EPL Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

EPL Ltd trades at ₹238, in a confirmed uptrend and 19 weeks into that stage. That is +4.4% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 66% of a 52-week range of ₹184 to ₹266. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 7 straight weeks.

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 19 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹238 it trades +4.4% versus its 200-day average and sits at 66% of its 52-week range (₹184–₹266).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.6 years the stock moved +254% while the NIFTY 500 moved +268% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 7 straight weeks — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

EPL Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 22 August 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: EARLY_EXPANSION_TO_MID. Our fortnightly research layers last read it on 22 August 2026.

Our read, 22 August 2026. EPL is executing a dual-engine transformation pairing a high-margin Beauty and Cosmetics portfolio pivot (54% of mix) with an all-equity merger with Indovida to create an 8,300 Cr revenue platform at compressed valuation multiples.

From the numbers. PE multiple is compressed at 18.5x (14th percentile of 10-year range) against a historical median of 23.1x, while EPS is expanding (+49.4% over 8 quarters). This earnings-driven multiple compression creates an…

From the price. Price stage 2, week 19 — above its 200-day line, relative strength rising.

From the research. EPL is executing a dual-engine transformation pairing a high-margin Beauty and Cosmetics portfolio pivot (54% of mix) with an all-equity merger with Indovida to create an 8,300 Cr revenue platform at compressed…

🚨 Where they disagree. PE multiple is compressed at 18.5x (14th percentile of 10-year range) against a historical median of 23.1x, while EPS is expanding (+49.4% over 8 quarters). This earnings-driven multiple compression creates an attractive GARP valuation setup.

What is proven. EPL is executing a dual-engine transformation pairing a high-margin Beauty and Cosmetics portfolio pivot (54% of mix) with an all-equity merger with Indovida to create an 8,300 Cr revenue platform at compressed valuation multiples.

What is not proven yet. Consolidated operating profit margin falling below 17.5% for two consecutive quarters, signaling a breakdown in landed-cost contract pass-throughs or structural inability to pass through polymer cost increases.

🚨 What would change our mind. Consolidated operating profit margin falling below 17.5% for two consecutive quarters, signaling a breakdown in landed-cost contract pass-throughs or structural inability to pass through polymer cost increases.

Layer 1 read, 22 August 2026 — KEEP. Not a value trap: operating profit is up 15% — new-plant depreciation and a tax reset ate the growth. EPL's reported profit has been flat at about Rs 101cr for a year, which the deterministic engine reads as a shrinking business at a cheap multiple - the classic trap. Checking the actual quarterly accounts, sales rose 25.3% to Rs 1,388cr and operating profit rose 15.0% to Rs 261cr; what took the difference was Rs 19cr of extra depreciation on newly built plant and a tax rate rising from 14% to 22%, with the low tax quarters being the anomaly, not the 22%. The business itself is doing what we bought it for - beauty and cosmetics is now 54% of the mix and management RAISED sales guidance to the high teens in August. The honest caution for a holder is that per-share profit has still gone…

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Sharpening the timeline's own line (operating margin below 17.5% for two quarters) into what would flip THIS override: if the Q2 FY27 result shows operating PROFIT growing slower than sales for a second consecutive quarter on a FALLING gross margin, then the margin loss is pricing, not investment, and my override collapses - the value-trap stamp would be right and this becomes a DROP. Concretely: operating profit below Rs 250cr on sales above Rs 1,350cr, or consolidated operating margin under…

Layer 2 read, 22 August 2026 — ADVANCE. EPL has pricing power just as sector supply spending is retreating. The sector review identifies EPL as the one major contributor compounding revenue and margin together, and four converters independently confirmed cost recovery. EPL's own landed-cost contracts show that mechanism at company level, while Stream F shows supply withdrawal with institutions still absent; that combination is strong enough to ADVANCE despite the soft fair-value warning.

What would change Layer 2’s mind. Two consecutive quarters in which EPL's landed-cost contracts fail to recover polymer and freight increases and operating margin falls below 19% would flip ADVANCE to DROP.

Layer 3 read, 22 August 2026 — BENCH. Pass-through works, but the merger and cash burden are not yet proven. Commodity and freight pressure are real, but management says landed-cost contracts recovered both currency and freight increases. The social integration warning did not uncover an active failure because CCI approved the deal, but capex missed management's benchmark and no combined reported quarter yet proves execution.

What would change Layer 3’s mind. Two consecutive reported quarters below 17.5% operating margin after customer price resets would make commodity/logistics risk HIGH and flip BENCH to DROP.

CIO read, 22 August 2026 — RETAIN. HELD (defended slot) · forward-asymmetry 73/100 · CONTESTED. CONTESTED — judged EPS growth of 17% is above the 12.9% implied rate, a +4.1-point sustain gap. The rating is depressed at the 14th percentile, but the pending merger, rising working capital and weak per-share progress keep the slot open to challenge.

The test written in advance. Consolidated operating profit margin falling below 17.5% for two consecutive quarters, signaling a breakdown in landed-cost contract pass-throughs or structural inability to pass through polymer cost increases. — the thesis as written as stated by the next result.

The test written in advance. Raw Material & Logistics Cost Inflation — Raw Material & Logistics Cost Inflation Consolidated operating profit margin dropping below 18.5% in consecutive quarters. by the next result.

The test written in advance. Indovida Merger Regulatory & Integration Friction — Indovida Merger Regulatory & Integration Friction Regulatory delays exceeding the 12-month timeline or downward revisions to synergy guidance. by the next result.

What the company does. The core business has structurally expanded beyond oral care into Beauty and Cosmetics (54% mix, growing 20%+ YoY), defending consolidated operating profit margins at 19-21% across 8 consecutive quarters. The announced all-equity Indovida merger doubles scale to 8,300 Cr revenue, reduces Net Debt to EBITDA to 0.25x from 0.65x, and unlocks 35-50 million USD in targeted annual operational synergies. At a PE of 18.5x (14th percentile of 10-year history) vs a 23.1x median, the valuation reflects cyclical cost anxiety rather than structural market share and margin delivery.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: The stock trades at a depressed valuation multiple relative to historical norms. The research reads it further: Valuation multiple compression has occurred alongside 15 consecutive quarters of double-digit revenue growth, creating a cyclical valuation disconnect.

Lever 1 · Operating leverage — BUILDING. Accelerating growth in high-margin Beauty and Cosmetics portfolio now representing 54% of total revenue. What proves it keeps working: Beauty & Cosmetics Mix Shift. It stops working if Global personal care demand contracts sharply or consumer brand destocking accelerates.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix — BUILDING. Transformational merger creating an 8,300 Cr revenue consumer packaging platform with $35-50M annual synergies. What proves it keeps working: Indovida Merger Scale & Synergies. It stops working if Regulatory approval process stalls beyond the 12-month target or customer integration encounters friction.

Lever 10 · New geographies — BUILDING. Volume scaling across high-growth manufacturing hubs in Brazil, Thailand, and Southeast Asia. What proves it keeps working: Emerging Market Expansion. It stops working if Emerging market currency depreciation or localized geopolitical friction impairs volume ramp-up.

Sources: our stock research file (22 August 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

EPL Ltd reported ₹1,388 Cr of revenue in the Jun 26 quarter, +25.3% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 8.4% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹4,763 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹5,043 Cr.

Why this happened. EPL continues to scale manufacturing assets across emerging markets. Brazil has expanded into a consistent regional outperformer, while the greenfield Thailand facility is ramping commercial volumes in FY27. Indovida integration further deepens access to high-growth markets in Vietnam, Nigeria, and the Philippines.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹4,763 Cr (+13.1% on the year), capping 10 years at 8.4% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹1,388 Cr, +25.3% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +16.8% growth against the decade's 8.4% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +16.9% over the last 4 quarters against +12.1%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating; TTM profit −1.5% vs +33.7%/yr — rolling over.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

EPL Ltd's operating margin is 19.0% in the Jun 26 quarter, −1.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 16.0% to 20.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Why this happened. EPL has transitioned its product mix toward premium Beauty and Cosmetics packaging, which expanded over 20% in Q1 FY27 and 30% in FY26. Non-oral categories now account for 54% of total revenue. Premium formats such as laminate tubes with embellishments and extruded solutions command higher average realizations and protect consolidated operating margins at 19-21%.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 19.0%, −1.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 16.0%–20.0%, and FY26's 20.0% is the top of that band — a record year.

🚨 Why the margin moved: operating margin went −1.6 pp year on year while gross margin went −0.8 pp — the loss came mostly below the gross line: operating leverage, with costs spread over a bigger revenue base.

Worth repeating from the valuation section: cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap — a record margin flatters every ratio built on top of it.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

EPL Ltd earned ₹101 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +0.0% year on year. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹394 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 8.6%. That is 7.3% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹101 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹101 Cr, +0.0% year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹394 Cr (+8.2%), and the 10-year compound rate is 8.6%.

🚨 Why profit moved: revenue contributed +25.3% and the margin −1.0 pp — the quarter was revenue-led, with the margin roughly flat.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit −0.6% vs revenue +16.8%. Profit is growing slower than sales — costs are eating the growth before it reaches the bottom line.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 217% of EPL Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY26 that was ₹723 Cr of operating cash against ₹394 Cr of profit. After ₹892 Cr of capital spending, ₹−169 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹723 Cr against reported profit of ₹394 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹−169 Cr after ₹892 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 217% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 217%: the cash cycle stretched 30 days between FY21 and FY26 — more of each rupee of profit waits inside the cycle before arriving.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 1.6× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

EPL Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 97 days in FY26, up from 67 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹1,739 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹4,763 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹13.0 Cr, so roughly ₹1,266 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 67 days, inventory at 177 days — roughly 5.8 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 97 days, looser than FY21's 67.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 177 days to sell; customers pay about 67 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 147 days — netting out to the 97-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹4,763 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹13.0 Cr — so the 97-day loop keeps roughly ₹1,266 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹1,739 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹1,061 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹153 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

EPL Ltd earns a ROCE of 18% in FY26. That is up from a trough of 12% in FY23. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by +2.0 percentage points, so growth here adds value rather than only size. The wiring behind it is 8.3% net margin on 0.98× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 18%, recovered from a FY23 trough of 12% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 8.3% net margin × 0.98× asset turns × 1.69× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 13.7% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 14.0% − 12.0% = a +2.0 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. Positive but thin — value creation with little room for error.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.

EPL Ltd carries total debt of ₹963 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹2,866 Cr as of Mar 26, a debt-to-equity of 0.34. On the annual view that ratio went from 0.41 in FY22 to 0.34 in FY26. Read the returns elsewhere on this page with that leverage in mind.

Mar 26: total debt of ₹963 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹2,866 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.34. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 0.41 (FY22) to 0.34 (FY26). Read the returns on this page with that leverage in mind.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters cut 25.1 points of EPL Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 26.4% of the company. Foreign institutions moved +2.7 points over the same window, to 14.1%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Promoters: −25.1 points over 8 quarters to 26.4%; Foreign institutions: +2.7 points over 8 quarters to 14.1%; Domestic institutions: +2.3 points over 8 quarters to 13.8%.

🚨 Why the register moved: promoters drove it (−25.1 points), absorbed on the other side by foreign institutions (+2.7 points) — distribution into the market’s bid.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

EPL Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

EPL Ltd trades at 18.3× P/E, near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 16% of the time. Its long-run median P/E is 23.2×, measured across 10.6 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 18.3× is near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 16% of the time, against a long-run median of 23.2× measured over 10.6 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

One caveat before moving on: margins are the best this company has ever printed — cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap. If profitability mean-reverts, today's multiple is higher than it looks.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved +8.1% against a +15.0% price move — the price outran earnings, pushing the multiple UP its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the −1.0%/yr price move, ~+9.8%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−10.8 pp from the multiple (compressing); over 10y, of the +7.6%/yr price move, ~+8.6%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−1.0 pp from the multiple (compressing). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is low against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

What the price assumes This reading works the multiple backwards. It asks one question: what yearly rate of profit growth is a buyer at the market price already paying for? The number is the growth rate that makes eleven years of profit — six years growing, then five fading — add up to that day's market price, once each year is discounted at 11% a year.

