Jana Small Finance Bank share price today

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's share price was ₹407.20 at the close on 6 November 2026. It has been rising for 23 weeks. That is 14.4% below its average price over the last 200 trading days. Over the past 13 weeks it has done worse than the NIFTY 500, and it has been behind for 4 weeks running.

A share price tends to move through four phases: moving sideways (stage 1), rising (stage 2), stalling near a high (stage 3) and falling (stage 4). Today Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd is in stage 2. The phase helps read everything below.

In the last 52 weeks it traded between ₹349 and ₹582, and at that close it sat 25% of the way up from that low.

Over the last 2.7 years the share price moved −3% while the NIFTY 500 moved +9%, so it is behind the index over that whole period. It was last ahead over 13 weeks in the week of 9 October 2026. The chart above shows the 13-week comparison for every week.

This page treats a rise as over when the price closes below its 200-day average on two Fridays in a row.

Three changes stood out: promoters cut their stake for 9 quarters in a row, revenue up on a year earlier for 12 quarters in a row (every quarter we can compare) and bad loans at their lowest share in 10 quarters.

1. Promoters cut their stake for 9 quarters in a row

   From 22.5% to 16.9% of the company by the September 2026 quarter.

2. Revenue up on a year earlier for 12 quarters in a row (every quarter we can compare)

   In the September 2026 quarter revenue was ₹1,587 crore, +22.6% on a year earlier.

   Why: The bank earned more from loans than it paid on deposits, helped by a better mix of loans and cheaper funding.

   Next results: check if low-cost deposits recover without the bank paying more for deposits, since that supports the lending margin.

   From the earnings call on 23 Oct 2026.

3. Bad loans at their lowest share in 10 quarters

   Gross NPA, the share of loans not being repaid, was 2.34% in the September 2026 quarter, from 2.87% a year earlier.

   Why: More borrowers paid on time, helped by strong collection work and by most microfinance customers having fewer lenders to repay.

   Next results: check whether loan repayments worsen as drought and one-off secured-loan cases fade.

   From the earnings call on 23 Oct 2026.

For July to September 2026 (the quarter ended 30 September 2026), Jana Small Finance Bank reported total income of ₹1,587 crore, up 22.6% from ₹1,294 crore a year earlier, and a profit of ₹170 crore, up 126.7% from ₹75.0 crore.

Jana Small Finance Bank results: July to September 2026 against a year earlier

The next results, for October to December 2026, are due by 14 February 2027: listed companies must publish quarterly results within 45 days of the quarter's end (60 days for the January to March quarter).

Jana Small Finance Bank's management discussed these results on a call held on 23 October 2026; what it said is further down this page.

From the company's reported quarterly results (quarter ended 30 September 2026). Income and profit in ₹ crore.

Jana Small Finance Bank closed at ₹407.20 on 6 November 2026, down 14.5% from ₹476.25 a year earlier (7 November 2025). Its highest weekly close since February 2024 was ₹728.20 on 21 June 2024.

Jana Small Finance Bank share price: then and now

Weekly closing prices. Each change is the move from that price to the 6 Nov 2026 close. A day's intraday high or low can go beyond these weekly closes.

150 weekly closes from 16 February 2024 to 6 November 2026.

6 Nov 2026: Jana Small Finance Bank closed at ₹407.20, up 9.0% on the week and down 16.8% on the month. 23 Oct 2026: Jana Small Finance Bank held its results call for July to September 2026. Management guided: FY27 profit growth of 100% on a year earlier.

Earlier

• Results for July to September 2026: Total income up 22.6% and profit up 126.7% on a year earlier.

Jana Small Finance Bank has paid no dividend on the NSE since its first NSE close in our records (16 February 2024), the start of the period we checked.

No. Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd paid out 0% of its profit as dividends in each of its last 9 reported years, so there is no payout history to show. That comes from the filed annual statements, not an estimate.

From the NSE corporate-actions record, read 7 November 2026.

On the call for July to September 2026, held on 23 October 2026, Jana Small Finance Bank's management guided: FY27 profit growth of 100% on a year earlier.

“The original guidance was an 80% increase in PAT, and we are now raising it to 100% growth in PAT. Therefore, we should double our PAT this year versus last year.”Ajay Kanwal, on the call for July to September 2026

What management guided

• FY27 advances growth of 19-21% and deposits growth of 23-25%; H2 CASA toward 20%.
• FY27 credit cost below 2%.
• ₹68 crore guarantee claim expected by end-November; remaining ₹251 crore to be lodged next Q3.
• NIM around 7.5%, cost of funds around 7.4%; cost-income ratio at or below Q2 level, with below 60% this year considered low likelihood.

Management’s own plans and goals, from our notes of the call. A plan is not a result.

Source: the call transcript.

From the call for July to September 2026, 23 October 2026.

When Jana Small Finance Bank reports October to December 2026, these are the 4 checks that show whether the story is still on course. First: Check whether H2 profit delivery remains at least in line with H1, the basis for the revised full-year commitment.

Jana Small Finance Bank is on one of our India lists: Bank stocks.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd earned ₹170 Cr of net profit in the Sep 2026 quarter, +126.7% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 3rd quarter in a row of profit growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹326 Cr. That is 10.7% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹75.0 Cr.

Net profit is what is left after every cost, interest and tax. Earnings per share, dividends and book value all grow from it.

Why this happened. ₹155cr, +52% year on year, earned despite other income falling ₹39cr, the cleanest beat in the file, but it carries zero tax (₹116cr taxed), and the FY27 '+80% or better' guide of ≥₹587cr is arithmetically inconsistent with the February return-on-assets guide of 1.5 to 1.6% (₹587cr on ~₹51,000cr of average assets is ~1.15%)

For the full year, FY26 profit was ₹326 Cr (−34.9% on the year before).

Why profit moved: revenue changed +22.6% on a year earlier and the margin moved +4.9 percentage points. Most of the change came from keeping more of each sale.

On average over the last four quarters, profit changed +25.4% and revenue +20.9%. Profit is growing faster than sales: fixed costs are spread over more sales, so each extra rupee of revenue adds more to profit.

Survival, credit cost eats everything · FY22-Q2 → FY22-Q4. Survival: credit cost ₹132cr consumed nearly all of ₹139cr operating profit The one loss quarter, provisions ₹149cr exceeded operating profit ₹143cr

Repair and growth into the listing · FY23-Q1 → FY24-Q3. First meaningful profit; other income of ₹179cr did the lifting Provisions ₹187cr consumed the quarter again; bad loans still 6.8%

The flattered peak, deferred-tax write-up inside · FY24-Q4 → FY25-Q1. ₹155cr of the ₹322cr was a deferred-tax write-up; underlying pre-tax profit moved only +₹33cr; cover peaked at 1.95× Microfinance stress first surfaces, slippages of ₹305cr disclosed for the first time

Microfinance stress plus a self-inflicted cost overshoot · FY25-Q2 → FY26-Q3. The stress is named; interest income flat, and the cost squeeze arrives before the credit cost does Management states provisions are being set to keep net bad loans below the licence test's 1% line

Provision-led recovery on a flat engine · FY26-Q4 → FY27-Q1. Guidance met at the bottom of the range, and four disclosure lines deleted in the same deck; guarantee-claim estimate halved The inflection print: slippages ₹291cr the lowest ever, margin 7.5%, and the promoter's debenture default landed the same fortnight

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd reported ₹1,587 Cr of income in the Sep 2026 quarter, +22.6% on the same quarter a year earlier. That is the 12th quarter in a row with growth on the year before. Over 8 years it has grown 16.7% a year on average. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹5,353 Cr.

For a bank, revenue is everything it earns: interest on its loans plus fees and other income.

The last four reported quarters add to ₹5,921 Cr.

FY26 revenue was ₹5,353 Cr, +14.6% on the year before.

Recent pace: the last four quarters grew +20.9% on average, against 16.7% a year over the longer run, so this year is growing faster than its own long-run rate.

Is growth speeding up? Revenue over the last 12 months grew +20.9%, against +14.9% a year over the last 8 quarters (accelerating); profit over the last 12 months grew +15.6%, against −19.1% a year (accelerating).

FY26-Q4. Guidance met at the bottom of the range, and four disclosure lines deleted in the same deck; guarantee-claim estimate halved

FY27-Q1. The inflection print: slippages ₹291cr the lowest ever, margin 7.5%, and the promoter's debenture default landed the same fortnight

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's net margin was 10.7% in the Sep 2026 quarter, 4.9 percentage points higher than the same quarter a year ago. Across 9 years it has been between −161.0% and 16.7%. The latest quarter is within that range.

Net margin is what the bank keeps from every ₹100 of revenue after every cost, provision for bad loans and tax. It is the clearest single margin we can read for a lender.

Why this happened. The 7.5% lending margin is the sector's highest, but the recovery from 6.5% is volume and mix, the loan yield fell 26 basis points, treasury money moved into loans, and management says the cost-of-funds fall is over, so the margin is being defended from a weakening funding position

Why: the net margin move is clear, but the cost details behind it are not in our data, so we show the move without guessing the reason.

FY26-Q4. Guidance met at the bottom of the range, and four disclosure lines deleted in the same deck; guarantee-claim estimate halved

FY27-Q1. The inflection print: slippages ₹291cr the lowest ever, margin 7.5%, and the promoter's debenture default landed the same fortnight

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's gross NPA, the share of loans that have stopped being repaid, is 2.34% in Sep 2026, down from 2.87% a year ago. After the money already set aside for bad loans, 1.17% is left (net NPA). That is the 5th quarter in a row of improvement.

Gross NPA is the share of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what is left after the money the lender has already set aside for those loans. Falling is good; rising is a warning.

Why this happened. Slippages fell five straight quarters to ₹291cr and the bad-loan pool shrank in rupees for the first time, but cover fell 68.2% → 62.6% over the same five quarters, write-offs have never been disclosed separately, asset-reconstruction sales are confirmed but unquantified, and the four disclosure lines that would verify the improvement were deleted exactly when it appeared

Across the 12 quarters on file it has been between 2.11% and 2.97%. Falling bad loans mean the loan book is healing; rising ones mean new damage.

In Sep 2026, gross NPA was 2.34% and net NPA 1.17%, against 2.87% and 0.94% a year ago.

In short: a lender's profit growth is only as good as its loans, and this loan book is healing, several quarters running. Quarterly detail on money set aside for bad loans is not in our data yet, so this shows the levels and the trend, not the cost of the clean-up.

Why bad loans moved: recoveries, write-offs and new bad loans all play a part. That split is not in our data, so the page shows the trend without the breakdown.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's revenue was ₹5,353 Cr in FY26, +14.6% on the year before, so the loan book is growing. The latest quarter was +22.6% on a year earlier. The net margin on that income is 10.7%, +4.9 percentage points on a year ago.

We read the loan book through revenue: when the book grows, revenue grows with it. It is only a rough guide, because interest-rate changes and fee swings can move it a few points in any year.

Why this happened. Growth restarted without the unsecured engine, loans +26% year on year with microfinance down to 27% of the book, but the fastest-growing lines (gold +141% in FY26, micro loans-against-property) are the exact segments the rating agencies now flag, and Jana itself is consciously shrinking micro loans-against-property

Interest income stands in for the size of the loan book; changes in interest rates can move it a few points in any year.

In short: a lender grows well when its loan book grows, its margin stays steady and its loans stay clean. Gross NPA is the loan-quality figure this page uses.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's P/BV is 0.9×, about the lowest it has ever been. Its usual P/BV (the middle reading) is 1.2×, over 2.5 years of weekly prices. This compares the share price with the company’s own past. It does not say what the business is worth.

For a bank or lender we compare the price with book value, the net worth on its balance sheet. P/BV is how many rupees the market pays for each ₹1 of that net worth. Below 1× means the market values it at less than its net worth.

Why this happened. 1.29× the June book of ₹449, above the 1.21× the listing was priced at, on a fully-taxed return on equity roughly two-thirds lower, with the price assuming a permanent taxed return of ~13.3 to 18.3% (centre 15.8%) against 5.7 to 10.1% delivered; the committed-money prints are 0.88× (the promoter block) and 1.04× (the warrant strike)

Why the multiple is low: this lender earns about 8% a year on its equity. A lender that earns less on its net worth is valued lower for each rupee of it, and that gap usually closes only if returns improve.

Why the multiple is where it is: over the past year book value grew while the price moved −14.5%. Price and book value moved together, so the multiple stayed in its range.

In short: the multiple is low against its own past, so the book value trend underneath matters more than the multiple.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's business is turning around. Profit growth has swung from −43.3% at its low to +15.6%, improving for 3 quarters in a row, with ROE rising at 9.7%. This is based on 12 quarters of 4 measures.

Every business is somewhere on a path of getting better or worse, and this section names where. The last 12 quarters of growth in revenue, profit and earnings per share, plus the return the business earns on its capital, are read as lines. Getting worse: the lines are falling. Turning around: a low point has just formed and the last few quarters are rising from it. Getting better: the rise from the low has lasted. Growing steadily: steady growth with healthy returns. Slowing from a peak: still high, but slowing. When the lines disagree the result is mixed; too little history means no reading. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the steady yearly rate that would turn the starting value into the latest one. It is the fairest way to compare growth over different periods. If the 1-year figure is much bigger than the 10-year one, recent growth is running faster than the long-run trend. A dash means there is no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss, where a growth rate means nothing.

Why it matters: a turn in growth is often where a bigger change starts. The lines say a turn is forming, so the question is whether the next quarters confirm it.

Compound annual growth rate (%)

Compound annual growth rate over each period, %. Revenue, profit and EPS come from yearly figures; the share price row is price growth over the same periods. A dash means no figure for that period, or the starting year was a loss.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's story is not scored yet against the checks our research set on 17 August 2026. Checks so far: 20 not due yet.

NOT YET CHECKED 20 not due yet · first check at the next results

From the numbers. Slippages at ₹291cr are the lowest ever and cover is 1.87 times, but profit before provisions per rupee of assets is 2.71% versus 4.09% two years ago and the ₹155cr quarterly profit carries zero tax.

From the price. Stage 2 for 12 weeks at the 52-week high, 24.9% above the 200-day average, up 65% off the March-2026 low, the compression is gone.

Where they disagree. What stays open is quality: the credit-cost relief cannot be decomposed because the lines that would decompose it were withdrawn.

What is proven. Bad-loan formation fell five straight quarters to ₹291cr, the lowest print since disclosure began; the lending margin is restored to 7.5%; operating profit covers credit cost 1.87 times, the second-best reading in twenty quarters; the secured share of loans rose from 39.7% to 72.8% over five years, verified by two rating agencies.

What is not proven yet. The engine: profit before provisions per rupee of assets is 2.71% against 4.09% in FY24; every reported profit is untaxed until 31-Mar-2027; the composition of the credit-cost relief is unverifiable because four disclosure lines were deleted exactly when the numbers turned; and the guarantee scheme that anchors FY27 guidance has paid zero rupees in two years.

The test written in advance. The credit turn lasts: net credit cost stays at or below management's own floor. Measured by: net credit cost as a share of average gross loans, per quarter <= 0.45% in each of FY27-Q2, FY27-Q3 and FY27-Q4 by FY27-Q2 result (October 2026), then each quarter.

The test written in advance. Slippages keep falling: flat in FY27-Q2, lower in the second half, per the 15-Jul-2026 guide. Measured by: gross slippages per quarter <= ₹300cr in FY27-Q2 and falling in FY27-Q3 and FY27-Q4 by FY27-Q2 result (October 2026).

The test written in advance. The guarantee trust actually pays, the single most falsifiable claim in the file. Measured by: CGFMU/CGTMSE claim money actually received >= ₹65cr received by FY27-Q3 result (January 2027).

What the company does. Jana takes ordinary deposits (₹35,756cr) and lends small amounts (₹37,612cr) to under-served households and tiny businesses, affordable housing, small-business loans against property, two-wheeler, gold and farm loans now 72.8% of the book, with the remaining unsecured microfinance ~80% covered by government credit-guarantee schemes. It was born from the near-failure of microfinance lender Janalakshmi in 2016 to 17, became a bank in March 2018, and listed in February 2024 at ₹414.

How the money is made. Profit = (loan yield ~17.7% − deposit cost ~7.4%) on ₹37,612cr of loans, minus a 67% cost-to-income operating base, minus credit losses net of collateral and guarantees, with zero tax until the demonetisation-era loss shelter expires 31-Mar-2027.

The key numbers to watch, and the level that would change the picture

Everything further down this page is evidence for or against these.

Why the latest quarter changed (FY27-Q1 versus FY26-Q1)

The sequential engine has already slowed; the honest read is the two-quarter recovery off the FY26-Q3 trough.

Did the business cover its own costs? Operating profit covered credit cost, out of operating profit before provisions in 19 of 20 periods; cumulatively. Survival was never the question, the bank is deposit-funded with a 20.2% capital ratio. Earnings quality is the question: fully taxed and stripped of write-ups and disposal gains, twenty quarters produced roughly ₹1,020cr of economic profit against ₹3,058cr of accumulated losses still on the balance sheet.

The dot is where the company is now; the dashed line is the level that would settle the question; a tinted band is where management says it is heading.

The turn is real and the engine is not. Slippages fell five straight quarters and cover rebuilt to 1.87×, while profit before provisions per rupee of assets sat at 2.71% against the bank's own 4.09% two years earlier, and trailing operating profit grew 8% on a loan book that grew 42%.

Asset quality improved exactly as the ability to check it was withdrawn. The deck that first showed the improvement deleted the technical-write-off cover, the by-product cover table, the restructured-book slide and the discretionary-provision row; the bad-loan table was rebased +₹21cr unexplained; the stress metric now excludes the fastest-growing gold book.

'Secured is safe' versus the bank's own slides. Secured slippages ran 2.4 to 3.7% annualised through the cycle, exceeded unsecured slippages in rupees from FY26-Q4, secured early-warning overdue (4.8%) sat above unsecured (4.2%) at Dec-2025, and secured cover was cut 49.8% → 27.6% before the line was deleted. Collateral cuts loss severity, not default frequency.

What is temporary, what is cyclical, what is structural

• 1 · Operating leveragebuilding
• 2 · Value-added mixworking now
• 3 · Management changebuilding
• 4 · Paying down debtquiet
• 5 · Regulatory approvalreversed
• 6 · Order-book winsquiet
• 7 · Consolidationquiet
• 8 · Demerger or value unlockquiet
• 9 · Buybackquiet
• 10 · New geographiesquiet
• 11 · More business from existing customersquiet
• 12 · New product launchbuilding
• 13 · Mandatory normsquiet
• 14 · A bigger market to servequiet
• 15 · Market-share gainsquiet
• 16 · Asset qualityworking now

Lever 16 · Asset quality: working now. Slippages fell five straight quarters to ₹291cr; provisions eased from ₹266cr to ₹178cr, flowing rupee-for-rupee to pre-tax profit; cover of credit cost by operating profit is 1.87×, second-best of twenty quarters. What proves it keeps working: net credit cost ≤0.45% of average loans at the FY27-Q2 result (October 2026), with slippages flat or lower. It stops working if slippages rise for two consecutive quarters, or provision cover falls below 62%.

Lever 1 · Operating leverage: building. Operating costs +1.5% quarter on quarter against 12.9% two-quarter loan growth, the first real leverage in six quarters; cost-to-income 67.0% must reach the 63 to 65% FY27 guide. What proves it keeps working: cost-to-income below 66% at FY27-Q2 and at or below 65% by FY27-Q4. It stops working if cost-to-income above 65% at FY27-Q4, the fourth broken cost promise in a row.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix: working now. Secured share of loans 39.7% → 72.8% over five years, verified by two rating agencies, lower loss severity and lower risk weights, at the cost of 125 basis points of lending margin already given up. What proves it keeps working: secured slippages falling two consecutive quarters; micro loans-against-property back to positive growth in FY27-Q2. It stops working if secured slippages (2.4 to 3.7% annualised through the cycle, above unsecured in rupees since FY26-Q4) fail to fall while the mix keeps rising.

Lever 3 · Management change: building. The defaulted promoter stake-cutting below 9.99% plus a strategic two-wheeler group taking up to 9.9% converts the largest supply overhang into an anchor shareholder with captive origination logic. What proves it keeps working: a negotiated placement of the ≥6.96% block before 31-Dec-2026 and RBI approval of the 9.99% stake. It stops working if a second maturity extension without a completed sale, or the rating watch resolving into a downgrade of the bank's own instruments.

What this research does not know. The FY26 annual report is unpublished, the asset-reconstruction gain (making FY26 and FY27-Q1 honest earnings upper bounds, not points), the Mar-2026 accumulated-loss balance, the remaining unrecognised tax shelter (the ₹801cr figure and…; Write-offs have never been disclosed separately in any quarter in the bank's history, every bad-loan ratio here reads 'losses still on the books', not 'losses taken'; The FY26 full-year discretionary ('accelerated') provision, the row was deleted after nine months at ≥₹292cr; Tier-1 capital since FY25-Q2, never separated from the total ratio in ten decks; risk-weighted assets unpublished; The actual reason the Reserve Bank returned the universal-bank application, never stated by anyone, including the bank; the structure hypothesis is inference; The exact promoter obligation, ₹1,831cr rated, ~₹4,200cr with accrued interest, ₹1,663cr restructured are three measures of one stack, never reconciled to one number.

Sources: Eleven quarterly earnings-call transcripts, FY24-Q3 results (26-Feb-2024) through FY27-Q1 results (15-Jul-2026), read end to end (15 July 2026); Eleven company presentations for the same quarters, including the bad-loan movement tables the write-off analysis differences (15 July 2026); Annual reports FY24 and FY25 (Schedule 14 asset-reconstruction gains; related-party schedules; auditor reports) (1 August 2025); Pre-listing audited quarterly results under the debt-listing rules, Sep-2021 → Dec-2022, on the bank's own site (1 February 2023); India Ratings press release: Jana Holdings / Jana Capital debentures downgraded to IND D; the bank placed on watch with negative… (1 July 2026); Business Standard: universal-bank application filed 09-Jun-2025; returned by the Reserve Bank 28-Oct-2025 (28 October 2025); TVS Motor Company exchange filing: 51,60,903 shares (4.90%) acquired for ₹193.31cr = ₹374.6 a share (18 May 2026); Preferential warrant issue: ₹728.51cr at ₹464.82, board approval 18-May-2026; ₹103cr received June 2026 (30 June 2026); +7 more. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

The whole page in one table. Each row links to its section.

What Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's management promised, against what actually happened: 6 promises on the record. Scored in our research file, promise by promise. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

Said 30 April 2024, due FY25–FY27: missed. Promised: Profit growth 30 to 40% a year for the next three years, 'because the cost of credit will come down even more next year'. What arrived: FY25 −25% (₹501cr), FY26 −35% (₹326cr).

Said 30 April 2024, due FY27: missed. Promised: Cost-to-income from 58% to 52 to 53% within three years. What arrived: FY26 came in at 67.8%; the goal now reads 63 to 65% and 'will not go below 60%'.

Said 30 April 2024, due FY27: missed. Promised: Current-and-savings deposits from 20% to 30% in three years. What arrived: 19.2% at FY27-Q1, net −0.5 points against a +10-point promise.

Said 30 April 2024, due FY27: missed. Promised: No equity capital raise for three years. What arrived: ₹728cr of tier-1 warrants approved 18-May-2026; the interim 'no intention of raising equity capital' (17-Oct-2025) reversed in eight months.

Said 30 April 2024, due FY26: met. Promised: Asset and deposit growth ~20%. What arrived: loans +22.8%, deposits +22.9% in FY26.

Said 29 April 2025, due FY26: missed. Promised: FY26 profit growth ~30%; 'the peak is behind us… Karnataka… already baked into our Q4 numbers'. What arrived: slippages rose the next quarter ('the bump was followed by a pothole'); guidance cut to 0 to 2% in October; FY26 delivered −35%.

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd earned a return on equity of 8% in FY26. Its lowest yearly reading on file was −189% in FY19. On its assets, every ₹100 earned about ₹1.03, before the effect of borrowing. For a lender the balance sheet is the business, so the return on equity and on assets have to be read together.

Two numbers rate a bank: ROE, what it earns on shareholders’ money, and ROA, what it earns on all its assets. An ROE above about 13 to 15% is healthy; below that, net worth grows slowly.

Why this happened. Reported return on equity 13.6% annualised is ≤10.2% fully taxed; FY26's 7.6% is ≤5.7%. The bank has printed above 13% honestly once in five years, at the FY24 cycle peak, and its honest mid-cycle earning power computes to 9 to 12%, centre ~10.5%

That return is below the level a bank needs to grow its net worth quickly, which helps explain why its multiple is where it is.

Why: the ROE chart shows the move, but the deposit-cost and bad-loan details behind it are not in our data.

For a bank, borrowing is the raw material of the business, not a warning sign: it borrows money in order to lend it out. Its safety is read through its returns and its loans. Its safety is read from the bad-loan figures and the return on equity instead.

Why this happened. Deposits were flat in the June quarter while loans grew 3.6%, loans-to-deposits 97.0%, current-and-savings 19% against a 30% promise, liquidity cushion 153% against 391% two years ago, and growth needs ~₹480cr of external equity a year against ~half generated internally, hence the ₹728cr warrant raise eight months after 'no intention of raising equity capital'

For a manufacturer, debt is a claim on its profits. For a lender it is the stock it trades in, so the usual debt-to-equity test would mislead and is not used here.

Promoters cut their stake in Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd by 5.5 percentage points over 8 quarters, the biggest change among its owners. Promoters now own 16.9% of the company. Foreign institutions moved +4.0 points over the same period, to 5.1%. This uses the four owner groups that companies report every quarter; nothing is guessed between filings.

Who owns the company each quarter: promoters (the founders or controlling owners), foreign institutions, domestic institutions such as mutual funds, and the public. When people close to the business steadily raise their stake, that is worth noticing; a quiet list is also an answer.

Over the last two years: Promoters: −5.5 points over 8 quarters, to 16.9%; Foreign institutions: +4.0 points over 8 quarters, to 5.1%; Domestic institutions: −1.7 points over 8 quarters, to 16.3%. Promoters own under 20%, so this is a widely owned company where institutions, not a family, have the most say.

Why the owners changed: foreign institutions moved +4.0 points and domestic institutions −1.7 points over 8 quarters, while promoters moved −5.5 points. One group of institutions took over shares from the other; it is not a change of mind by the people running the company.

For Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd, the Z-score is not used, because it was built for manufacturers, not lenders. For a lender, safety is read from its capital and bad-loan figures instead.

The Z-score estimates how far a company is from balance-sheet trouble. Above about 3 is safe; below about 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not used for banks and lenders.

37.4 out of 100, rank 7 of 9 in Banks - Small Finance, with 100% of the evidence available.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd scores 37.4 out of 100 against the 9 companies it is compared with in Banks - Small Finance, ranking 7. The evidence is balanced: no factor stands out, so another reported quarter is needed before the picture is clearer.

The four parts add up to the total exactly: 15.3 + 11.9 + 8 + 2.2 = 37.4. This is the same number shown on the industry page; it is worked out once for the whole group and read here.

What would change it: The score would fall if ROA turns down or gross NPA rises while the share price lags its sector.

Jana Small Finance Bank ranks 7 of 9 Banks - Small Finance companies on the 4-Factor Sector Score, with 37.4 out of 100.

Missing figures are not scored as bad. They lower the confidence and pull the final score toward the middle. Relative strength counts only when the company has a reading for this week; with no reading, that factor is left out and its 20 points are shared across the other three in proportion. Financial companies use P/BV÷ROE and asset quality; PEG, industrial OPM and ROCE are excluded. Under relative strength, one mark per week shows the last 12 weeks: a mark is filled where the company led NIFTY 500 by 5% or more over the 13 weeks ending that week, which is the same test used everywhere on this site. Price stage places the company on the same six-step path the industry is placed on (basing, turning, breaking out, leader, fading, asleep), read from how many weeks running it has led NIFTY 500 and whether that lead is growing or shrinking. It describes where the share price stands, not the direction of earnings, and it is not a recommendation; it is left blank for a company whose weekly history is too short or too stale to read.

The figures in this ranking come from the industry comparison: results through the Sep 2026 quarter, and the P/E at that quarter's end. The sections above use the latest weekly price, so a P/E or return there can differ a little from the one here. The stage words in this ranking (such as losing its lead or breaking out) describe the lead over the index, not the price phase in the price section.

Related companies: Banks - Small Finance, all 9 compared on one page.

Jana Small Finance Bank is the 4th largest of 9 Banks - Small Finance companies on Sector Alpha by market value (scores of 30 October 2026). Just above it: AU Small Finance Bank, Ujjivan Small Finance Bank and Equitas Small Finance Bank. Just below it: ESAF Small Finance Bank, Utkarsh Small Finance Bank and Suryoday Small Finance Bank.

Banks - Small Finance companies close in size

1. AU Small Finance Bank Ltd ₹64,953 crore
2. Ujjivan Small Finance Bank Ltd ₹10,368 crore
3. Equitas Small Finance Bank Ltd ₹6,131 crore
4. Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd ₹3,953 crore
5. ESAF Small Finance Bank Ltd ₹2,192 crore
6. Utkarsh Small Finance Bank Ltd ₹2,039 crore
7. Suryoday Small Finance Bank Ltd ₹1,432 crore

All 9 Banks - Small Finance companies, largest first

Companies close in size in other industries

941. MPS Ltd ₹3,970 crore · E-Commerce - Platform - Utility
942. Sustainable Energy Infra Trust ₹3,969 crore · Infrastructure Investment Trusts
943. Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd ₹3,953 crore
944. Capital Infra Trust ₹3,934 crore · Infra/Real Estate Investment Trust
945. Electrosteel Castings Ltd ₹3,929 crore · DI Pipes/Saw Pipes

Our Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd research of 17 August 2026 set 20 checks, and every results season scores each one. No results season has been scored against them yet. A row is permanent: a miss stays on the record after it is fixed.

The checks we set once and score every results season

A row is permanent: a miss stays on the record even after it is later fixed.

What we checked on how Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd is run. 7 items came back clean and 8 are being watched. Read from the company’s own filings and earnings calls; a watch item is a question, not a finding.

Clean (7). Promoter shares pledged: 0.00% in all ten quarters since the February-2024 listing, verified across three exchange-sourced records, the feared forced trustee sale has no legal mechanism; Joint statutory auditors (S.R. Batliboi & Associates and Batliboi & Purohit) unqualified in FY24 and FY25; no frauds reported; secretarial audit clean; The ring-fence is legally real: no cross-default between bank and promoter debt, no common board member, no capital taken from the promoter since June 2022, bank capital ratio 20.2%; The promoter's largest creditor itself owns 8.11% of the bank directly (85.4 lakh shares, unchanged Jun-2025 → Jun-2026), structurally aligned to an orderly block placement; Public shareholding 62.69% against a 25% floor, the minimum-public-shareholding rule does not bind; the five-year promoter lock expired March 2023; Foreign institutions rose 0.28% → 4.01% through the crisis quarters and held through the promoter default;; Related-party payments are minimal: brand royalty renegotiated to ₹3.81cr a year flat (under 1% of pre-tax profit), the only such payment discussed on any call.

On watch (8). Promoter stake companies defaulted on ₹1,831cr of rated debentures (30-Jun-2026), extended to 31-Dec-2026, treated as a distressed exchange and rated default; ~₹4,200cr due with accrued interest against a stake worth ~₹1,035cr, expect…; India Ratings placed the BANK's own ₹3,750cr of instruments and deposit programme on watch with negative implications because of the parent; the other agency took no action; Both regulator interactions on record concern how the equity is built: the universal-bank application returned October 2025 for unstated reasons ('approval criteria are different, but we meet the gating requirements'), and a ₹1cr penalty…; Four disclosure lines deleted in the FY26-Q4 deck (technical-write-off cover, by-product cover table, restructured book, discretionary-provision row); write-offs never disclosed separately in the bank's history; tier-1 capital not…; Asset-reconstruction sales of ₹187cr / ₹85cr / ₹98cr (FY23–FY25, from annual reports) never mentioned on any of eleven calls despite four direct other-income questions; an independent director of the bank is a registry-recorded former…; The chief credit officer resigns 30-Aug-2026 after twelve months in the seat, at a bank whose equity story is 'we fixed credit'; the chief operating officer left November 2025; The chief executive's term ends 20-Mar-2027, a discretionary re-approval by the same regulator that returned the licence; no board proposal visible yet; Six wrong peak calls and four silent goal re-basings across the cycle; the FY26 guidance was missed twice on profit, return on assets and return on equity.

Sector Alpha, written by code from the published numbers. Data as of 6 November 2026.

Every chart on this page is drawn by code from the published figures, with no forecasts and no price opinions.

See the plain-text version of this page.