Craftsman Automation Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Craftsman Automation Ltd trades at ₹10,251, in a confirmed uptrend and 63 weeks into that stage. That is +25.2% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 94% of a 52-week range of ₹6,519 to ₹10,483. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 3 straight weeks.

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 63 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹10,251 it trades +25.2% versus its 200-day average and sits at 94% of its 52-week range (₹6,519–₹10,483).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 5.4 years the stock moved +586% while the NIFTY 500 moved +92% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 3 straight weeks — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

Craftsman Automation Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 17 May 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: MID_EXPANSION. Still open: Five documented guidance reversals in 4 calls: Sunbeam EBITDA, alloy wheel Phase 2, leverage ratio, Shoolagiri plant impact, stationary engine revenue timeline. Pattern-level miss, not one-off.

Our read, 17 May 2026. A heavy capex cycle bottoming — three proof points (Sunbeam margin, alloy wheel utilization, stationary engines) that keep getting pushed out reveal a management credibility discount baked into the thesis.

From the numbers. PE at 68th percentile of historical range — above median 39.75x at current 51.4x. YoY trend is INFLECTION_DOWN (early deceleration in PE expansion). DII buying (DII at 24.37% vs 17.2% in Jun23) provides institutional…

From the price. Price stage 2, week 63 — above its 200-day line, relative strength falling.

From the research. A heavy capex cycle bottoming — three proof points (Sunbeam margin, alloy wheel utilization, stationary engines) that keep getting pushed out reveal a management credibility discount baked into the thesis.

🚨 Where they disagree. PE at 68th percentile of historical range — above median 39.75x at current 51.4x. YoY trend is INFLECTION_DOWN (early deceleration in PE expansion). DII buying (DII at 24.37% vs 17.2% in Jun23) provides institutional support. The cycle is EXPANDED_THEN_CONTRACTING_SHORT — peak was 64.7x in Mar2021 cycle, compressed to 29.8x trough (Mar2022), and has re-expanded. First-time expansion from trough — not cheap on current metrics but valuation has room to contract if earnings don't accelerate.

What is proven. A heavy capex cycle bottoming — three proof points (Sunbeam margin, alloy wheel utilization, stationary engines) that keep getting pushed out reveal a management credibility discount baked into the thesis.

What is not proven yet. Five documented guidance reversals in 4 calls: Sunbeam EBITDA, alloy wheel Phase 2, leverage ratio, Shoolagiri plant impact, stationary engine revenue timeline. Pattern-level miss, not one-off.

Layer 1 read, 19 July 2026 — KEEP. Real cash-generative machining recovery, but 5 guidance misses and unresolved paper-profit/promoter-selling digs cap it at P2. The operating turn is genuine — revenue 1,038->2,226 Cr, EPS off its Dec-2024 trough to 48.80, OPM 13%->16%, and STRONG cash conversion (OCF/PAT 1.43) with WC tightening. But the timeline's own thesis leads with a management-credibility discount: Sunbeam double-digit EBITDA, alloy-wheel Phase 2, and the leverage guide have all MISSED (5 reversals across 4 calls) [G1/G2/G3], and the why_dossier flags the headline PAT growth as partly other-income-driven and a 629bps promoter stake cut — both unresolved. At a RICH PE 58 (79.5th %ile) the market is paying up while execution keeps slipping, so P2, not P1.

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Sunbeam EBITDA finally inflecting to double-digit AND the other-income/promoter-selling digs resolving cleanly (a benign pledge-release explanation, core operating PAT confirmed) would lift this toward P1; conversely another Sunbeam/leverage MISS or promoter selling continuing would break the credibility leg and push toward DROP.

Layer 2 read, 19 July 2026 — BENCH. Real, cash-backed recovery - but a rich late-cycle entry with 5 broken promises: hold, don't chase. Craftsman's profit growth is genuine and operations-backed - PAT +73% is revenue-led and OCF ran +84.5% with working capital tightening, which clears the low-quality-earnings worry. But management has missed five stated targets (leverage, alloy-wheel Phase-2, stationary engines slipped to 2029), promoters have cut their stake ~629bps, and the whole auto-ancillary industry is flooding in fresh capacity while institutions crowd in (LATE_CYCLE_FLOOD) - a late-cycle setup on a top-quintile PE. That combination caps a P2 name at bench, not advance.

What would change Layer 2’s mind. A cited, benign explanation for the promoter reduction (QIP/estate/ESOP, not distress) PLUS a concall data point that the alloy-wheel utilization ramp and Sunbeam margin have finally turned as guided - i.e. the credibility discount starts closing - would flip BENCH->ADVANCE. Conversely, a 6th guidance miss or promoter selling continuing would move it toward DROP.

The test written in advance. Repeated Management Guidance Misses — Credibility Discount — Repeated Management Guidance Misses — Credibility Discount Q2 FY27 Sunbeam EBITDA margin — must show progress from single-digit; alloy wheel Phase 2 decision announcement by the next result.

The test written in advance. Leverage Elevated, Deleveraging Path Delayed — Leverage Elevated, Deleveraging Path Delayed Net debt/EBITDA in each quarterly result; Sunbeam land monetization announcement by the next result.

The test written in advance. Aluminum Commodity Price Volatility (Input Cost Squeeze) — Aluminum Commodity Price Volatility (Input Cost Squeeze) Aluminum LME price trajectory; reported OPM vs realized value-addition margins per concall by the next result.

Lever 7 · Consolidation — BUILDING. Sunbeam + DR Axion merge into one entity targeting $1B aluminum revenue in 2-3 years; EBITDA currently single-digit but restructuring (exit unprofitable customers/products, Rs30Cr piston line sold) underway. What proves it keeps working: Operating Leverage Inflection (Aluminum Consolidation). It stops working if Q2 FY27 Sunbeam EBITDA margin — must show progress from single-digit; alloy wheel Phase 2 decision announcement.

Lever 9 · Buyback — BUILDING. Order book crosses 50% of $100M FY29-30 target; first invoicing 18 months away; global data center AI boom + only 8-9 companies globally mastered this technology; Craftsman partners with 3 of top 4 OEMs. What proves it keeps working: Stationary Engines for Data Centers ($100M by FY29-30). It stops working if Q2 FY27 Sunbeam EBITDA margin — must show progress from single-digit; alloy wheel Phase 2 decision announcement.

Lever 3 · Management change — BUILDING. OEM migration to 400+ HP heavy-duty engines and tractors increasing revenue per vehicle; powertrain delivered margin spike in FY25 from cessation of 4-5Q repair/maintenance penalty; 60% capacity utilization with 25% headroom. What proves it keeps working: Powertrain Mix Upgrade (Higher-Horsepower CV + Export). It stops working if Q2 FY27 Sunbeam EBITDA margin — must show progress from single-digit; alloy wheel Phase 2 decision announcement.

Lever 11 · Selling more to existing customers — BUILDING. China+1 manufacturing shift bringing Japanese, European, US OEM orders to India; Craftsman's 12-plant footprint positions it to capture $50-100M customer orders; FrankenMuth German subsidiary generating Rs158Cr quarterly at 14.87Cr EBITDA. What proves it keeps working: India Manufacturing Hub — Global OEM Inflows. It stops working if Q2 FY27 Sunbeam EBITDA margin — must show progress from single-digit; alloy wheel Phase 2 decision announcement.

Sources: our stock research file (17 May 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Craftsman Automation Ltd reported ₹2,432 Cr of revenue in the Jun 26 quarter, +36.3% year on year. That is the 11th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 24.7% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹8,069 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹8,717 Cr.

Why this happened. The aluminum business is the main value creation lever. Three entities — Craftsman aluminum, DR Axion (critical castings), and Sunbeam (acquired, die-casting) — are being consolidated under one entity. The strategic logic is sound: global peers operate at $3-6B scale while each Craftsman sub-segment is $100-200M. Consolidation enables overhead elimination, customer relationship depth, and capability bundling (casting, machining, assembly). Management guidance on Sunbeam margin has been deferred three times running. The inflection is real but the timeline keeps slipping.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹8,069 Cr (+41.8% on the year), capping 10 years at 24.7% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹2,432 Cr, +36.3% year on year — the 11th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +39.8% growth against the decade's 24.7% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +37.9% over the last 4 quarters against +38.2%/yr over the last 8 — stabilising; TTM profit +119.3% vs +21.5%/yr — accelerating.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Craftsman Automation Ltd's operating margin is 16.0% in the Jun 26 quarter, +1.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 15.0% to 28.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 16.0%, +1.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 15.0%–28.0%.

Why the margin moved: operating margin went +0.9 pp year on year while gross margin went −1.6 pp — the gain came mostly from the gross line: input costs and pricing.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Craftsman Automation Ltd earned ₹151 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +115.7% year on year. It is the 5th consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹384 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 25.7%. That is 6.2% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹70.0 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹151 Cr, +115.7% year on year — the 5th consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹384 Cr (+91.0%), and the 10-year compound rate is 25.7%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +36.3% and the margin +1.0 pp — the quarter was revenue-led, with the margin roughly flat.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +239.7% vs revenue +39.8%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 143% of Craftsman Automation Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY26 that was ₹522 Cr of operating cash against ₹384 Cr of profit. After ₹1,487 Cr of capital spending, ₹−965 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹522 Cr against reported profit of ₹384 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹−965 Cr after ₹1,487 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 143% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 143%: the cash cycle tightened 11 days between FY21 and FY26 — cash that used to wait in the cycle now reaches the bank sooner.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 3.7× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Craftsman Automation Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 74 days in FY26, down from 85 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹3,906 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹8,069 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹22.1 Cr, so roughly ₹1,636 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 50 days, inventory at 145 days — roughly 4.8 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 74 days, tighter than FY21's 85.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 145 days to sell; customers pay about 50 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 121 days — netting out to the 74-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹8,069 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹22.1 Cr — so the 74-day loop keeps roughly ₹1,636 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹3,906 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹1,069 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹382 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

Craftsman Automation Ltd earns a ROCE of 14% in FY26. That is up from a trough of 10% in FY17. A return-on-invested-capital spread against the cost of capital is not computable from what is held here. The wiring behind it is 4.8% net margin on 0.90× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 14%, recovered from a FY17 trough of 10% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 4.8% net margin × 0.90× asset turns × 2.75× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 11.9% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The quarterly return curves and the return-on-invested-capital overlay, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 12% on reported income across 14 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings; interest cover says how many times operating profit pays the interest bill. Low and high, respectively, is the safe corner.

Craftsman Automation Ltd carries ₹3,623 Cr of borrowings against ₹3,264 Cr of equity in FY26, a debt-to-equity of 1.11. Operating profit covers the interest bill 4×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹806 Cr to ₹3,623 Cr. Capital spending ran ₹3,906 Cr across the last 3 of those years.

FY26: borrowings of ₹3,623 Cr against equity of ₹3,264 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 1.11. Operating profit covers the interest bill 4×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹806 Cr to ₹3,623 Cr while capital spending ran ₹3,906 Cr in just the last 3 — part of the build-out is riding on borrowed money.

The total-debt and debt-to-equity series, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 12% on reported income across 14 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Domestic institutions added 11.4 points of Craftsman Automation Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes domestic institutions to 32.9% of the company. Promoters moved −6.3 points over the same window, to 42.4%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

Why this happened. This is the long-dated diversification bet. Craftsman's Kothavadi foundry (Kova) is being built out for large stationary engine blocks for data center generators. The revenue timeline itself was deferred from FY27 to 2029 on the Nov 2025 call — another guidance slip — but the strategic logic remains intact. The AI/data center buildout globally is structural, India has manufacturing cost advantages, and only ~8-9 companies globally have mastered this technology. Order book at >50% of target provides better forward visibility than most greenfield bets.

The register over the last two years — Domestic institutions: +11.4 points over 8 quarters to 32.9%; Promoters: −6.3 points over 8 quarters to 42.4%; Foreign institutions: +1.5 points over 8 quarters to 17.3%.

Why the register moved: domestic institutions drove it (+11.4 points), absorbed on the other side by promoters (−6.3 points) — steady accumulation by institutions reading the same numbers this page reads.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Craftsman Automation Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

Craftsman Automation Ltd trades at 57.2× P/E, at the pricey end of its own range (81st percentile). Its long-run median P/E is 39.0×, measured across 5.4 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 57.2× is at the pricey end of its own range (81st percentile), against a long-run median of 39.0× measured over 5.4 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved +97.4% against a +44.5% price move — earnings outran the price, pushing the multiple DOWN its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +38.7%/yr price move, ~+33.0%/yr came from earnings growth and ~+5.7 pp from the multiple (expanding). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is full against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

The PEG ratio and its quarterly curve, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 12% on reported income across 14 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

Stage: Turning around Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Craftsman Automation Ltd reads as turning around on its fundamental arc. Turning around — profit growth swung from −40.4% at the trough to +119.3%, a 5-quarter improving streak, ROCE holding at 14.0%. The read is built from 8 quarters across 4 curves, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: growth inflections are where re-ratings start — the curves say a turn is forming, so the question becomes whether the next quarters confirm it.

Return readings here are annual, not quarterly — read as level and direction only; they can confirm the growth curves but never drive the stage on their own.

A partial read: at least one curve is short, or the returns curve is not the computed quarterly series — hold the stage word a little more loosely.

4-Factor Sector Score

59.6/100 — rank 2 of 7 in Auto & Auto Ancl - CV · 82% evidence confidence

Craftsman Automation Ltd scores 59.6 out of 100 against the 7 companies it is compared with in Auto & Auto Ancl - CV, ranking 2. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 27.7 + 12.8 + 6.8 + 12.3 = 59.6. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What Craftsman Automation Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

🚨 Alloy Wheel Phase 2 Expansion - Material Timeline Reversal · 8 May 2026. In Nov 2025, management committed to installing an additional 2 million wheels of Phase 2 capacity at the Hosur plant within the coming couple of quarters, with full operation targeted by Q2 FY27, and cited customer orders above 6 million wheels as the demand justification. In May 2026, management states they have not pushed hard on Phase 2 expansion and will wait until after the current financial year to decide, without explaining why an execution described as imminent has been deferred indefinitely while current capacity is described as fully sold.

🚨 Sunbeam Double-Digit EBITDA Target - Missed and Deferred · 8 May 2026. Both the Nov 2025 and Jan 2026 calls provided confident, specific guidance that Sunbeam would achieve double-digit EBITDA margins in FY27, with Jan 2026 further stating that Q4 FY27 margins would exceed 10%. In May 2026, with FY27 already underway, management acknowledges Sunbeam remains at single-digit margins, explicitly describes the situation as lagging behind, and pushes any meaningful improvement out to Q2 FY27 at the earliest, making the full-year double-digit target appear out of reach with no substantive explanation for the miss.

Contradictory New Plant Impact · 29 January 2026. Management explicitly assured investors in July 2025 that the new Hosur (Shoolagiri) plant startup would not experience the 'shake up' or visible impact seen in previous ramp-ups. Contradicting this assurance, the latest call cites the startup of this exact plant as the primary reason for operational losses and a negative impact on standalone results. Earlier call (Jul 2025): “We will not see that sort of shake up, which has happened at Bhiwadi, in Hosur... So, that impact might not be visible much.” Later call (Jan 2026): “In Q3, there was the startup of a new plant in Shoolagiri. We have incurred operational losses in the first quarter to prove out all the parts. This affected the standalone results because it is quite a significant plant.”

Margin Sustainability Reversal · 29 January 2026. In the November 2025 call, management expressed high confidence that the improved aluminum margins were sustainable and that the current margin trend would continue. However, in the very next quarter, they reported that standalone EBIT margins fell sharply by 500 basis points, contradicting the sustainability narrative established just two months prior. Earlier call (Nov 2025): “These are sustainable margins... What current margin trend you are seeing, this will continue in the future also.” Later call (Jan 2026): “On the aluminum standalone margin, there is a dip sequentially quarter-on-quarter... EBIT margins fell sharply by almost 500 basis points.”

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions