's 24.0% is the top of that band — a record year.

Why: the numbers show the net margin move clearly, but the cost lines behind it sit below what we hold — so we state the move without inventing its driver.

Worth repeating from the valuation section: cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap — a record margin flatters every ratio built on top of it.

FY26-Q4. revenue ₹7,755 Cr and profit ₹2,045 Cr as reported.

FY27-Q1. revenue ₹8,035 Cr and profit ₹2,023 Cr as reported.

Why-sources: our stock research file (19 July 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Bank of Maharashtra earned ₹2,023 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +34.5% year on year. It is the 12th consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹7,017 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 50.5%. That is 25.2% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹1,504 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹2,023 Cr, +34.5% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹7,017 Cr (+26.6%), and the 10-year compound rate is 50.5%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +13.9% and the margin +3.9 pp — the quarter was margin-led: most of the profit growth came from keeping more of each sale.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +30.8% vs revenue +15.9%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

FY26-Q4. revenue ₹7,755 Cr and profit ₹2,045 Cr as reported.

FY27-Q1. revenue ₹8,035 Cr and profit ₹2,023 Cr as reported.

Why-sources: our stock research file (19 July 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Asset quality — the ladder Gross NPA is the slice of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what remains after the money already set aside against those loans. Falling is healing; rising is damage arriving.

Bank of Maharashtra's gross NPA is 1.45% of the loan book in Jun 26, down from 1.74% a year ago. Net of provisions already set aside, 0.13% remains. That is the 11th straight quarter of improvement. Across the 12 quarters held here the book has ranged 1.45% to 2.19%.

Why this happened. GNPA fell from 1.85% (Jun 2024) to 1.45% (Jun 2026) over 8 quarters; credit cost 0.99% in Q1 FY27 (vs 1.19% two years ago) — each 10 bps decline in GNPA releases ~Rs 100-150 Cr PAT annually.

Jun 26: gross NPA at 1.45% and net NPA at 0.13%, against 1.74% / 0.18% a year ago. Over the 12 quarters we hold, the book's worst reading was 2.19% and its best is 1.45% — which is the current print. The ladder has now improved for 11 consecutive quarters.

The synthesis: profit growth at a bank is only as good as the book behind it, and this book is healing on a multi-quarter streak. A note on depth: quarterly provisioning detail is not in our numbers yet, so this ladder reads levels and trend, not the cost of the cleanup.

Why the ladder moved: recoveries, write-offs and slippages each play a part, and that split sits below what we hold — the numbers show the healing; the driver mix does not travel with them.

The loan book We read the loan book through revenue — when the book grows, revenue grows with it. It is a rough proxy, and we say so: rate moves and fee swings can shift it a few points in any one year.

Bank of Maharashtra's revenue grew +17.4% in FY26 to ₹29,282 Cr, so the book is growing. The latest quarter ran +13.9% year on year. The net margin on that income is 25.2%, +3.9 percentage points against a year ago. Interest income is a proxy for the book; rate moves can shift it a few points in any one year.

Why this happened. 200 branches annually in identified growth centers; 3-4 year payback; GIFT IBU profitable in 6 months vs 3-year plan; outside-Maharashtra deposits contributed Rs 21,000 Cr of Rs 43,000 Cr total deposit growth in FY26.

FY26 revenue was ₹29,282 Cr, +17.4% on the year, and the latest quarter ran +13.9% year on year. The net margin on that revenue is 25.2% this quarter (+3.9 pp YoY) — growth with a widening margin on it.

The synthesis: a lender compounds when the book grows while the margin holds and the loan book stays clean — gross NPA is the loan-quality read we carry here.

Returns on equity and assets Two numbers rate a bank: ROE — what it earns on shareholder money — and ROA — what it earns on everything it deploys. ROE above ~13–15% earns its keep; below that, growth builds book slowly.

Bank of Maharashtra earns a return on equity of 23% in FY26. Its trough over the ladder below was −60% in FY19. On the asset side every ₹100 of the balance sheet earned about ₹1.90, which is the return before leverage is applied.

FY26 ROE came in at 23%, recovered from a FY19 trough of −60%. On assets, the latest reading is about 1.90% — every ₹100 the bank deploys earns roughly ₹1.90 a year. That clears the bar a bank must beat for its book value to compound.

Why ROE moved: profit compounded 50.5% a year over 10 years while the equity base grew more slowly — earnings recovering faster than book value builds is what lifts ROE off a trough.

Debt

For a bank, borrowings are raw material, not a warning sign — solvency is read through the returns and the loan book. A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits, so the debt-to-equity lens that works everywhere else misleads on a lender and is not applied here.

A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits; a bank’s borrowings are its inventory — money taken in to be lent out. The debt lens that works everywhere else misleads here, so this page does not apply it. The solvency questions for a bank — is the loan book sound, is the equity earning — are read through the loan-book and returns sections above.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters cut 12.9 points of Bank of Maharashtra over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 73.6% of the company. Domestic institutions moved +9.7 points over the same window, to 14.3%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Promoters: −12.9 points over 8 quarters to 73.6%; Domestic institutions: +9.7 points over 8 quarters to 14.3%; Foreign institutions: +4.6 points over 8 quarters to 5.8%.

🚨 Why the register moved: promoters drove it (−12.9 points), absorbed on the other side by domestic institutions (+9.7 points) — distribution into the market’s bid.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Bank of Maharashtra: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre. The Z-score was built for manufacturers and is not applied to banks and lenders, so solvency here is read from the capital and asset-quality lines instead.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre.

Valuation For a bank we price the book, not the earnings: P/BV is what the market pays for each ₹1 of the bank's net worth. A bank below 1× book is priced below the value of what it owns, net of what it owes.

Bank of Maharashtra trades at 1.8× P/BV, at the pricey end of its own range (88th percentile). Its long-run median P/BV is 0.9×, measured across 10.6 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/BV of 1.8× is at the pricey end of its own range (88th percentile), against a long-run median of 0.9× measured over 10.6 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

🚨 Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year book value grew while the price moved +57.2% — the price ran ahead of the book, pushing the multiple up its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +36.3%/yr price move, ~+18.6%/yr came from book-value growth and ~+17.7 pp from the multiple (expanding); over 10y, of the +10.6%/yr price move, ~−4.9%/yr came from book-value growth and ~+15.5 pp from the multiple (expanding). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus book-value growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is full against its own past, so the story rests on the book-value line underneath it, not the multiple.

What the price assumes This reading works the multiple backwards. It asks one question: what yearly rate of profit growth is a buyer at the market price already paying for? The number is the growth rate that makes eleven years of profit — six years growing, then five fading — add up to that day's market price, once each year is discounted at 11% a year.

Solved at its 27 August 2026 price, Bank of Maharashtra was paying for profit growth of about 1.1% a year. Profit itself has compounded 50.5% a year over the past 10 years. Today the market pays 1.8× P/BV, the 88th percentile of its own 11-year range.

What the two numbers say together. The multiple is full against its own past, and the growth the price is paying for is below what this company has actually delivered.

How to hold this number: it is a reading of one day's price, taken on 27 August 2026, not a running figure — every other number on this page, the multiple included, is read off the live quote as of 25 September 2026. A higher price is paying for more growth and a lower price for less, so it moves whenever the price does, and this page does not restate it between measurements.

Stage: Consistent Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Bank of Maharashtra reads as consistent on its fundamental arc. Consistent — revenue, profit and EPS growth have stayed positive through the window, with ROE at 21.1% and holding. The read is built from 12 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why it matters: steady curves with healthy returns are the compounding setup — the risk is the price, not the business.

4-Factor Sector Score

78.6/100 — rank 1 of 10 in Banks - PSU · 100% evidence confidence

Bank of Maharashtra scores 78.6 out of 100 against the 10 companies it is compared with in Banks - PSU, ranking 1. Confirmed research leader: earnings, capital efficiency and relative strength agree. Move to management, catalyst and risk diligence.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 29.8 + 24.3 + 10.5 + 14 = 78.6. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if ROA rolls over or gross NPA rises while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What Bank of Maharashtra's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

Tax Rate Guidance Substantially Higher · 10 July 2026. In the Jan 2026 call, management guided that the tax rate on a PBT basis for FY27 would be around 18% to 20%, and on an OP basis it would be 13% to 14%. However, in the Jul 2026 call, management now states the tax rate on a PBT basis is 16% to 17% and on an OP basis it is 12% to 13%, a notable downward revision without clear explanation of what changed structurally.

Gold Loan Co-Lending Pause Not Disclosed · 20 April 2026. In the January 2026 call, management actively promoted further expansion of gold loan co-lending partnerships, reinforcing gold loans as a key focus product growing at 40-45% year-on-year with plans to deepen NBFC tie-ups. Critically, RBI's mandatory CLM1 co-lending model requirement had already taken effect on January 1, 2026 — 13 days before the call — causing management to pause all fresh gold loan co-lending underwriting, a material development left entirely undisclosed to analysts. The April 2026 call confirmed this pause and that gold loans declined 17% Q-o-Q in Q4 FY26 as a direct consequence. Earlier call (Jan 2026): “We intend to further increase these co-lending partnerships with some good rated gold NBFCs who will be willing to join hands with us... we will keep this drive of growing the gold portfolio.” Later call (Apr 2026): “for our co-lending arrangements with nine gold NBFCs, RBI issued fresh guidelines requiring a mandatory switch to the CLM1 model starting January 1, 2026...While we were getting high collections, we paused fresh underwriting during this transition.”

FY26 Capital Raise Plans Silently Abandoned · 20 April 2026. In the October 2025 call, management provided an explicit, directional commitment to execute a Rs. 7,500 crore capital raise (Rs. 5,000 crore equity, Rs. 2,500 crore debt) within FY26, with Board approval already in hand and dual motivations of funding growth and achieving MPS compliance clearly stated. With FY26 now concluded, the April 2026 call makes zero mention of any bank-level equity or debt raise, referencing only the Government of India's OFS for MPS compliance, and providing no explanation for why the previously committed fundraise was not executed or deferred. Earlier call (Oct 2025): “I have Rs. 7,500 crore of approval from the Board within which equity is Rs. 5,000 crore, the rest is debt. At the opportune time in the remaining FY26, we would definitely like to take a call on this and we will use to go for the fund raise.” Later call (Apr 2026): “Following the OFS issuance by the Government of India, their holding has come down to 73.60%, and we are now MPS compliant.”

🚨 MSME and Agri Growth Recovery Consistently Deferred · 20 April 2026. In the October 2025 call, management signaled a return to 15-16% growth in MSME and agriculture 'in coming quarters.' The January 2026 call escalated confidence by stating that 'from December and onwards' growth would return to the prior 15-16% run-rate. However, the April 2026 call confirmed both segments closed FY26 materially below target — MSME at 11% and agri at 13% — with management once again deferring the recovery by saying they will 'soon regain' the 15-16% level in FY27, marking the third consecutive call where this recovery promise has been pushed out. Later call (Apr 2026): “While we were targeting 15% to 16% for these portfolios...This will continue, and we will soon regain our 15% to 16% growth levels in those segments.”

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions