GMR Airports Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

GMR Airports Ltd trades at ₹111, in a confirmed uptrend and 8 weeks into that stage. That is +12.3% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 89% of a 52-week range of ₹86 to ₹114. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 13 straight weeks.

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 8 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹111 it trades +12.3% versus its 200-day average and sits at 89% of its 52-week range (₹86–₹114).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.3 years the stock moved +907% while the NIFTY 500 moved +274% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 13 straight weeks — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

→ The trend is one thing; the bill is another. Are you paying up for it? Next: how the P/E reads against its own history.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

GMR Airports Ltd trades at 544.0× P/E, against too little history to rank. Its long-run median P/E is 47.9×, measured across 8.7 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 544.0× is against too little history to rank, against a long-run median of 47.9× measured over 8.7 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Put together: the multiple is unremarkable against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

→ Cheap or dear rides on the earnings. Are they actually growing? Next: the fundamental stage — where the business sits in its arc, and how growth has compounded.

Stage: No read Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

GMR Airports Ltd reads as no read on its fundamental arc. Under eight usable quarters on the growth trio — not enough history for an honest trajectory read. The read is built from 12 quarters across 1 curve, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: with too little history, an honest page says so instead of guessing a trajectory.

The return-on-capital curve is not shown — net worth is negative, so a return on capital is not a meaningful number in any basis. This is a distressed balance sheet, and the stage is read from the growth curves alone.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Fewer than eight usable quarters on the growth curves — this page will not guess a trajectory from a stub of history.

→ The stage names the trajectory. Next: the revenue line that produces it, quarter by quarter.

4-Factor Sector Score

58.0/100 — rank 9 of 36 in Miscellaneous · 71% evidence confidence

GMR Airports Ltd scores 58.0 out of 100 against the 36 companies it is compared with in Miscellaneous, ranking 9. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 22.5 + 10.8 + 8.6 + 16.1 = 58. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

GMR Airports Ltd reported ₹3,938 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, +37.5% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 6.0% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹14,807 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹14,807 Cr.

GMR Airports Ltd reported ₹3,938 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, +37.5% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 6.0% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹14,807 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹14,807 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹14,807 Cr (+42.2% on the year), capping 10 years at 6.0% compound. The latest quarter (Mar 26) printed ₹3,938 Cr, +37.5% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +42.1% growth against the decade's 6.0% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +42.2% over the last 4 quarters against +30.0%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating.

→ Revenue grew — did margins hold as it scaled? Next: 37.0% this quarter (+2.0 pp YoY).

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

GMR Airports Ltd's operating margin is 37.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, +2.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 6.0% to 50.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

GMR Airports Ltd's operating margin is 37.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, +2.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 6.0% to 50.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 37.0%, +2.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 6.0%–50.0%.

Why the margin moved: operating margin went +1.4 pp year on year while gross margin went −4.7 pp — the gain came mostly from the gross line: input costs and pricing.

→ Margins held — did that reach the bottom line? Next: profit null in the latest quarter.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

GMR Airports Ltd earned ₹400 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹472 Cr. That is 10.2% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier lost ₹253 Cr. 7 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

GMR Airports Ltd earned ₹400 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹472 Cr. That is 10.2% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier lost ₹253 Cr. 7 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Mar 26 profit was ₹400 Cr, null year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹472 Cr (null).

→ Profit rose — but did the cash follow? Next: 1,289% of the last 2 years' profit arrived as cash.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 2 fiscal years 1,289% of GMR Airports Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY26 that was ₹4,884 Cr of operating cash against ₹472 Cr of profit. After ₹4,260 Cr of capital spending, ₹624 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹4,884 Cr against reported profit of ₹472 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹624 Cr after ₹4,260 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 2 fiscal years the conversion rate is 1,289% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 1,289%: the cash cycle tightened 395 days between FY21 and FY26 — cash that used to wait in the cycle now reaches the bank sooner.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 2.6× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

→ So follow the cash to where it goes. Next: ₹13,330 Cr of building over 3 years.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

GMR Airports Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs −278 days in FY26, down from 117 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹13,330 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹14,807 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹40.6 Cr, so roughly ₹−11,278 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 15 days, inventory at 201 days — roughly 6.6 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of −278 days, tighter than FY21's 117.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 201 days to sell; customers pay about 15 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 494 days — netting out to the −278-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹14,807 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹40.6 Cr — so the −278-day loop keeps roughly ₹−11,278 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹13,330 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹5,213 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹5,433 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

→ Does all this activity actually earn its cost of capital? Next: ROCE is 12% and the ROIC − WACC spread is −4.0 pp.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

GMR Airports Ltd earns a ROCE of 12% in FY26. That is up from a trough of −1% in FY16. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by −4.0 percentage points, so growth here is not yet paying for the capital it uses. The wiring behind it is 3.2% net margin on 0.27× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 12%, recovered from a FY16 trough of −1% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

🚨 Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 3.2% net margin × 0.27× asset turns × −22.08× balance-sheet leverage ≈ −19.1% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is modest — this is an earned return, not a borrowed one.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 8.0% − 12.0% = a −4.0 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. Negative — growth at these returns destroys value until the returns recover.

→ Returns like these — is the balance sheet borrowing to make them? Next: debt-to-equity is −17.45.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.

GMR Airports Ltd's net worth is negative — it owes more than it owns — so a debt-to-equity ratio is not meaningful here. On the annual view that ratio went from 13.89 in FY22 to −27.94 in FY26. The returns elsewhere on this page are therefore earned rather than borrowed.

Mar 26: total debt of ₹43,283 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹−1,549 Cr — a debt-to-equity of −27.94. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 13.89 (FY22) to −27.94 (FY26). The returns on this page are earned, not borrowed.

→ Who owns this, and are they adding or leaving? Next: Promoters added 8.1 points over 8 quarters.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters added 8.1 points of GMR Airports Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 67.2% of the company. Foreign institutions moved −4.2 points over the same window, to 21.7%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Promoters: +8.1 points over 8 quarters to 67.2%; Foreign institutions: −4.2 points over 8 quarters to 21.7%; Domestic institutions: −0.6 points over 8 quarters to 5.1%.

Why the register moved: promoters drove it (+8.1 points), absorbed on the other side by foreign institutions (−4.2 points) — steady accumulation by institutions reading the same numbers this page reads.

→ One last check: does the safety math agree? Next: the balance-sheet safety line.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

GMR Airports Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

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