Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd trades at ₹634, in a confirmed uptrend and 15 weeks into that stage. That is +7.6% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 84% of a 52-week range of ₹446 to ₹670. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 4 straight weeks.

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 15 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹634 it trades +7.6% versus its 200-day average and sits at 84% of its 52-week range (₹446–₹670).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.5 years the stock moved +391% while the NIFTY 500 moved +267% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 4 straight weeks — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 19 July 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: Not stated in the research file. Our fortnightly research layers last read it on 19 July 2026.

Our read, 19 July 2026. Jindal Drilling has a fully deployed rig fleet and an observable tender opportunity, but the reported low earnings multiple is distorted by peak operating margins and volatile other income while refurbishment and vendor-payment needs limit capital-allocation flexibility.

What is proven. Jindal Drilling has a fully deployed rig fleet and an observable tender opportunity, but the reported low earnings multiple is distorted by peak operating margins and volatile other income while refurbishment and vendor-payment needs limit capital-allocation flexibility.

What is not proven yet. The thesis improves only if refurbished rigs return to work at higher realised day rates while operating margin holds near the latest level without further litigation-driven profit volatility; it breaks if refurbishment is delayed, the Pioneer vendor payment requires fresh funding, or operating margin falls further despite fleet deployment.

🚨 What would change our mind. The thesis improves only if refurbished rigs return to work at higher realised day rates while operating margin holds near the latest level without further litigation-driven profit volatility; it breaks if refurbishment is delayed, the Pioneer vendor payment requires fresh funding, or operating margin falls further despite fleet deployment.

🚨 Layer 1 read, 19 July 2026 — DROP. Cheap PE is a peak-margin cyclical trap, not a setup — operating margin is rolling over and earnings swing on litigation. The PE 7.98 looks cheap but sits on PEAK operating margins that have already fallen from 42% to 30%, with operating_cycle in CONTRACTION and reported EPS distorted by volatile litigation other income (Sep 2025 other income was 70% of PBT; Dec 2025 was a loss quarter on a -Rs 77 Cr reversal). All four management guidance items missed and there is only one unproven runway driver (a refurbished-rig award not yet signed), so this ranks to the bottom of keep as a value trap, not a multi-bagger.

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Refurbished rigs return to work at higher realised day rates with operating margin holding near 30%+ and NO further litigation-driven profit volatility (the timeline's own turn condition) — that would convert the trap read to a genuine operating recovery; a signed refurbishment contract award (M2) is the first proof point.

The test written in advance. Peak-margin valuation trap — Peak-margin valuation trap Operating margin falls below the latest level while tender pricing remains flat. by the next result.

The test written in advance. Refurbishment and funding execution — Refurbishment and funding execution Borrowings rise or the vendor payment remains unresolved without a disclosed cash source. by the next result.

What the company does. Revenue growth and the operating-profit recovery are real, but recent operating margins have stepped down from their mid-year high. The litigation reversal explains the reported loss without implying a loss of operating profitability, yet it also demonstrates why statutory profit is not a clean run-rate measure. The investment case needs better tender rates and completed redeployment before the optically low multiple can be treated as value.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: A quarterly loss suggests an operating breakdown. The research reads it further: Operating profit remained positive; the loss coincided with the litigation-related other-income reversal rather than a loss of the core drilling contribution.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: The reported profit surge suggests an earnings acceleration. The research reads it further: Most of the pre-tax profit came from other income linked to the litigation award, so the statutory profit spike was not a clean operating-margin signal.

Lever 6 · Order-book wins — BUILDING. Limited suitable rigs and the ONGC tender pipeline can improve utilization after refurbishment. What proves it keeps working: Tender-led fleet redeployment. It stops working if Tender awards do not convert into deployed days after refurbishment, or realised rates remain at the low competitive level.

Sources: our stock research file (19 July 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd reported ₹275 Cr of revenue in the Jun 26 quarter, +8.3% year on year. That is the 11th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 12.0% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹997 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹1,018 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹997 Cr (+20.4% on the year), capping 10 years at 12.0% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹275 Cr, +8.3% year on year — the 11th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +13.8% growth against the decade's 12.0% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +11.9% over the last 4 quarters against +21.1%/yr over the last 8 — rolling over; TTM profit −19.3% vs +52.1%/yr — rolling over.

FY26-Q4. revenue ₹263 Cr and profit ₹45 Cr as reported.

FY27-Q1. revenue ₹275 Cr and profit ₹47 Cr as reported.

Why-sources: our stock research file (19 July 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd's operating margin is 36.0% in the Jun 26 quarter, −6.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −267.0% to 38.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 36.0%, −6.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −267.0%–38.0%.

🚨 Why the margin moved: operating margin went −6.3 pp year on year while gross margin went +0.0 pp — the loss came mostly below the gross line: operating leverage, with costs spread over a bigger revenue base.

FY26-Q4. revenue ₹263 Cr and profit ₹45 Cr as reported.

FY27-Q1. revenue ₹275 Cr and profit ₹47 Cr as reported.

Why-sources: our stock research file (19 July 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd earned ₹47.0 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, −28.8% year on year. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹211 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 5.0%. That is 17.1% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹66.0 Cr. 2 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Jun 26 profit was ₹47.0 Cr, −28.8% year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹211 Cr (−2.3%), and the 10-year compound rate is 5.0%.

🚨 Why profit moved: revenue contributed +8.3% and the margin −6.0 pp — the quarter was revenue-led despite a thinner margin.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +18.7% vs revenue +13.8%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

FY26-Q4. revenue ₹263 Cr and profit ₹45 Cr as reported.

FY27-Q1. revenue ₹275 Cr and profit ₹47 Cr as reported.

Why-sources: our stock research file (19 July 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 209% of Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY26 that was ₹178 Cr of operating cash against ₹211 Cr of profit. After ₹49.0 Cr of capital spending, ₹129 Cr was left as free cash.

Why this happened. The multi-year cash record and the reduction in reported borrowings show that the business has funded both asset investment and debt reduction. The latest annual cash conversion is weaker than the multi-year result, so this driver is support rather than proof that all refurbishment needs can be self-funded.

FY26: operating cash of ₹178 Cr against reported profit of ₹211 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹129 Cr after ₹49.0 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 209% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 209%: the cash cycle tightened 70 days between FY21 and FY26 — cash that used to wait in the cycle now reaches the bank sooner.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 2.9× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 82 days in FY26, down from 152 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹894 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹997 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹2.7 Cr, so roughly ₹224 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 82 days (an asset-light business — no inventory to speak of) — for a full cycle of 82 days, tighter than FY21's 152.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹997 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹2.7 Cr — so the 82-day loop keeps roughly ₹224 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹894 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹304 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹7.0 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.⚠ unverified

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd earns a ROCE of 14% in FY26. That is up from a trough of −31% in FY20. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by −2.3 percentage points, so growth here is not yet paying for the capital it uses. The wiring behind it is 21.2% net margin on 0.40× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 14%, recovered from a FY20 trough of −31% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

🚨 Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 21.2% net margin × 0.40× asset turns × 1.38× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 11.7% on equity. Margin is doing the heavy lifting; leverage is modest — this is an earned return, not a borrowed one.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 9.7% − 12.0% = a −2.3 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. Negative — growth at these returns destroys value until the returns recover.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.⚠ unverified

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd carries total debt of ₹93.0 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹1,820 Cr as of Mar 26, a debt-to-equity of 0.05 — effectively unlevered. On the annual view that ratio went from 0.18 in FY22 to 0.05 in FY26. The returns elsewhere on this page are therefore earned rather than borrowed.

Mar 26: total debt of ₹93.0 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹1,820 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.05. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 0.18 (FY22) to 0.05 (FY26). The returns on this page are earned, not borrowed.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters added 2.5 points of Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 66.8% of the company. Domestic institutions moved −1.0 points over the same window, to 0.0%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Promoters: +2.5 points over 8 quarters to 66.8%; Domestic institutions: −1.0 points over 8 quarters to 0.0%; Foreign institutions: +0.1 points over 8 quarters to 0.4%.

Why the register moved: promoters drove it (+2.5 points), absorbed on the other side by domestic institutions (−1.0 points) — steady accumulation by institutions reading the same numbers this page reads.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd trades at 9.4× P/E, mid-range by its own standards (65th percentile). Its long-run median P/E is 7.9×, measured across 10.6 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 9.4× is mid-range by its own standards (65th percentile), against a long-run median of 7.9× measured over 10.6 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved −2.5% against a +5.6% price move — the price outran earnings, pushing the multiple UP its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +36.3%/yr price move, ~+76.8%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−40.5 pp from the multiple (compressing); over 10y, of the +13.4%/yr price move, ~+5.1%/yr came from earnings growth and ~+8.3 pp from the multiple (expanding). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is full against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

A quarterly PEG curve, which only the second data source carries, is not drawn on this page: its two data sources do not share enough overlapping reported history to be compared. A figure nobody could check is not used to price growth — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

What the price assumes This reading works the multiple backwards. It asks one question: what yearly rate of profit growth is a buyer at the market price already paying for? The number is the growth rate that makes eleven years of profit — six years growing, then five fading — add up to that day's market price, once each year is discounted at 11% a year.

Solved at its 20 July 2026 price, Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd was paying for profit growth of about 1.0% a year. Profit itself has compounded 5.0% a year over the past 10 years. Today the market pays 9.4× P/E, the 65th percentile of its own 11-year range.

What the two numbers say together. The multiple is full against its own past, and the growth the price is paying for is close to what this company has actually delivered.

How to hold this number: it is a reading of one day's price, taken on 20 July 2026, not a running figure — every other number on this page, the multiple included, is read off the live quote as of 11 September 2026. A higher price is paying for more growth and a lower price for less, so it moves whenever the price does, and this page does not restate it between measurements.

Stage: Deteriorating Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd reads as deteriorating on its fundamental arc. Deteriorating — profit and EPS growth are shrinking (profit growth −19.3% latest against +323.5% at its 12-quarter best), ROCE holding at 14.0%. The read is built from 8 quarters across 4 curves, on partial evidence.

🚨 Why it matters: falling curves mean every cheap-looking ratio below needs a discount for direction.

Return readings here are annual, not quarterly — read as level and direction only; they can confirm the growth curves but never drive the stage on their own.

A partial read: at least one curve is short, or the returns curve is not the computed quarterly series — hold the stage word a little more loosely.

4-Factor Sector Score

44.2/100 — rank 7 of 10 in Oil Drilling & Exploration · 74% evidence confidence

Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd scores 44.2 out of 100 against the 10 companies it is compared with in Oil Drilling & Exploration, ranking 7. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 14.3 + 11.1 + 11.1 + 7.7 = 44.2. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

🚨 Jindal Pioneer Deployment Delayed · 10 August 2026. In Nov 2025, management expected the Jindal Pioneer refurbishment to conclude in Q4 FY26, while the Jan 2026 call said the rig was being brought back to India for the ONGC tender. In Aug 2026, management still described the rig as under refurbishment in the UAE and targeted deployment in October 2026, a material timeline slippage that was not explained on the latest call.

Refurbishment Downtime Estimate Increased · 10 August 2026. The Jan 2026 call estimated that refurbishment after de-hiring would take about 3 to 4 months. In Aug 2026, management raised the expected period to 4 to 6 months and confirmed that no revenue would accrue during the work; with three rigs due for de-hire, this increases near-term revenue and earnings risk without explaining the revised duration.

Litigation Income Reversal · 30 January 2026. Management confidently stated in the November 2025 call that the ONGC litigation was concluded after a bank guarantee release, leading them to book a onetime gain of ~INR 100 crores. In the January 2026 call, they contradicted this finality, announcing that due to a Supreme Court appeal, they have now been forced to reverse this previously booked income entirely. Earlier call (Nov 2025): “At this point in time, the High Court ordered that the bank guarantee can be released. So we have booked it as other income.” Later call (Jan 2026): “However, since that point in time, the favorable award of the Bombay High Court was appealed in the Supreme Court... we should reverse the income which was already booked in the earlier quarter. Therefore, the other income line item is negative in the third quarter.”

Undisclosed Liability Contradicting Net Cash Narrative · 30 January 2026. In the November 2025 call, management touted a net cash position of INR 295 crores, explicitly claiming this improvement occurred 'despite the recent acquisition of Jindal Pioneer,' implying the asset was paid for or fully accounted for in that status. However, in the January 2026 call, they revealed a massive outstanding liability of $35 million (~INR 290 crores) specifically due to the Jindal Pioneer vendor, using this previously unhighlighted debt to explain why they cannot utilize cash for buybacks. Earlier call (Nov 2025): “Net cash position of the company, which has improved rapidly to INR 295 crores... It is important to note that the net cash position continues to improve despite the recent acquisition of Jindal Pioneer.” Later call (Jan 2026): “Additionally, there are dues of approximately $35 million to the vendor from whom we acquired Jindal Pioneer. ... That would consume almost the entire net cash we have right now.”

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions