Suryoday Small Finance Bank share price today

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd's share price was ₹147.30 at the close on 4 November 2026. It has been falling for 3 weeks. That is 2.7% below its average price over the last 200 trading days. Over the past 13 weeks it has done worse than the NIFTY 500, and it has been behind for 15 weeks running.

A share price tends to move through four phases: moving sideways (stage 1), rising (stage 2), stalling near a high (stage 3) and falling (stage 4). Today Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd is in stage 4. The phase helps read everything below.

In the last 52 weeks it traded between ₹122 and ₹193, and at that close it sat 35% of the way up from that low.

Over the last 5.6 years the share price moved −47% while the NIFTY 500 moved +78%, so it is behind the index over that whole period. It was last ahead over 13 weeks in the week of 24 July 2026. The chart above shows the 13-week comparison for every week.

This page treats a rise as over when the price closes below its 200-day average on two Fridays in a row.

1. Revenue up on a year earlier for 12 quarters in a row (every quarter we can compare)

   In the September 2026 quarter revenue was ₹703 crore, +35.2% on a year earlier.

   Why: The bank had a much bigger loan book, so it earned more from lending.

   Next results: check whether advances growth stays above the lower end of the bank's own range.

   From the earnings call on 30 Oct 2026.

3. Bad loans at their lowest share in 9 quarters

   Gross NPA, the share of loans not being repaid, was 2.97% in the September 2026 quarter, from 5.93% a year earlier.

   Why: Bad loans fell because the bank received a guarantee claim and wrote off old problem loans.

   Next results: check whether repayments hold up in drought areas in November.

   From the earnings call on 30 Oct 2026.

For July to September 2026 (the quarter ended 30 September 2026), Suryoday Small Finance Bank reported total income of ₹703 crore, up 35.2% from ₹520 crore a year earlier, and a profit of ₹77.0 crore, up 156.7% from ₹30.0 crore.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank results: July to September 2026 against a year earlier

The next results, for October to December 2026, are due by 14 February 2027: listed companies must publish quarterly results within 45 days of the quarter's end (60 days for the January to March quarter).

Suryoday Small Finance Bank's management discussed these results on a call held on 30 October 2026; what it said is further down this page.

From the company's reported quarterly results (quarter ended 30 September 2026). Income and profit in ₹ crore.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank closed at ₹147.30 on 4 November 2026, up 2.8% from ₹143.28 a year earlier (7 November 2025) and down 16.5% over five years. Its highest weekly close since March 2021 was ₹277.80 on 26 March 2021.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank share price: then and now

Weekly closing prices. Each change is the move from that price to the 4 Nov 2026 close. A day's intraday high or low can go beyond these weekly closes.

300 weekly closes from 26 March 2021 to 4 November 2026.

4 Nov 2026: Suryoday Small Finance Bank closed at ₹147.30, up 9.3% on the week and up 2.6% on the month. 30 Oct 2026: Suryoday Small Finance Bank held its results call for July to September 2026. Management guided: FY27 advances growth 30-35% ending above lower end.

Earlier

• Results for July to September 2026: Total income up 35.2% and profit up 156.7% on a year earlier.
• 17 Jul 2026: ex-date for a dividend of ₹1.50 a share.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank paid ₹1.50 a share in regular dividends in the 12 months to 5 November 2026 (1 payment), a yield of 1.02% at the ₹147.30 close on 4 November 2026. The last was a dividend of ₹1.50 a share, ex-date 17 July 2026.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank dividends since 1 April 2021

Amounts as the company declared them on the NSE. A dividend goes to whoever owns the shares before the ex-date. The record date is the same day as the ex-date for every payment here.

Yes. Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd paid out 10% of its profit as dividends in FY26, and it paid a dividend in 1 of its last 13 reported years.

From the NSE corporate-actions record, read 5 November 2026.

On the call for July to September 2026, held on 30 October 2026, Suryoday Small Finance Bank's management guided: FY27 advances growth 30-35% ending above lower end.

“For the current financial year, the CGFMU cover has not opened yet. We are expecting that, with due clearance from various authorities, it should open up.”Baskar Babu Ramachandran, on the call for July to September 2026

What management guided

• FY27 profit around ₹300 crore with exit RoA 1.4-1.5% intact.
• IF to retail assets mix 45:55 in medium term, not by year-end.
• CLOU book ₹500-600 crore by year-end.
• IF disbursements ₹450-550 crore per month next five months with 50 branches added.

Management’s own plans and goals, from our notes of the call. A plan is not a result.

Source: the call transcript.

From the call for July to September 2026, 30 October 2026.

When Suryoday Small Finance Bank reports October to December 2026, these are the 2 checks that show whether the story is still on course. First: Ministry window for current-year guarantee opening with premium payment before third-quarter provisioning versus continued provisioning.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank is on one of our India lists: Bank stocks.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd earned ₹77.0 Cr of net profit in the Sep 2026 quarter, +156.7% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 2nd quarter in a row of profit growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹152 Cr. Over 10 years profit has grown 18.9% a year on average. That is 11.0% of the quarter's revenue.

Net profit is what is left after every cost, interest and tax. Earnings per share, dividends and book value all grow from it.

Why this happened. FY27-Q1 profit ₹75.2cr versus ₹35.3cr a year earlier. About ₹31cr of that is extra priority-sector-certificate income against a ₹10 to 15cr run-rate. Clean profit is ~₹52 to 55cr. The sequential jump was almost entirely that fee. Costs still grew faster than net interest income.

The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹30.0 Cr. 1 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

For the full year, FY26 profit was ₹152 Cr (+32.2% on the year before).

Why profit moved: revenue changed +35.2% on a year earlier and the margin moved +5.2 percentage points. Most of the change came from keeping more of each sale.

On average over the last four quarters, profit changed +94.4% and revenue +25.1%. Profit is growing faster than sales: fixed costs are spread over more sales, so each extra rupee of revenue adds more to profit.

Covid trough, 24% of the book visibly stressed · FY22-Q2 → FY22-Q4. Covid second wave: provisions ₹97cr against ₹83cr of operating profit; restructured book 14% of loans The trough: provisions ₹112cr, bad loans peak 11.8%, FY22 closes at a ₹93cr loss; capital ratio down to 37.9% with no raise

The peak year, return on assets 1.94% · FY24-Q1 → FY25-Q1. Peak year begins: net interest income 8.7% of assets; the June-2023 analyst day promises 15% return on equity and a 4% return-on-assets 'steady state' Growth 41% incl. cover only 50.5% against a '90% plus' promise; group-loan bad loans quietly rising 3.6% → 5.3%

Second microfinance cycle, the margin breaks, the guarantee starts paying · FY25-Q2 → FY26-Q3. Stress arrives, slippages ₹129cr; management calls it 'usually seasonal'; margin starts compressing Slippages ₹270cr, bad loans double to 5.5%; the bank stops provisioning the guaranteed portion, a one-time ₹102cr release keeps credit cost tame

Guarantee-funded recovery on a flat engine · FY26-Q4 → FY27-Q1. Slippages ₹106cr; FY26 profit ₹152cr on return on assets 0.86% vs a 1.5 to 1.6% guide; first-ever dividend ₹1.50; the FY26 bad-loan goal missed and never acknowledged aloud Fourth guarantee claim ₹387cr parked as provisions, cover 35% → 82%, net bad loans 4.2% → 1.2%; ₹46cr of one-off priority-sector income;

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd reported ₹703 Cr of income in the Sep 2026 quarter, +35.2% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 12th quarter in a row with growth on the year before. Over 10 years it has grown 26.9% a year on average. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹2,160 Cr.

For a bank, revenue is everything it earns: interest on its loans plus fees and other income.

Why this happened. Net interest income rose 28% year on year on a 33% larger loan book, all volume, slightly negative rate. Yield 20.1% → 16.2% as the book went secured and bad loans stopped paying. The sequential step was flat (₹316.6cr → ₹315.7cr) on an 8% larger book.

The last four reported quarters add to ₹2,471 Cr.

FY26 revenue was ₹2,160 Cr, +10.5% on the year before.

Recent pace: the last four quarters grew +25.1% on average, against 26.9% a year over the longer run, so this year is growing slower than its own long-run rate.

Is growth speeding up? Revenue over the last 12 months grew +25.2%, against +15.5% a year over the last 8 quarters (accelerating); profit over the last 12 months grew +273.4%, against +1.3% a year (accelerating).

FY26-Q4. Slippages ₹106cr; FY26 profit ₹152cr on return on assets 0.86% vs a 1.5 to 1.6% guide; first-ever dividend ₹1.50; the FY26 bad-loan goal missed and never acknowledged aloud

FY27-Q1. Fourth guarantee claim ₹387cr parked as provisions, cover 35% → 82%, net bad loans 4.2% → 1.2%; ₹46cr of one-off priority-sector income;

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd's net margin was 11.0% in the Sep 2026 quarter, 5.2 percentage points higher than the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 years it has been between −9.9% and 17.0%. The latest quarter is within that range.

Net margin is what the bank keeps from every ₹100 of revenue after every cost, provision for bad loans and tax. It is the clearest single margin we can read for a lender.

Why this happened. Net interest income per rupee of assets 8.65% (FY24) → 6.19% (FY26) → 6.30% now. About half the loss is the secured mix (a choice), about a third is non-paying loans (recoverable), the rest is pricing and a slightly dearer deposit book. At 56% secured the FY24 margin cannot structurally return. Printed net interest margin 7.2%, flat year on year, against a 7.5 to 8.0% guide.

Why: the net margin move is clear, but the cost details behind it are not in our data, so we show the move without guessing the reason.

FY26-Q4. Slippages ₹106cr; FY26 profit ₹152cr on return on assets 0.86% vs a 1.5 to 1.6% guide; first-ever dividend ₹1.50; the FY26 bad-loan goal missed and never acknowledged aloud

FY27-Q1. Fourth guarantee claim ₹387cr parked as provisions, cover 35% → 82%, net bad loans 4.2% → 1.2%; ₹46cr of one-off priority-sector income;

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd's gross NPA, the share of loans that have stopped being repaid, is 2.97% in Sep 2026, down from 5.93% a year ago. After the money already set aside for bad loans, 1.54% is left (net NPA). Across the 12 quarters on file it has been between 2.84% and 8.46%.

Gross NPA is the share of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what is left after the money the lender has already set aside for those loans. Falling is good; rising is a warning.

Why this happened. Slippages fell five quarters. Cover 81.8% and net bad loans 1.2% only because ₹387cr of trust cash sits in provisions. Gross bad loans ₹931cr, never organically down. Same-period write-offs in Q1 were ₹5cr, the claim was parked, not used to take loans off the book. Cumulative write-offs since December 2021 ~₹1,030cr plus three asset-reconstruction sales, about 48% of today’s net worth.

Falling bad loans mean the loan book is healing; rising ones mean new damage.

In Sep 2026, gross NPA was 2.97% and net NPA 1.54%, against 5.93% and 3.80% a year ago.

In short: a lender's profit growth is only as good as its loans, and this loan book is better than a year ago. Quarterly detail on money set aside for bad loans is not in our data yet, so this shows the levels and the trend, not the cost of the clean-up.

Why bad loans moved: recoveries, write-offs and new bad loans all play a part. That split is not in our data, so the page shows the trend without the breakdown.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd's revenue was ₹2,160 Cr in FY26, +10.5% on the year before, so the loan book is growing. The latest quarter was +35.2% on a year earlier. The net margin on that income is 11.0%, +5.2 percentage points on a year ago.

We read the loan book through revenue: when the book grows, revenue grows with it. It is only a rough guide, because interest-rate changes and fee swings can move it a few points in any year.

Why this happened. Gross loans ₹14,376cr, 56% labelled secured. Hard-collateral retail (homes, mortgages, vehicles) is 36%; adding loans-to-lenders and supply-chain gets near 50%. Inclusive finance is 44% and ~98% guarantee-covered, that is 72.75% of principal, so about one-third of the whole bank. Vikas individual loans grew 40% and supplied 39% of the year’s growth; the joint-liability-group book still disbursed ₹343cr in Q1 and rose ₹102cr even while management talks of running it down. Used vehicles 13.7% of the book, 30-day overdue 11.5% and rising.

Interest income stands in for the size of the loan book; changes in interest rates can move it a few points in any year.

In short: a lender grows well when its loan book grows, its margin stays steady and its loans stay clean. Gross NPA is the loan-quality figure this page uses.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd's P/BV is 0.7×, near the low end of its own history: it has been lower only 33% of the time. Its usual P/BV (the middle reading) is 0.8×, over 5.4 years of weekly prices. This compares the share price with the company’s own past. It does not say what the business is worth.

For a bank or lender we compare the price with book value, the net worth on its balance sheet. P/BV is how many rupees the market pays for each ₹1 of that net worth. Below 1× means the market values it at less than its net worth.

Why this happened. ₹152 is 0.75× June book and 0.78× March book, below a ~0.9× listed median and 7 to 17% above a twice-tested 0.7× trough. The 5.4-year band is real: the market has refused above 1.1× since listing and re-tested 0.7× twice. At 0.75× the price assumes a permanent return on equity of roughly 10 to 11% with no growth value, the cleaned present, not the guide, not history (6.4%). Haircut the ₹300cr guide 40% as the record says and ~8% return on equity supports only ~0.55 to 0.6×.

Why the multiple is low: this lender earns about 8% a year on its equity. A lender that earns less on its net worth is valued lower for each rupee of it, and that gap usually closes only if returns improve.

Why the multiple is where it is: over the past year book value grew while the price moved +2.8%. Price and book value moved together, so the multiple stayed in its range.

Where the price move came from: over 5 years the price moved −3.5% a year; about +5.2% a year came from book-value growth and about −8.7 percentage points from the multiple (the market paying less). The split is approximate (price return minus book-value growth). It shows how much of the move came from the market paying a different multiple.

In short: the multiple is low against its own past, so the book value trend underneath matters more than the multiple.

Worked out from its price on 20 July 2026, Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd's share price assumed profit growth of about 6.3% a year. Over the past 10 years its profit actually grew 18.9% a year. Today its P/BV is 0.7×, lower than 67% of its own last 5.4 years.

This works the share price backwards. It asks one question: what yearly profit growth does the price already assume? The answer is the growth rate at which eleven years of profit (six years of growth, then five years of slowing) add up to that day's market value, after each year is discounted at 11%.

This is a one-day reading, taken on 20 July 2026. Every other number on this page, the multiple included, uses the latest price as of 4 November 2026. A higher price assumes more growth and a lower price less, so it changes whenever the price changes, and this page does not update it between measurements.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd's business is turning around. Profit growth has swung from −67.5% at its low to +273.4%, improving for 3 quarters in a row, with ROE rising at 10.8%. This is based on 12 quarters of 4 measures.

Every business is somewhere on a path of getting better or worse, and this section names where. The last 12 quarters of growth in revenue, profit and earnings per share, plus the return the business earns on its capital, are read as lines. Getting worse: the lines are falling. Turning around: a low point has just formed and the last few quarters are rising from it. Getting better: the rise from the low has lasted. Growing steadily: steady growth with healthy returns. Slowing from a peak: still high, but slowing. When the lines disagree the result is mixed; too little history means no reading. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the steady yearly rate that would turn the starting value into the latest one. It is the fairest way to compare growth over different periods. If the 1-year figure is much bigger than the 10-year one, recent growth is running faster than the long-run trend. A dash means there is no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss, where a growth rate means nothing.

Why it matters: a turn in growth is often where a bigger change starts. The lines say a turn is forming, so the question is whether the next quarters confirm it.

Compound annual growth rate (%)

Compound annual growth rate over each period, %. Revenue, profit and EPS come from yearly figures; the share price row is price growth over the same periods. A dash means no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd's story is not scored yet against the checks our research set on 17 August 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: Credit-flow recovery on a structurally thinner margin, after two loss cycles without an equity raise. Checks so far: 15 not due yet.

NOT YET CHECKED 15 not due yet · first check at the next results

From the numbers. Slippages falling five quarters and guarantee cash rebuilding cover; net interest income per rupee of assets still near the floor and costs still outrunning income.

From the price. Stage 2 from the ₹122 trough to ₹193 on the claim events, then minus 21% to ₹152, first weekly close below the 200-day average after the plus 113% print.

From the research. Guarantee-mechanical promises met four of four; operating and quality promises missed; founder having 5.22% with 96% pledged to an undisclosed lender.

Where they disagree. What is still open is FY27-Q2, the first quarter without the extra priority-sector fee.

What is proven. Four CGFMU claims paid in full (₹32cr, ₹56cr, ₹313cr, ₹387cr = ₹788cr) against ~₹250 to 270cr of premium; slippages 308→92 crore over five quarters; deposits now exceed loans (credit-deposit 98%); capital ratio 20% with no equity raised since the March 2021 listing; book value per share 150.5→202.8 = 5.7% a year.

What would change our mind. Two consecutive quarters with net interest margin at or above 7.5%, cost-to-income at or below 68%, slippages at or below ₹90 crore, priority-sector-certificate income at the ₹10 to 20 crore run-rate, and the ₹300 crore equity raise priced at or above book, or the opposite: slippages above ₹100 crore, a second weekly close under the 200-day average together with a below-book raise, or a pledge invocation.

The test written in advance. The first honest quarter has the clean run-rate. Measured by: FY27-Q2 profit after tax with priority-sector-certificate income ₹10 to 15cr >= ₹55 crore by FY27-Q2 results (October–November 2026).

The test written in advance. New bad-loan formation stays inside the guided band. Measured by: Bank slippages <= ₹90 crore by FY27-Q2 results.

The test written in advance. The margin node actually lifts. Measured by: Net interest margin >= 7.5% for two consecutive quarters by FY27-Q3 results (January–February 2027).

What the company does. Suryoday takes ordinary deposits (₹14,634cr) and lends small amounts (₹14,376cr) to low-income households and tiny businesses, group microfinance loans, individual 'Vikas' loans to the same borrowers, home and small-mortgage loans, used-commercial-vehicle loans and small-business loans, now 56% secured. From FY23 it insured almost the entire unsecured book under the government's CGFMU credit-guarantee scheme, paying ~1% a year in premium for 72.75% cover on defaults; the trust has paid it ₹788cr across four claims. It became a bank in January 2017 and listed in March 2021 at ₹305.

How the money is made. Profit = (loan yield ~16 to 17% − funding cost ~7.5%) on ₹14,376cr of loans, minus a ~70% cost-to-income operating base, minus ~1% a year of guarantee premium on the insured book, minus credit losses net of collateral and net of guarantee receipts, taxed at a normal ~24%.

The key numbers to watch, and the level that would change the picture

Everything further down this page is evidence for or against these.

Why the latest quarter changed (FY27-Q1 versus FY26-Q1)

Did the business cover its own costs? Operating profit covered reported (net-of-claims) credit cost, out of operating profit after guarantee premium in 17 of 20 periods; cumulatively. Survival was never the question, the bank came through covid and the second microfinance cycle at 20%+ capital with no equity raised. Earnings quality is: twenty quarters of ₹591cr reported profit sit beside a book value that compounded at only 5.7% a year.

The dot is where the company is now; the dashed line is the level that would settle the question; a tinted band is where management says it is heading.

Cover rebuilt, rupee bad loans at a record. Net bad loans 4.2% → 1.2% and cover 37% → 82% in one quarter. Gross bad loans in rupees 864 → 931, the highest ever. Same-period write-offs ₹5cr. The fundamental stream’s ‘asset quality improved’ and the qualitative stream’s ‘removal event, not a cure’ are both true. They describe different columns of the same table.

Guarantee paid; engine did not return. ₹788cr received, four of four claims in full, ~30 paise of premium per rupee. Pre-provision profit per rupee of assets still 2.16 to 2.77% against FY24’s 4.08%. The credit stream and the margin stream have decoupled, the first time in this small-finance-bank series that neglect is real on ownership and the engine, not the accident, is the argument against engaging.

Snapshot table versus the tape. The 14-Aug close on the June book is 0.75×, below median. Using the snapshot as ‘not low’ or ‘already mid-cycle’ is a stale-denominator error.

What is temporary, what is cyclical, what is structural

• 1 · Operating leveragereversed
• 2 · Value-added mixbuilding
• 3 · Management changequiet
• 4 · Paying down debtbuilding
• 5 · Regulatory approvalworking now
• 6 · Order-book winsquiet
• 7 · Consolidationquiet
• 8 · Demerger or value unlockquiet
• 9 · Buybackquiet
• 10 · New geographiesquiet
• 11 · More business from existing customersquiet
• 12 · New product launchquiet
• 13 · Mandatory normsquiet
• 14 · A bigger market to servequiet
• 15 · Market-share gainsquiet
• 16 · Asset qualityworking now

Lever 16 · Asset quality: working now. New bad loans fell five straight quarters (₹308cr → ₹92cr). The government guarantee paid ₹788cr in four claims, the last ₹387cr parked as provisions, taking cover to 81.8% and net bad loans to 1.2%. Without that receipt net bad loans would be ~4.0%. Gross bad loans in rupees are a record ₹931cr, every headline fall was a write-off or an asset-reconstruction sale, not a collections recovery. What proves it keeps working: FY27-Q2 slippages at or below ₹90cr with monthly microfinance flows under ₹20cr, and net provisions at or below ₹40cr with no new claim inside the quarter. It stops working if FY27-Q2 slippages above ₹100cr, or used-commercial-vehicle 30-day overdue having above 11.5%, or the trust contesting a claim.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix: building. Secured lending 33% → 56% of the book (home loans, small mortgages, used commercial vehicles, small business). Inclusive-finance share 44%, of which Vikas individual loans are 75%. The mix shift is the main reason loan yield fell 20.1% → 16.2% and net interest income per rupee of assets cannot return to the FY24 8.65%. What proves it keeps working: Inclusive-finance share near 45% by March 2027 with Vikas-loan gross bad loans not rising from 8.5%, and used-commercial-vehicle 30-day overdue turning down from 11.5%. It stops working if Inclusive-finance share back above 50% (re-risking) or used-vehicle overdue still rising at the FY27-Q2 result.

Lever 4 · Paying down debt: building. Deposits compounded ~38% a year and now exceed loans (credit-deposit 98%, from 143% in September 2021). Current-and-savings balances never crossed 23% against a 25% goal. Cost of funds 7.5%. A ₹100cr 12.5% subordinated bond matures 7 April 2027; ₹200cr of fresh subordinated debt and ₹300cr of equity are approved. What proves it keeps working: Deposit growth of at least 30% for FY27 with cost of funds held near 7.5%, and the April 2027 bond rolled at a lower coupon. It stops working if Credit-deposit back above 110%, or current-and-savings below 19%, or the equity raise priced well below book with no named customer.

What this research does not know. The files named annual-FY24.pdf and annual-FY25.pdf are the FY21 and FY22 annual reports. No FY23–FY26 annual report is in the working set, so deferred-tax-asset after March 2022, the true second-claim amount, and Table V pledge detail…; Second guarantee claim printed as ₹50cr (call, Jul-2025), ₹56cr (deck, used here), and ‘₹70cr’ (call, Jan-2026).; Third-claim write-off ₹432cr versus a ₹423cr footnote; claim restated as ‘₹340-odd crores’ on a later call.; FY23-Q3 earnings-call transcript is genuinely absent, the bank’s own URL serves the wrong file.; Current pledgee and purpose of the 53.4 lakh pledged founder shares.; Whether the ₹387.45cr fourth claim hit cash on 30-Jun or 1-Jul-2026 (booked in FY27-Q1; exchange filing 1-Jul).

Sources: Q1 FY27 earnings presentation (24 July 2026); Q1 FY27 conference-call transcript (24 July 2026); Q4 FY26 earnings presentation (7 May 2026); Q4 FY26 conference-call transcript (8 May 2026); Q3 FY26 conference-call transcript (23 January 2026); Q2 FY26 conference-call transcript (10 November 2025); Q1 FY26 conference-call transcript (25 July 2025); Q4 FY25 conference-call transcript (9 May 2025); +9 more. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Also being watched. These checks cover parts of the business this page cannot chart, because the figures are not reported every quarter. They still apply.

The whole page in one table. Each row links to its section.

What Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd's management promised, against what actually happened: 6 promises on the record. Scored in our research file, promise by promise. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

Said 22 June 2023, due FY24–FY25: missed. Promised: Analyst day: cost-to-income ~57% including guarantee premium, bad loans <2%, net bad loans <0.5%, return on equity 15%, current-and-savings 25%. What arrived: FY24 cost-to-income 61.6% including premium; bad loans 2.8%; net 0.8%; return on equity 12.9%; current-and-savings never crossed 23%. The March 2024 scorecard slide reprinted <2.5%, <1% and ~57% excluding premium.

Said 25 October 2024, due FY25 close: missed. Promised: FY25 profit after tax ~₹225 crore. What arrived: ₹115 crore.

Said 2 August 2024, due FY25 close: missed. Promised: FY25 advances growth 30 to 35%; cost-to-income 57 to 58%. What arrived: advances +18.5%; cost-to-income 70.6%.

Said 2 August 2024, due FY25-Q3: missed. Promised: Stress is usually seasonal; normalisation next quarter. What arrived: Slippages 129 → 270 → 308; Q4 FY25 was the year’s worst. Management later called it a crisis sharper than anything in 15 years.

Said 9 May 2025, due FY26 close: missed. Promised: FY26 slippages ₹300 to 400 crore; gross / net bad loans <5% / <3%; return on assets 1.5 to 1.6%. What arrived: Slippages ₹746 crore; 6.5% / 4.2%; return on assets 0.86%. Two formal return-on-assets cuts (1.2% then 1.1%). The 5%/3% miss was never verbally acknowledged on the Q4 call.

Said 9 May 2025, due FY26 close: met. Promised: FY26 CGFMU claims ~₹350 to 360 crore. What arrived: ₹369 crore received (₹56cr + ₹313cr), paid in full.

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

The management question, 'did they deliver when guidance was tested?', answers weak: repeated misses through the down-cycle with selective accountability.

Regulatory and governance record

Old RBI penalty ₹57.75 lakh (immaterial quantum); 2024 Katni FIR is external account-mule fraud, not promoter/board misconduct; no promoter-level enforcement action.

Checked 7 June 2026.

Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd earned a return on equity of 8% in FY26. Its lowest yearly reading on file was −6% in FY22. On its assets, every ₹100 earned about ₹1.25, before the effect of borrowing. For a lender the balance sheet is the business, so the return on equity and on assets have to be read together.

Two numbers rate a bank: ROE, what it earns on shareholders’ money, and ROA, what it earns on all its assets. An ROE above about 13 to 15% is healthy; below that, net worth grows slowly.

Why this happened. Printed FY27-Q1 return on assets 1.6% and return on equity 14.5%. Ex the extra certificate fee: ~1.1% and ~10%. FY26 delivered 0.86% and 7.6% against a 1.5 to 1.6% return-on-assets guide. Twenty-quarter average return on equity ~6.4%. Mid-cycle build at 56% secured, fully taxed at ~24%: about 10% return on equity (band 8 to 13%). The 13 to 14% FY27 guide needs margin, costs and credit cost to land together.

That return is below the level a bank needs to grow its net worth quickly, which helps explain why its multiple is where it is.

Why ROE moved: profit grew 18.9% a year over 10 years while net worth grew more slowly. When earnings recover faster than net worth builds up, ROE climbs off its low.

For a bank, borrowing is the raw material of the business, not a warning sign: it borrows money in order to lend it out. Its safety is read through its returns and its loans. Its safety is read from the bad-loan figures and the return on equity instead.

Why this happened. Deposits ₹14,634cr exceed loans. Retail 87%, current-and-savings 21%, cost of funds 7.5%. Capital ratio 20%, tier-1 ~19%. No equity since listing. ₹300cr equity plus ₹200cr subordinated debt approved August 2026; ₹100cr of 12.5% bonds mature April 2027. Struck near ₹152 the equity issue dilutes book about 4% and earnings about 16%.

For a manufacturer, debt is a claim on its profits. For a lender it is the stock it trades in, so the usual debt-to-equity test would mislead and is not used here.

Domestic institutions cut their stake in Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd by 2.4 percentage points over 8 quarters, the biggest change among its owners. Domestic institutions now own 5.7% of the company. Foreign institutions moved +1.2 points over the same period, to 4.7%. This uses the four owner groups that companies report every quarter; nothing is guessed between filings.

Who owns the company each quarter: promoters (the founders or controlling owners), foreign institutions, domestic institutions such as mutual funds, and the public. When people close to the business steadily raise their stake, that is worth noticing; a quiet list is also an answer.

Why this happened. Promoter group 22.48%. Founder-CEO Baskar Babu Ramachandran 5.22%, of which 96% is pledged (53.4 lakh shares, 5% of the company, ~₹81cr at ₹152). The pledge was released and re-created in March 2026. Lender and purpose of the current pledge are not in the public tables. Domestic institutions 20.9% → 5.5% since March 2023. 1729 Capital is cleared to 9.99% and has 3.69%.

Over the last two years: Domestic institutions: −2.4 points over 8 quarters, to 5.7%; Foreign institutions: +1.2 points over 8 quarters, to 4.7%; Promoters: +0.2 points over 8 quarters, to 22.5%.

Why the owners changed: domestic institutions drove it (−2.4 points), with the other side taken by foreign institutions (+1.2 points). They reduced their stake.