EPL Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

EPL Ltd trades at ₹245, in a confirmed uptrend and 13 weeks into that stage. That is +10.1% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 100% of a 52-week range of ₹184 to ₹245. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 1 straight week.

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 13 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹245 it trades +10.1% versus its 200-day average and sits at 100% of its 52-week range (₹184–₹245).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.5 years the stock moved +264% while the NIFTY 500 moved +284% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 1 straight week — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

EPL Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 27 June 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: EARLY_EXPANSION_TO_MID. Our fortnightly research layers last read it on 19 July 2026.

Our read, 27 June 2026. EPL's transformational merger with IndoVida creates a large global packaging platform, pairing Beauty and Cosmetics growth with scaled emerging market leadership, though near-term Middle East inflation tests its pricing power.

From the numbers. PE compressed to 12th percentile of 10Y range while earnings grew. Earnings-driven multiple compression creates a GARP setup.

From the price. Price stage 2, week 13 — above its 200-day line, relative strength rising.

From the research. EPL's transformational merger with IndoVida creates a large global packaging platform, pairing Beauty and Cosmetics growth with scaled emerging market leadership, though near-term Middle East inflation tests its pricing…

🚨 Where they disagree. PE compressed to 12th percentile of 10Y range while earnings grew. Earnings-driven multiple compression creates a GARP setup.

What is proven. EPL's transformational merger with IndoVida creates a large global packaging platform, pairing Beauty and Cosmetics growth with scaled emerging market leadership, though near-term Middle East inflation tests its pricing power.

What is not proven yet. A failure to recover Middle East supply chain cost inflation through pricing, leading to consolidated EBITDA margins compressing for two consecutive quarters, would invalidate the thesis on pricing power and margin resilience.

🚨 What would change our mind. A failure to recover Middle East supply chain cost inflation through pricing, leading to consolidated EBITDA margins compressing for two consecutive quarters, would invalidate the thesis on pricing power and margin resilience.

Layer 1 read, 19 July 2026 — KEEP. Held packaging compounder: PE at 11th-percentile lows while earnings quietly hit record highs. EPL's earnings engine is expanding, not contracting: quarterly EPS climbed from 1.71 to 3.21 with OPM held at 20-21% and record revenue of Rs 1,300cr in Mar 2026, yet the PE sits at the 11th percentile of its own decade. Both said-vs-delivered guidance pairs came in as BEAT, and the IndoVida merger plus Beauty & Cosmetics growth give a nameable multi-quarter runway. I flag that the deterministic value_trap=true label is wrong here — the recent 12 quarters show expansion — and that the row is a web-fallback (synthetic_source), so conviction is held one notch below top.

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Consolidated EBITDA margin compressing for two consecutive quarters (from the current ~20% OPM) because Middle East supply-chain cost inflation cannot be recovered through pricing — that would break the pricing-power leg of the thesis.

Layer 2 read, 19 July 2026 — ADVANCE. Held packaging compounder sitting in the doctrine's ideal supply-withdrawal trough — cheap, cash-rich, no external negative. EPL trades at the 12th percentile of its own PE history (17.5 vs 23.1 median) with both guidance pairs beaten and 12-quarter EPS up 1.71->3.21, and it generates strong cash (OCF/PAT 2.17x). The capital-cycle block reads IDEAL_TROUGH_SETUP — industry capex is falling 20% yoy while institutions are absent — the under-owned, supply-tightening setup the strategy is built to hold early. The sector-fallback fundamentals (aggregate OPM stepped 13.6%->20%) confirm this is a durable, de-rating platform, not a contracting one; the CONTRACTION atom is a base-effect artifact.

What would change Layer 2’s mind. If EPL fails to recover Middle East supply-chain cost inflation through pricing and consolidated EBITDA margins compress for two consecutive quarters (the thesis' own falsification) — OR the SUPPLY_WITHDRAWAL reverses to a sector capex flood — that would break the pricing-power/supply-side pillars and flip this ADVANCE toward a DROP/exit review.

Layer 3 read, 19 July 2026 — DEPLOY. The one HIGH risk (Middle East cost inflation) is the exact test EPL's pass-through pricing model is built to pass, not a thesis-breaker. EPL's only HIGH risk is raw-material/logistics cost escalation from the Middle East crisis, but the thesis rests on a landed-cost pass-through model and delivered margin execution (8/10), so this is a one-to-two-quarter margin-timing risk, not a demand or structural risk. With PE at the 14th percentile and MoS +18.3%, the compressed multiple already prices in near-term margin noise. Merger integration adds a managed MEDIUM overlay.

What would change Layer 3’s mind. A confirmed report that EPL failed to recover Middle East cost inflation through pricing and consolidated EBITDA margin compressed for two consecutive quarters — escalating R1 to existential and flipping DEPLOY toward BENCH.

The test written in advance. A failure to recover Middle East supply chain cost inflation through pricing, leading to consolidated EBITDA margins compressing for two consecutive quarters, would invalidate the thesis on pricing power and margin resilience. — the thesis as written as stated by the next result.

The test written in advance. Raw Material Inflation — Raw Material Inflation Consolidated EBITDA margins compressing despite revenue growth. by the next result.

The test written in advance. Merger Integration Complexity — Merger Integration Complexity Delayed regulatory approvals or a downward revision of synergy targets post-closure. by the next result.

What the company does. EPL has structurally shifted its portfolio toward high-margin Beauty and Cosmetics, achieving strong growth in the segment which now exceeds Oral Care. The all-equity merger with IndoVida doubles revenue scale, creating a debt-free emerging market powerhouse with significant cross-selling and synergy potential. While Middle East supply chain disruptions test near-term margins, a robust landed-cost pass-through model and strong volume momentum underpin sustained earnings growth.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: The stock appears cheap relative to its historical valuation. The research reads it further: The valuation multiple has compressed despite consistent double-digit earnings growth and margin expansion, indicating a cyclical disconnect between fundamental performance and market pricing.

Lever 1 · Operating leverage — BUILDING. Accelerating growth in high-margin Beauty and Cosmetics segment surpassing legacy Oral Care. What proves it keeps working: Beauty & Cosmetics Mix Shift. It stops working if Global consumer spending on premium personal care products decelerates significantly.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix — BUILDING. Transformational platform creation driving annual synergies. What proves it keeps working: IndoVida Merger Synergies. It stops working if Regulatory approvals face extended delays or integration challenges disrupt customer relationships.

Lever 10 · New geographies — BUILDING. Rapid volume scaling across new and existing emerging market manufacturing facilities. What proves it keeps working: Emerging Market Scaling. It stops working if Macroeconomic instability or currency devaluation in key emerging markets impairs local demand.

Sources: our stock research file (27 June 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

EPL Ltd reported ₹1,388 Cr of revenue in the Jun 26 quarter, +25.3% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 8.4% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹4,763 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹5,043 Cr.

Why this happened. EPL is aggressively expanding its footprint in high-growth emerging markets. The Brazil operation has scaled into a consistent regional outperformer, while the newly commercialized Thailand facility is ramping up volumes. The IndoVida merger further accelerates this driver by providing immediate scale and market leadership in complementary frontier markets, diversifying revenue away from slower-growing developed regions.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹4,763 Cr (+13.1% on the year), capping 10 years at 8.4% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹1,388 Cr, +25.3% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +16.8% growth against the decade's 8.4% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +16.9% over the last 4 quarters against +12.1%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating; TTM profit −1.5% vs +33.7%/yr — rolling over.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

EPL Ltd's operating margin is 19.0% in the Jun 26 quarter, −1.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 16.0% to 20.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Why this happened. EPL has successfully executed a strategic pivot toward the Beauty and Cosmetics segment, which delivered YoY growth in FY26 and now accounts for a large portion of the total business. This deliberate shift toward premium formats commands higher margins and drives consolidated profitability improvement. Continued investments in innovation and capacity support sustained momentum in this higher-value category.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 19.0%, −1.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 16.0%–20.0%, and FY26's 20.0% is the top of that band — a record year.

🚨 Why the margin moved: operating margin went −1.6 pp year on year while gross margin went −0.8 pp — the loss came mostly below the gross line: operating leverage, with costs spread over a bigger revenue base.

Worth repeating from the valuation section: cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap — a record margin flatters every ratio built on top of it.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

EPL Ltd earned ₹101 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +0.0% year on year. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹394 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 8.6%. That is 7.3% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹101 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹101 Cr, +0.0% year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹394 Cr (+8.2%), and the 10-year compound rate is 8.6%.

🚨 Why profit moved: revenue contributed +25.3% and the margin −1.0 pp — the quarter was revenue-led, with the margin roughly flat.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit −0.6% vs revenue +16.8%. Profit is growing slower than sales — costs are eating the growth before it reaches the bottom line.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 217% of EPL Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY26 that was ₹723 Cr of operating cash against ₹394 Cr of profit. After ₹892 Cr of capital spending, ₹−169 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹723 Cr against reported profit of ₹394 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹−169 Cr after ₹892 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 217% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 217%: the cash cycle stretched 30 days between FY21 and FY26 — more of each rupee of profit waits inside the cycle before arriving.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 1.6× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

EPL Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 97 days in FY26, up from 67 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹1,739 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹4,763 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹13.0 Cr, so roughly ₹1,266 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 67 days, inventory at 177 days — roughly 5.8 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 97 days, looser than FY21's 67.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 177 days to sell; customers pay about 67 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 147 days — netting out to the 97-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹4,763 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹13.0 Cr — so the 97-day loop keeps roughly ₹1,266 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹1,739 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹1,061 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹148 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

EPL Ltd earns a ROCE of 18% in FY26. That is up from a trough of 12% in FY23. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by +2.0 percentage points, so growth here adds value rather than only size. The wiring behind it is 8.3% net margin on 0.97× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 18%, recovered from a FY23 trough of 12% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 8.3% net margin × 0.97× asset turns × 1.71× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 13.8% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 14.0% − 12.0% = a +2.0 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. Positive but thin — value creation with little room for error.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.

EPL Ltd carries total debt of ₹963 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹2,866 Cr as of Mar 26, a debt-to-equity of 0.34. On the annual view that ratio went from 0.41 in FY22 to 0.34 in FY26. Read the returns elsewhere on this page with that leverage in mind.

Mar 26: total debt of ₹963 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹2,866 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.34. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 0.41 (FY22) to 0.34 (FY26). Read the returns on this page with that leverage in mind.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters cut 25.1 points of EPL Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 26.4% of the company. Foreign institutions moved +2.7 points over the same window, to 14.1%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Promoters: −25.1 points over 8 quarters to 26.4%; Foreign institutions: +2.7 points over 8 quarters to 14.1%; Domestic institutions: +2.3 points over 8 quarters to 13.8%.

🚨 Why the register moved: promoters drove it (−25.1 points), absorbed on the other side by foreign institutions (+2.7 points) — distribution into the market’s bid.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

EPL Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

EPL Ltd trades at 19.1× P/E, near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 22% of the time. Its long-run median P/E is 23.2×, measured across 10.5 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 19.1× is near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 22% of the time, against a long-run median of 23.2× measured over 10.5 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

One caveat before moving on: margins are the best this company has ever printed — cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap. If profitability mean-reverts, today's multiple is higher than it looks.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved +8.1% against a +6.2% price move — earnings outran the price, pushing the multiple DOWN its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +0.8%/yr price move, ~+9.9%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−9.1 pp from the multiple (compressing); over 10y, of the +8.6%/yr price move, ~+8.9%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−0.3 pp from the multiple (roughly flat). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is low against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

Stage: Topping out Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

EPL Ltd reads as topping out on its fundamental arc. Topping out — profit and EPS growth have decelerated hard (profit growth +73.3% at its peak → −1.5% latest) while ROCE still reads 18.6%. The read is built from 12 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why it matters: decelerating from a peak is where good stories quietly end — the multiple usually notices late.

4-Factor Sector Score

49.7/100 — rank 3 of 6 in Packaging - FMCG/Consumers · 100% evidence confidence

EPL Ltd scores 49.7 out of 100 against the 6 companies it is compared with in Packaging - FMCG/Consumers, ranking 3. Cheap but unconfirmed: require improving earnings before treating the valuation as an opportunity.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 11.7 + 16.9 + 15.1 + 6 = 49.7. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What EPL Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

Middle East Crisis Margin Risk Narrative · 14 May 2026. In the Mar 2026 merger call, the COO provided categorical assurance that the Middle East supply disruption posed no risk to margins, projecting the company would navigate the crisis fully intact over a 4 to 5 month horizon. By the May 2026 Q4 FY26 call, management walked back this assurance, acknowledging potential optical changes to margins and conceding it is very difficult to quantify the pricing impact given the volatile environment. This shift from a categorical no-risk stance to admitting possible margin deterioration is a material change that requires analysts to revisit FY27 margin assumptions.

Capex vs Depreciation Commitment · 14 May 2026. In the Feb 2026 Q3 FY26 earnings call, the CFO explicitly stated the company's investment philosophy was to invest in line with depreciation, which analysts would use to anchor free cash flow projections. The May 2026 Q4 FY26 call disclosed actual FY26 capex of 480 crore against depreciation of 385 crore - approximately 25% above the stated benchmark - and guided FY27 capex to remain at a slightly elevated level above depreciation. This material gap between the stated capex-at-depreciation philosophy and the actual and forward-guided outcomes requires a meaningful revision to free cash flow and leverage models.

EBITDA Margin Guidance Reversal · 13 February 2026. In the November 2025 call, management guided for gradual EBITDA margin improvement following five consecutive quarters of 20%+ margins and a 91-basis point year-on-year expansion. However, the February 2026 call reported a margin of 20.1%, which was 20 basis points lower than the previous year and a significant sequential decline from the 20.9% reported in November, contradicting the prior outlook for steady expansion. Earlier call (Nov 2025): “Our EBITDA margin will show improvement, gradual improvement now, and that is how we manage the P&L.” Later call (Feb 2026): “EBITDA margin stood at 20.1%, 20 basis points lower than last year but firmly within our target operating range.”

🚨 European Performance Narrative Shift · 13 February 2026. During the November 2025 call, management dismissed weak results in Europe as a temporary 'aberration' caused by external customer destocking and promised immediate margin recovery. In the February 2026 call, management shifted the explanation for continued margin pressure in the region to 'short-term operational issues,' introducing internal execution failures that were not previously disclosed as a risk or factor. Earlier call (Nov 2025): “In terms of margin, this quarter, I would say, is an aberration, and it will now start improving... The bulk of the challenge has been with one customer, there”. Later call (Feb 2026): “Margins improved across all regions except Europe, where performance was impacted by short-term operational issues and adverse mix.”

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions