Man Infraconstruction Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd trades at ₹101, in a downtrend and 72 weeks into that stage. That is −16.0% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 18% of a 52-week range of ₹87 to ₹166. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (5 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a downtrend — week 72 of stage 4, confirmed. At ₹101 it trades −16.0% versus its 200-day average and sits at 18% of its 52-week range (₹87–₹166).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.3 years the stock moved +358% while the NIFTY 500 moved +274% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (5 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-06-24) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

→ The trend is one thing; the bill is another. Are you paying up for it? Next: the P/E sits at the 41st percentile of its own range.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd trades at 21.1× P/E, mid-range by its own standards (41st percentile). Its long-run median P/E is 23.1×, measured across 10.4 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 21.1× is mid-range by its own standards (41st percentile), against a long-run median of 23.1× measured over 10.4 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved −34.0% against a −43.9% price move — earnings outran the price, pushing the multiple DOWN its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +20.2%/yr price move, ~+39.6%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−19.4 pp from the multiple (compressing); over 10y, of the +13.2%/yr price move, ~+25.5%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−12.3 pp from the multiple (compressing). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is unremarkable against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

A quarterly PEG curve, which only the second data source carries, is not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 20% on reported income across 14 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Cheap or dear rides on the earnings. Are they actually growing? Next: the fundamental stage — where the business sits in its arc, and how growth has compounded.

Stage: Deteriorating Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Man Infraconstruction Ltd reads as deteriorating on its fundamental arc. Deteriorating — revenue and profit growth are shrinking (revenue growth −50.3% latest (single-quarter readings) against +7.0% at its 12-quarter best), ROCE slipping at 13.0%. The read is built from 10 quarters across 3 curves, on partial evidence.

🚨 Why it matters: falling curves mean every cheap-looking ratio below needs a discount for direction.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Return readings here are annual, not quarterly — read as level and direction only; they can confirm the growth curves but never drive the stage on their own.

A partial read: at least one curve is short, or the returns curve is not the computed quarterly series — hold the stage word a little more loosely.

→ The stage names the trajectory. Next: the revenue line that produces it, quarter by quarter.

4-Factor Sector Score

38.9/100 — rank 10 of 12 in Construction & Contracting · 73% evidence confidence

Man Infraconstruction Ltd scores 38.9 out of 100 against the 12 companies it is compared with in Construction & Contracting, ranking 10. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 6.4 + 16.4 + 11.4 + 4.7 = 38.9. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd reported ₹146 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, −50.3% year on year. Over 10 years it has compounded at 10.8% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹630 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹631 Cr.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd reported ₹146 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, −50.3% year on year. Over 10 years it has compounded at 10.8% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹630 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹631 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹630 Cr (−43.1% on the year), capping 10 years at 10.8% compound. The latest quarter (Mar 26) printed ₹146 Cr, −50.3% year on year.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged −42.2% growth against the decade's 10.8% — the current year is running slower than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew −43.1% over the last 4 quarters against −29.3%/yr over the last 8 — rolling over; TTM profit −32.4% vs −16.7%/yr — rolling over.

→ Revenue slipped — did margins hold as it scaled? Next: 13.0% this quarter (−23.0 pp YoY).

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd's operating margin is 13.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, −23.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −1.0% to 31.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd's operating margin is 13.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, −23.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −1.0% to 31.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 13.0%, −23.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −1.0%–31.0%.

🚨 Why the margin moved: operating margin went −23.2 pp year on year while gross margin went +37.6 pp — the loss came mostly from the gross line: input costs and pricing.

→ Margins slipped — did that reach the bottom line? Next: profit −57.7% in the latest quarter.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd earned ₹41.0 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, −57.7% year on year. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹211 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 30.3%. That is 28.1% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹97.0 Cr.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd earned ₹41.0 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, −57.7% year on year. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹211 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 30.3%. That is 28.1% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹97.0 Cr.

Mar 26 profit was ₹41.0 Cr, −57.7% year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹211 Cr (−32.6%), and the 10-year compound rate is 30.3%.

🚨 Why profit moved: revenue contributed −50.3% and the margin −23.0 pp — the quarter was revenue-led despite a thinner margin.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit −24.8% vs revenue −42.2%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

→ Profit rose — but did the cash follow? Next: 79% of the last 3 years' profit arrived as cash.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 79% of Man Infraconstruction Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — most of the profit is real cash. In FY26 that was ₹−50.0 Cr of operating cash against ₹211 Cr of profit. After ₹24.0 Cr of capital spending, ₹−74.0 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹−50.0 Cr against reported profit of ₹211 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹−74.0 Cr after ₹24.0 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 79% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 79%: the cash cycle tightened 1,293 days between FY21 and FY26 — cash that used to wait in the cycle now reaches the bank sooner.

Router verdict: no single sink dominates — the next section checks both the working-capital cycle and the capital spending.

→ So follow the cash to where it goes. Next: a 41-day cycle and ₹30.0 Cr of building.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Man Infraconstruction Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 41 days in FY26, down from 1,334 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹30.0 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹630 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹1.7 Cr, so roughly ₹71.0 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 41 days, inventory at 2,772 days — roughly 91.2 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 41 days, tighter than FY21's 1,334.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 2,772 days to sell; customers pay about 41 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 277 days — netting out to the 41-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹630 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹1.7 Cr — so the 41-day loop keeps roughly ₹71.0 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹30.0 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹30.0 Cr of depreciation — spending at or below maintenance level. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹0.0 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: neither the cycle nor the build-out is hoarding the cash — the machine is reasonably clean.

→ Does all this activity actually earn its cost of capital? Next: ROCE is 13%.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd earns a ROCE of 13% in FY26. That is up from a trough of 2% in FY20. A return-on-invested-capital spread against the cost of capital is not computable from what is held here. The wiring behind it is 33.5% net margin on 0.23× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 13%, recovered from a FY20 trough of 2% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 33.5% net margin × 0.23× asset turns × 1.22× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 9.4% on equity. Margin is doing the heavy lifting; leverage is modest — this is an earned return, not a borrowed one.

The quarterly return curves and the return-on-invested-capital overlay, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 20% on reported income across 14 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Returns like these — is the balance sheet borrowing to make them? Next: debt-to-equity is 0.03.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings; interest cover says how many times operating profit pays the interest bill. Low and high, respectively, is the safe corner.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd carries ₹64.0 Cr of borrowings against ₹2,267 Cr of equity in FY26, a debt-to-equity of 0.03. Operating profit covers the interest bill 13×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹506 Cr to ₹64.0 Cr. Capital spending ran ₹30.0 Cr across the last 3 of those years.

FY26: borrowings of ₹64.0 Cr against equity of ₹2,267 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.03. Operating profit covers the interest bill 13×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹506 Cr to ₹64.0 Cr while capital spending ran ₹30.0 Cr in just the last 3 — the build-out is being paid for out of cash, not debt.

The total-debt and debt-to-equity series, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 20% on reported income across 14 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Who owns this, and are they adding or leaving? Next: Promoters cut 4.8 points over 8 quarters.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters cut 4.8 points of Man Infraconstruction Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 62.5% of the company. Foreign institutions moved −1.6 points over the same window, to 1.9%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Promoters: −4.8 points over 8 quarters to 62.5%; Foreign institutions: −1.6 points over 8 quarters to 1.9%; Domestic institutions: −1.0 points over 8 quarters to 1.1%.

🚨 Why the register moved: promoters drove it (−4.8 points), alongside foreign institutions (−1.6 points) — distribution into the market’s bid.

→ One last check: does the safety math agree? Next: the balance-sheet safety line.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Man Infraconstruction Ltd: the Z-score is withheld — it comes from the second data source this page could not reconcile, and a solvency score is not worth printing on a number two sources dispute. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is withheld — it comes from the second data source this page could not reconcile, and a solvency score is not worth printing on a number two sources dispute.

Frequently asked questions