Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd trades at ₹517, in a confirmed uptrend and 16 weeks into that stage. That is +8.2% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 72% of a 52-week range of ₹349 to ₹582. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 8 straight weeks.

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 16 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹517 it trades +8.2% versus its 200-day average and sits at 72% of its 52-week range (₹349–₹582).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 2.6 years the stock moved +23% while the NIFTY 500 moved +14% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 8 straight weeks — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 17 August 2026. Marker count: 20 not due yet.

From the numbers. Slippages at ₹291cr are the lowest ever and cover is 1.87 times, but profit before provisions per rupee of assets is 2.71% versus 4.09% two years ago and the ₹155cr quarterly profit carries zero tax.

From the price. Stage 2 for 12 weeks at the 52-week high, 24.9% above the 200-day average, up 65% off the March-2026 low — the compression is gone.

From the research. A real five-year secured pivot and a strategic buyer, wrapped in a defaulted promoter who must sell ~7% of the company by 31-Dec-2026 and a disclosure aperture that narrowed as the numbers improved.

🚨 Where they disagree. Numbers and research agree the business turned; the price says the turn is already owned. What stays open is quality: the credit-cost relief cannot be decomposed because the lines that would decompose it were withdrawn.

What is proven. Bad-loan formation fell five straight quarters to ₹291cr, the lowest print since disclosure began; the lending margin is restored to 7.5%; operating profit covers credit cost 1.87 times, the second-best reading in twenty quarters; the secured share of loans rose from 39.7% to 72.8% over five years, verified by two rating agencies.

What is not proven yet. The engine: profit before provisions per rupee of assets is 2.71% against 4.09% in FY24; every reported profit is untaxed until 31-Mar-2027; the composition of the credit-cost relief is unverifiable because four disclosure lines were deleted exactly when the numbers turned; and the guarantee scheme that anchors FY27 guidance has paid zero rupees in two years.

🚨 What would change our mind. A fully-taxed return on equity above 13% sustained for two quarters with the deleted disclosure lines restored — or the price back near the bank's own book value of ₹449 with the FY27 markers intact.

The test written in advance. The credit turn holds: net credit cost stays at or below management's own floor — net credit cost as a share of average gross loans, per quarter <= 0.45% in each of FY27-Q2, FY27-Q3 and FY27-Q4 by FY27-Q2 result (October 2026), then each quarter.

The test written in advance. Slippages keep falling: flat in FY27-Q2, lower in the second half, per the 15-Jul-2026 guide — gross slippages per quarter <= ₹300cr in FY27-Q2 and falling in FY27-Q3 and FY27-Q4 by FY27-Q2 result (October 2026).

The test written in advance. The guarantee trust actually pays — the single most falsifiable claim in the file — CGFMU/CGTMSE claim money actually received >= ₹65cr received by FY27-Q3 result (January 2027).

What the company does. Jana takes ordinary deposits (₹35,756cr) and lends small amounts (₹37,612cr) to under-served households and tiny businesses — affordable housing, small-business loans against property, two-wheeler, gold and farm loans now 72.8% of the book, with the remaining unsecured microfinance ~80% covered by government credit-guarantee schemes. It was born from the near-failure of microfinance lender Janalakshmi in 2016–17, became a bank in March 2018, and listed in February 2024 at ₹414.

How the money is made. Profit = (loan yield ~17.7% − deposit cost ~7.4%) on ₹37,612cr of loans, minus a 67% cost-to-income operating base, minus credit losses net of collateral and guarantees — with zero tax until the demonetisation-era loss shelter expires 31-Mar-2027.

Did the business cover its own costs? Operating profit covered credit cost, out of operating profit before provisions in 19 of 20 periods; cumulatively . Survival was never the question — the bank is deposit-funded with a 20.2% capital ratio. Earnings quality is the question: fully taxed and stripped of write-ups and disposal gains, twenty quarters produced roughly ₹1,020cr of economic profit against ₹3,058cr of accumulated losses still on the balance sheet.

The dot is where the company is now; the dashed line is the level that would settle the question; a tinted band is where management says it is heading.

🚨 The turn is real and the engine is not. Slippages fell five straight quarters and cover rebuilt to 1.87× — while profit before provisions per rupee of assets sat at 2.71% against the bank's own 4.09% two years earlier, and trailing operating profit grew 8% on a loan book that grew 42%. A provisions-and-tax recovery on a flat engine: the business turned; the economics have not followed yet.

🚨 Asset quality improved exactly as the ability to check it was withdrawn. The deck that first showed the improvement deleted the technical-write-off cover, the by-product cover table, the restructured-book slide and the discretionary-provision row; the bad-loan table was rebased +₹21cr unexplained; the stress metric now excludes the fastest-growing gold book.

🚨 The committed money and the screen are at different prices. TVS Motor paid ₹374.6 (0.88× book) for the promoter's block after diligence; the board struck warrants at ₹464.82 (~1.04×); the screen pays 1.29×. Nine-tenths of the move from block to screen is the multiple, on one quarter of new information.

🚨 'Secured is safe' versus the bank's own slides. Secured slippages ran 2.4–3.7% annualised through the cycle, exceeded unsecured slippages in rupees from FY26-Q4, secured early-warning overdue (4.8%) sat above unsecured (4.2%) at Dec-2025, and secured cover was cut 49.8% → 27.6% before the line was deleted. Collateral cuts loss severity, not default frequency.

🚨 Foreign money bought the crisis; domestic money sold it. Foreign institutions went 0.28% → 4.31% through the worst quarters and held through the promoter default; domestic institutions cut 18.47% → 12.92% and only partly returned; retail holders fell 31% from listing. The two informed pools took opposite sides.

Lever 16 · Asset quality — ACTIVE. Slippages fell five straight quarters to ₹291cr; provisions eased from ₹266cr to ₹178cr, flowing rupee-for-rupee to pre-tax profit; cover of credit cost by operating profit is 1.87×, second-best of twenty quarters. What proves it keeps working: net credit cost ≤0.45% of average loans at the FY27-Q2 result (October 2026), with slippages flat or lower. It stops working if slippages rise for two consecutive quarters, or provision cover falls below 62%.

Lever 1 · Operating leverage — BUILDING. Operating costs +1.5% quarter on quarter against 12.9% two-quarter loan growth — the first real leverage in six quarters; cost-to-income 67.0% must reach the 63–65% FY27 guide. What proves it keeps working: cost-to-income below 66% at FY27-Q2 and at or below 65% by FY27-Q4. It stops working if cost-to-income above 65% at FY27-Q4 — the fourth broken cost promise in a row.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix — ACTIVE. Secured share of loans 39.7% → 72.8% over five years, verified by two rating agencies — lower loss severity and lower risk weights, at the cost of 125 basis points of lending margin already given up. What proves it keeps working: secured slippages falling two consecutive quarters; micro loans-against-property back to positive growth in FY27-Q2. It stops working if secured slippages (2.4–3.7% annualised through the cycle, above unsecured in rupees since FY26-Q4) fail to fall while the mix keeps rising.

Lever 3 · Management change — BUILDING. The defaulted promoter selling below 9.99% plus a strategic two-wheeler group taking up to 9.9% converts the largest supply overhang into an anchor investor with captive origination logic. What proves it keeps working: a negotiated placement of the ≥6.96% block before 31-Dec-2026 and RBI approval of the 9.99% stake. It stops working if a second maturity extension without a completed sale, or the rating watch resolving into a downgrade of the bank's own instruments.

What this research does not know. The FY26 annual report is unpublished — the asset-reconstruction gain (making FY26 and FY27-Q1 honest earnings upper bounds, not points), the Mar-2026 accumulated-loss balance, the remaining unrecognised tax shelter (the ₹801cr figure and…; Write-offs have never been disclosed separately in any quarter in the bank's history — every bad-loan ratio here reads 'losses still on the books', not 'losses taken'; The FY26 full-year discretionary ('accelerated') provision — the row was deleted after nine months at ≥₹292cr; Tier-1 capital since FY25-Q2 — never separated from the total ratio in ten decks; risk-weighted assets unpublished; The actual reason the Reserve Bank returned the universal-bank application — never stated by anyone, including the bank; the structure hypothesis is inference; The exact promoter obligation — ₹1,831cr rated, ~₹4,200cr with accrued interest, ₹1,663cr restructured are three measures of one stack, never reconciled to one number.

Sources: Eleven quarterly earnings-call transcripts, FY24-Q3 results (26-Feb-2024) through FY27-Q1 results (15-Jul-2026), read end to end (15 July 2026); Eleven investor presentations for the same quarters, including the bad-loan movement tables the write-off analysis differences (15 July 2026); Annual reports FY24 and FY25 (Schedule 14 asset-reconstruction gains; related-party schedules; auditor reports) (1 August 2025); Pre-listing audited quarterly results under the debt-listing rules, Sep-2021 → Dec-2022, on the bank's own site (1 February 2023); India Ratings press release: Jana Holdings / Jana Capital debentures downgraded to IND D; the bank placed on watch with negative… (1 July 2026); Business Standard: universal-bank application filed 09-Jun-2025; returned by the Reserve Bank 28-Oct-2025 (28 October 2025); TVS Motor Company exchange filing: 51,60,903 shares (4.90%) acquired for ₹193.31cr = ₹374.6 a share (18 May 2026); Preferential warrant issue: ₹728.51cr at ₹464.82, board approval 18-May-2026; ₹103cr received June 2026 (30 June 2026); +7 more. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue For a bank, revenue is everything the franchise earns — interest on the loan book plus fee and other income.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd reported ₹1,515 Cr of income in the Jun 26 quarter, +22.1% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 8 years it has compounded at 16.7% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹5,353 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹5,639 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹5,353 Cr (+13.7% on the year), capping 8 years at 16.7% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹1,515 Cr, +22.1% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +18.2% growth against the decade's 16.7% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +18.3% over the last 4 quarters against +14.6%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating; TTM profit −12.2% vs −28.9%/yr — accelerating.

FY26-Q4. Guidance met at the bottom of the range — and four disclosure lines deleted in the same deck; guarantee-claim estimate halved

FY27-Q1. The inflection print: slippages ₹291cr the lowest ever, margin 7.5% — and the promoter's debenture default landed the same fortnight

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net margin Net margin — what the bank keeps of every ₹100 of revenue after every cost, provision and tax. It is the cleanest single margin we can read for a lender.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's net margin is 10.2% in the Jun 26 quarter, +2.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 9 fiscal years the net margin has ranged −161.0% to 16.7%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Why this happened. The 7.5% lending margin is the sector's highest, but the recovery from 6.5% is volume and mix — the loan yield fell 26 basis points, treasury money moved into loans, and management says the cost-of-funds fall is over — so the margin is being defended from a weakening funding position

The latest quarter's net margin is 10.2%, +2.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 9 fiscal years the net margin has ranged −161.0%–16.7%.

Why: the numbers show the net margin move clearly, but the cost lines behind it sit below what we hold — so we state the move without inventing its driver.

FY26-Q4. Guidance met at the bottom of the range — and four disclosure lines deleted in the same deck; guarantee-claim estimate halved

FY27-Q1. The inflection print: slippages ₹291cr the lowest ever, margin 7.5% — and the promoter's debenture default landed the same fortnight

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd earned ₹155 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +52.0% year on year. It is the 2nd consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹326 Cr. That is 10.2% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹102 Cr.

Why this happened. ₹155cr, +52% year on year, earned despite other income falling ₹39cr — the cleanest beat in the file — but it carries zero tax (₹116cr taxed), and the FY27 '+80% or better' guide of ≥₹587cr is arithmetically inconsistent with the February return-on-assets guide of 1.5–1.6% (₹587cr on ~₹51,000cr of average assets is ~1.15%)

Jun 26 profit was ₹155 Cr, +52.0% year on year — the 2nd consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹326 Cr (−34.9%).

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +22.1% and the margin +2.0 pp — the quarter was margin-led: most of the profit growth came from keeping more of each sale.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit −12.0% vs revenue +18.2%. Profit is growing slower than sales — costs are eating the growth before it reaches the bottom line.

🚨 Survival — credit cost eats everything · FY22-Q2 → FY22-Q4. Survival: credit cost ₹132cr consumed nearly all of ₹139cr operating profit The one loss quarter — provisions ₹149cr exceeded operating profit ₹143cr

Repair and growth into the listing · FY23-Q1 → FY24-Q3. First meaningful profit; other income of ₹179cr did the lifting Provisions ₹187cr consumed the quarter again; bad loans still 6.8%

The flattered peak — deferred-tax write-up inside · FY24-Q4 → FY25-Q1. ₹155cr of the ₹322cr was a deferred-tax write-up; underlying pre-tax profit moved only +₹33cr; cover peaked at 1.95× Microfinance stress first surfaces — slippages of ₹305cr disclosed for the first time

🚨 Microfinance stress plus a self-inflicted cost overshoot · FY25-Q2 → FY26-Q3. The stress is named; interest income flat, and the cost squeeze arrives before the credit cost does Management states provisions are being set to hold net bad loans below the licence test's 1% line

Provision-led recovery on a flat engine · FY26-Q4 → FY27-Q1. Guidance met at the bottom of the range — and four disclosure lines deleted in the same deck; guarantee-claim estimate halved The inflection print: slippages ₹291cr the lowest ever, margin 7.5% — and the promoter's debenture default landed the same fortnight

Why-sources: our stock research file (17 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Asset quality — the ladder Gross NPA is the slice of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what remains after the money already set aside against those loans. Falling is healing; rising is damage arriving.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's gross NPA is 2.39% of the loan book in Jun 26, down from 2.91% a year ago. Net of provisions already set aside, 0.91% remains. That is the 4th straight quarter of improvement. Across the 12 quarters held here the book has ranged 2.11% to 2.97%.

Why this happened. Slippages fell five straight quarters to ₹291cr and the bad-loan pool shrank in rupees for the first time — but cover fell 68.2% → 62.6% over the same five quarters, write-offs have never been disclosed separately, asset-reconstruction sales are confirmed but unquantified, and the four disclosure lines that would verify the improvement were deleted exactly when it appeared

Jun 26: gross NPA at 2.39% and net NPA at 0.91%, against 2.91% / 0.94% a year ago. Over the 12 quarters we hold, the book's worst reading was 2.97% and its best is 2.11%. The ladder has now improved for 4 consecutive quarters.

The synthesis: profit growth at a bank is only as good as the book behind it, and this book is healing on a multi-quarter streak. A note on depth: quarterly provisioning detail is not in our numbers yet, so this ladder reads levels and trend, not the cost of the cleanup.

Why the ladder moved: recoveries, write-offs and slippages each play a part, and that split sits below what we hold — the numbers show the healing; the driver mix does not travel with them.

The loan book We read the loan book through revenue — when the book grows, revenue grows with it. It is a rough proxy, and we say so: rate moves and fee swings can shift it a few points in any one year.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's revenue grew +13.7% in FY26 to ₹5,353 Cr, so the book is growing. The latest quarter ran +22.1% year on year. The net margin on that income is 10.2%, +2.0 percentage points against a year ago.

Why this happened. Growth restarted without the unsecured engine — loans +26% year on year with microfinance down to 27% of the book — but the fastest-growing lines (gold +141% in FY26, micro loans-against-property) are the exact segments the rating agencies now flag, and Jana itself is consciously shrinking micro loans-against-property

FY26 revenue was ₹5,353 Cr, +13.7% on the year, and the latest quarter ran +22.1% year on year. The net margin on that revenue is 10.2% this quarter (+2.0 pp YoY) — growth with a widening margin on it.

The synthesis: a lender compounds when the book grows while the margin holds and the loan book stays clean — gross NPA is the loan-quality read we carry here.

Returns on equity and assets Two numbers rate a bank: ROE — what it earns on shareholder money — and ROA — what it earns on everything it deploys. ROE above ~13–15% earns its keep; below that, growth builds book slowly.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd earns a return on equity of 8% in FY26. Its trough over the ladder below was −189% in FY19. For a lender the balance sheet is the operating asset, so equity return and asset return have to be read together.

🚨 Why this happened. Reported return on equity 13.6% annualised is ≤10.2% fully taxed; FY26's 7.6% is ≤5.7%. The bank has printed above 13% honestly once in five years — at the FY24 cycle peak — and its honest mid-cycle earning power computes to 9–12%, centre ~10.5%

FY26 ROE came in at 8%, recovered from a FY19 trough of −189%. Return on assets is withheld on this page — its two source series disagree for this quarter. That return is below the bar a bank must clear to compound book value quickly — which is also the honest reason the stock trades where it does.

Why: the ROE ladder shows the move; the deposit-cost and provisioning drivers behind it sit below what we hold.

Debt

For a bank, borrowings are raw material, not a warning sign — solvency is read through the returns and the loan book. A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits, so the debt-to-equity lens that works everywhere else misleads on a lender and is not applied here.

🚨 Why this happened. Deposits were flat in the June quarter while loans grew 3.6% — loans-to-deposits 97.0%, current-and-savings 19% against a 30% promise, liquidity cushion 153% against 391% two years ago — and growth needs ~₹480cr of external equity a year against ~half generated internally, hence the ₹728cr warrant raise eight months after 'no intention of raising equity capital'

A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits; a bank’s borrowings are its inventory — money taken in to be lent out. The debt lens that works everywhere else misleads here, so this page does not apply it. The solvency questions for a bank — is the loan book sound, is the equity earning — are read through the loan-book and returns sections above.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters cut 5.6 points of Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 16.9% of the company. Foreign institutions moved +3.0 points over the same window, to 4.0%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

🚨 Why this happened. The promoter holding companies (16.94%) defaulted on ₹1,831cr of debentures and must sell ≥6.96% by 31-Dec-2026 — but pledge is 0.00% in all ten quarters since listing so the exit is a negotiated placement, the largest creditor itself owns 8.11% of the bank, foreign institutions went 0.28% → 4.01% through the crisis and held, and TVS Motor bought 4.90% at ₹374.6

The register over the last two years — Promoters: −5.6 points over 8 quarters to 16.9%; Foreign institutions: +3.0 points over 8 quarters to 4.0%; Domestic institutions: −2.4 points over 8 quarters to 15.3%. Note the structure: promoters hold under 20% — this is a widely-held company where institutions, not a family, set the direction.

Why the register moved: rotation — foreign institutions +3.0 points against domestic institutions −2.4 points over 8 quarters, with promoters −5.6 points — one class of institutions handing the register to the other, not a verdict change by the people closest to the numbers.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre. The Z-score was built for manufacturers and is not applied to banks and lenders, so solvency here is read from the capital and asset-quality lines instead.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre.

Valuation For a bank we price the book, not the earnings: P/BV is what the market pays for each ₹1 of the bank's net worth. A bank below 1× book is priced below the value of what it owns, net of what it owes.

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd trades at 1.2× P/BV, mid-range by its own standards (60th percentile). Its long-run median P/BV is 1.2×, measured across 2.4 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

🚨 Why this happened. 1.29× the June book of ₹449 — above the 1.21× the listing was priced at, on a fully-taxed return on equity roughly two-thirds lower — with the price assuming a permanent taxed return of ~13.3–18.3% (centre 15.8%) against 5.7–10.1% delivered; the committed-money prints are 0.88× (the promoter block) and 1.04× (the warrant strike)

Today's P/BV of 1.2× is mid-range by its own standards (60th percentile), against a long-run median of 1.2× measured over 2.4 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

The honest context for that discount: a bank earning about 8% on its equity is worth less per rupee of book, and the market has priced that in rather than overlooked it. The discount closes only if the returns themselves improve.

🚨 Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year book value grew while the price moved +13.3% — price and book moved together, holding the multiple in its range.

Put together: the multiple is unremarkable against its own past, so the story rests on the book-value line underneath it, not the multiple.

What the price assumes This reading works the multiple backwards. It asks one question: what yearly rate of profit growth is a buyer at the market price already paying for? The number is the growth rate that makes eleven years of profit — six years growing, then five fading — add up to that day's market price, once each year is discounted at 11% a year.

Solved at its 13 June 2026 price, Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd was paying for profit growth of about 9.3% a year. Today the market pays 1.2× P/BV, the 60th percentile of its own 2-year range.

What the two numbers say together. The multiple is unremarkable against its own past, and the growth the price is paying for is the whole of what a buyer is backing.

How to hold this number: it is a reading of one day's price, taken on 13 June 2026, not a running figure — every other number on this page, the multiple included, is read off the live quote as of 11 September 2026. A higher price is paying for more growth and a lower price for less, so it moves whenever the price does, and this page does not restate it between measurements.

Stage: Turning around Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd reads as turning around on its fundamental arc. Turning around — profit growth swung from −43.3% at the trough to −12.2%, a 2-quarter improving streak, ROE holding at 8.5%. The read is built from 12 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why it matters: growth inflections are where re-ratings start — the curves say a turn is forming, so the question becomes whether the next quarters confirm it.

4-Factor Sector Score

49.4/100 — rank 6 of 9 in Banks - Small Finance · 94% evidence confidence

Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd scores 49.4 out of 100 against the 9 companies it is compared with in Banks - Small Finance, ranking 6. Price leads the evidence: RS versus the benchmark is 16.5%, but earnings trajectory is weak. Wait for revenue and profit confirmation.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 13.5 + 12 + 8.6 + 15.3 = 49.4. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if ROA rolls over or gross NPA rises while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Quarterly scorecard

20 markers came out of our Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd research file of 17 August 2026, and each results season scores every one of them. No results season has been scored against them yet. A row is permanent: a miss stays on the record after it is fixed.

Said versus delivered

What Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 6 tracked promises on the record. Scored in our research file, promise by promise. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

🚨 Said 2024-04-30, due FY25–FY27 — missed. Promised: Profit growth 30–40% a year for the next three years, 'because the cost of credit will come down even more next year'. What arrived: FY25 −25% (₹501cr), FY26 −35% (₹326cr).

🚨 Said 2024-04-30, due FY27 — missed. Promised: Cost-to-income from 58% to 52–53% within three years. What arrived: FY26 came in at 67.8%; the target now reads 63–65% and 'will not go below 60%'.

🚨 Said 2024-04-30, due FY27 — missed. Promised: Current-and-savings deposits from 20% to 30% in three years. What arrived: 19.2% at FY27-Q1 — net −0.5 points against a +10-point promise.

🚨 Said 2024-04-30, due FY27 — missed. Promised: No equity capital raise for three years. What arrived: ₹728cr of tier-1 warrants approved 18-May-2026; the interim 'no intention of raising equity capital' (17-Oct-2025) reversed in eight months.

Said 2024-04-30, due FY26 — met. Promised: Asset and deposit growth ~20%. What arrived: loans +22.8%, deposits +22.9% in FY26.

🚨 Said 2025-04-29, due FY26 — missed. Promised: FY26 profit growth ~30%; 'the peak is behind us… Karnataka… already baked into our Q4 numbers'. What arrived: slippages rose the next quarter ('the bump was followed by a pothole'); guidance cut to 0–2% in October; FY26 delivered −35%.

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Governance

What we checked on how Jana Small Finance Bank Ltd is run. 7 items came back clean and 8 are being watched. Read from the company’s own filings and earnings calls; a watch item is a question, not a finding.

Clean (7). Promoter shares pledged: 0.00% in all ten quarters since the February-2024 listing, verified across three exchange-sourced records — the feared forced trustee sale has no legal mechanism; Joint statutory auditors (S.R. Batliboi & Associates and Batliboi & Purohit) unqualified in FY24 and FY25; no frauds reported; secretarial audit clean; The ring-fence is legally real: no cross-default between bank and promoter debt, no common board member, no capital taken from the promoter since June 2022, bank capital ratio 20.2%; The promoter's largest creditor itself owns 8.11% of the bank directly (85.4 lakh shares, unchanged Jun-2025 → Jun-2026) — structurally aligned to an orderly block placement; Public shareholding 62.69% against a 25% floor — the minimum-public-shareholding rule does not bind; the five-year promoter lock expired March 2023; Foreign institutions rose 0.28% → 4.01% through the crisis quarters and held through the promoter default; TVS Motor bought 4.90% at ₹374.6 after diligence; Related-party payments are minimal: brand royalty renegotiated to ₹3.81cr a year flat (under 1% of pre-tax profit), the only such payment discussed on any call.

🚨 On watch (8). Promoter holding companies defaulted on ₹1,831cr of rated debentures (30-Jun-2026), extended to 31-Dec-2026, treated as a distressed exchange and rated default; ~₹4,200cr due with accrued interest against a stake worth ~₹1,035cr — expect…; India Ratings placed the BANK's own ₹3,750cr of instruments and deposit programme on watch with negative implications because of the parent; the other agency took no action; Both regulator interactions on record concern how the equity is built: the universal-bank application returned October 2025 for unstated reasons ('approval criteria are different, but we meet the gating requirements'), and a ₹1cr penalty…; Four disclosure lines deleted in the FY26-Q4 deck (technical-write-off cover, by-product cover table, restructured book, discretionary-provision row); write-offs never disclosed separately in the bank's history; tier-1 capital not…; Asset-reconstruction sales of ₹187cr / ₹85cr / ₹98cr (FY23–FY25, from annual reports) never mentioned on any of eleven calls despite four direct other-income questions; an independent director of the bank is a registry-recorded former…; The chief credit officer resigns 30-Aug-2026 after twelve months in the seat, at a bank whose equity story is 'we fixed credit'; the chief operating officer left November 2025; The chief executive's term ends 20-Mar-2027 — a discretionary re-approval by the same regulator that returned the licence; no board proposal visible yet; Six wrong peak calls and four silent target re-basings across the cycle; the FY26 guidance was missed twice on profit, return on assets and return on equity.

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