Solved at its 24 August 2026 price, EPL Ltd was paying for profit growth of about 12.9% a year. Profit itself has compounded 8.6% a year over the past 10 years. Today the market pays 18.3× P/E, the 16th percentile of its own 11-year range.

What the two numbers say together. The multiple is low against its own past, and the growth the price is paying for is close to what this company has actually delivered.

How to hold this number: it is a reading of one day's price, taken on 24 August 2026, not a running figure — every other number on this page, the multiple included, is read off the live quote as of 28 September 2026. A higher price is paying for more growth and a lower price for less, so it moves whenever the price does, and this page does not restate it between measurements.

Stage: Topping out Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

EPL Ltd reads as topping out on its fundamental arc. Topping out — profit and EPS growth have decelerated hard (profit growth +73.3% at its peak → −1.5% latest) while ROCE still reads 18.6%. The read is built from 12 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why it matters: decelerating from a peak is where good stories quietly end — the multiple usually notices late.

4-Factor Sector Score

49.2/100 — rank 2 of 4 in Packaging FMCG and Consumers · 97% evidence confidence

EPL Ltd scores 49.2 out of 100 against the 4 companies it is compared with in Packaging FMCG and Consumers, ranking 2. Cheap but unconfirmed: require improving earnings before treating the valuation as an opportunity.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 12.9 + 17.1 + 14.2 + 5 = 49.2. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What EPL Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

Customer Pricing Mechanics Recharacterized · 11 August 2026. In February 2026, management said only 50% of the business was on a pass-through basis, with the balance negotiated when prices increased. In March 2026, management again described a mix of contractual recovery and ongoing customer discussions, but in August 2026 it characterized all customer contracts as landed-cost based and stated that currency and freight costs were fully recovered. This unexplained change in the stated pricing mechanism materially affects the assumptions around inflation protection and margin risk.

Middle East Crisis Margin Risk Narrative · 14 May 2026. In the Mar 2026 merger call, the COO provided categorical assurance that the Middle East supply disruption posed no risk to margins, projecting the company would navigate the crisis fully intact over a 4 to 5 month horizon. By the May 2026 Q4 FY26 call, management walked back this assurance, acknowledging potential optical changes to margins and conceding it is very difficult to quantify the pricing impact given the volatile environment. This shift from a categorical no-risk stance to admitting possible margin deterioration is a material change that requires analysts to revisit FY27 margin assumptions.

Capex vs Depreciation Commitment · 14 May 2026. In the Feb 2026 Q3 FY26 earnings call, the CFO explicitly stated the company's investment philosophy was to invest in line with depreciation, which analysts would use to anchor free cash flow projections. The May 2026 Q4 FY26 call disclosed actual FY26 capex of 480 crore against depreciation of 385 crore - approximately 25% above the stated benchmark - and guided FY27 capex to remain at a slightly elevated level above depreciation. This material gap between the stated capex-at-depreciation philosophy and the actual and forward-guided outcomes requires a meaningful revision to free cash flow and leverage models.

EBITDA Margin Guidance Reversal · 13 February 2026. In the November 2025 call, management guided for gradual EBITDA margin improvement following five consecutive quarters of 20%+ margins and a 91-basis point year-on-year expansion. However, the February 2026 call reported a margin of 20.1%, which was 20 basis points lower than the previous year and a significant sequential decline from the 20.9% reported in November, contradicting the prior outlook for steady expansion. Earlier call (Nov 2025): “Our EBITDA margin will show improvement, gradual improvement now, and that is how we manage the P&L.” Later call (Feb 2026): “EBITDA margin stood at 20.1%, 20 basis points lower than last year but firmly within our target operating range.”

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions