Manorama Industries Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Manorama Industries Ltd trades at ₹1,968, in a confirmed uptrend and 23 weeks into that stage. That is +26.6% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 90% of a 52-week range of ₹1,095 to ₹2,063. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 12 straight weeks.

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 23 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹1,968 it trades +26.6% versus its 200-day average and sits at 90% of its 52-week range (₹1,095–₹2,063).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 8.0 years the stock moved +5,162% while the NIFTY 500 moved +161% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 12 straight weeks — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

Manorama Industries Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 22 August 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: EXPANSION_STARTED. Our fortnightly research layers last read it on 22 August 2026.

Our read, 22 August 2026. A specialty-fats compounder with Q1 FY27 revenue of ₹404 Cr and OPM recovering to 26% after the Q4 dip — but margins remain at historically elevated levels, management has accrued eleven cross-call contradictions across five concalls including a Brazil subsidiary operations reversal, and the ₹460 Cr integration programme has not met a single timeline commitment.

From the numbers. The trailing price-to-earnings multiple of approximately 42x sits at the 33rd percentile of available PE history, with the peak being 77.1x in June 2025. The pe_pb_expansion_snapshots for the week of August 22…

From the price. Price stage 2, week 23 — above its 200-day line, relative strength rising.

From the research. A specialty-fats compounder with Q1 FY27 revenue of ₹404 Cr and OPM recovering to 26% after the Q4 dip — but margins remain at historically elevated levels, management has accrued eleven cross-call contradictions across…

🚨 Where they disagree. The trailing price-to-earnings multiple of approximately 42x sits at the 33rd percentile of available PE history, with the peak being 77.1x in June 2025. The pe_pb_expansion_snapshots for the week of August 22 classifies this as the 'strong opportunity' segment with expansion started — driven by earnings growth compressing the multiple faster than price. The critical overlay from the pre-computed cycle engine: OPM at the 74th percentile of 7-year history means trailing EPS is inflated by peak margins; at mid-cycle OPM of 17.3%, the normalized multiple rises to the 81st percentile. The trailing compressed multiple is an earnings-peak artifact, not a cycle trough. Q1 FY27 OPM of 26.3% shows…

What is proven. A specialty-fats compounder with Q1 FY27 revenue of ₹404 Cr and OPM recovering to 26% after the Q4 dip — but margins remain at historically elevated levels, management has accrued eleven cross-call contradictions across five concalls including a Brazil subsidiary operations reversal, and the ₹460 Cr integration programme has not met a single timeline commitment.

What is not proven yet. Two consecutive quarterly OPM prints above 26% with CBE mix exceeding 40% of revenue at confirmed higher unit economics — while the Dekel/Brazil inconsistency is formally resolved and the fractionation debottlenecking to 52,000 MT is completed and confirmed operational. All three together would compress the margin-peak risk, restore management credibility on subsidiary status, and demonstrate that the capex programme can meet at least one deadline.

🚨 What would change our mind. Two consecutive quarterly OPM prints above 26% with CBE mix exceeding 40% of revenue at confirmed higher unit economics — while the Dekel/Brazil inconsistency is formally resolved and the fractionation debottlenecking to 52,000 MT is completed and confirmed operational. All three together would compress the margin-peak risk, restore management credibility on subsidiary status, and demonstrate that the capex programme can meet at least one deadline.

Layer 1 read, 22 August 2026 — KEEP. Best growth here, worst disclosure record — eight quarters of compounding at 44 times earnings. Sales have risen every quarter for two years, 195 to 404 Cr, and per-share earnings have tripled to 13.17, with roughly 85% of the growth coming from selling more rather than charging more, as cocoa-butter-equivalent fats grew from a tenth to a third of revenue. The problem is the people telling the story: the August 2026 call reversed an earlier statement that the Brazil subsidiary had begun operating, cut the utilisation assumption it had given three months earlier, and dropped its own growth target — eleven such contradictions across five calls. And the shares are not cheap: the 33rd-percentile reading comes from about six quarters of data, while at a normal margin the multiple sits at…

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Operating margin printing below 25% for two consecutive quarters, or the fractionation debottlenecking slipping past Q3 FY27 for a third time — the first would say the higher margin floor was never structural (which is the whole basis of a 44-times multiple), the second would confirm that the 460 Cr programme cannot meet a deadline and that the FY27 volume base is not arriving.

Layer 2 read, 22 August 2026 — BENCH. Demand is working, but missed delivery milestones keep Manorama off the advance list. The latest call ties growth to volume and a richer value-added mix, which the SOIC Finance social item also supports. But the capacity plan is at least one year late, and management said Dekel had not started operations and had no revenue figure to share; that violates the external credibility model.

What would change Layer 2’s mind. Advance only after the 52,000-tonne debottlenecking is confirmed operational, Dekel's status is formally resolved, and two consecutive quarters keep operating margin above 26% with CBE above 40% of revenue.

The test written in advance. Margin peak-trap — OPM near a historical high percentile — Margin peak-trap — OPM near a historical high percentile by the next result.

The test written in advance. Management guidance discipline — eleven cross-call contradictions across five concalls — Management guidance discipline — eleven cross-call contradictions across five concalls by the next result.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: Trailing PE around 42x at the 33rd percentile of available PE history reads as moderately valued or compressed The research reads it further: OPM at 26.29% sits well above the 6.8-year history median of 17.3%. At mid-cycle margins, the normalized PAT is about 37% below trailing TTM PAT, lifting the normalized PE to the 81st percentile. The 'fair PE' reads as a peak-earnings multiple — the same valuation trap that catches cyclicals at the top of their margin cycle.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: FY26 OCF/PAT 1.11x looks above average versus FY25's negative ratio The research reads it further: The FY26 OCF improvement was driven by inventory days compressing from 518 to 362 — a 156-day release. This is timing-driven (seasonal bulk-procurement normalization), not a structural cash conversion improvement. The 3-year aggregate OCF/PAT of 0.58x reflects the expected model for a seasonal bulk-inventory business that pre-stocks raw materials. The cash decomposition shows cash_story = structural_model, consistent with the distributor/converter wc_model flag.

Lever 1 · Operating leverage — BUILDING. OPM moved from a 14-17% underutilization band to 25-27% post-July 2024 and has now held above 25% for seven consecutive quarters, with Q1 FY27 recovering to 26.3% after the Q4 FY26 dip. What proves it keeps working: Operating Leverage / Margin Step-Up. It stops working if OPM falls below 25% for two consecutive quarters, which would suggest the structural new-normal margin thesis is failing and mid-cycle normalization is resuming.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix — BUILDING. CBE held at 30% of Q1 FY27 revenue with CB and stearin at 71.4% of total revenue — the mix shift continues to execute and provides pricing insulation from cocoa commodity cycles. What proves it keeps working: CBE and Value-Added Product Mix Shift. It stops working if CBE pricing collapses in correlation with cocoa bean prices — which would indicate the application-specific lock-in thesis is weaker than presented — or the value-added share stalls below 75% over two consecutive quarters.

Lever 6 · Order-book wins — BUILDING. ₹460 Cr across CBA, fractionation 3, refinery expansion, and West Africa backward integration — none of the four pillars have met a single timeline commitment, and fractionation debottlenecking now targets Q3 FY27 (originally Q3 FY26). What proves it keeps working: ₹460 Cr Four-Pillar Integration Capex. It stops working if Fractionation debottlenecking slips past Q3 FY27 for the third time, or total FY27 capex deployment falls below ₹100 Cr, which would push the FY28 commissioning target to FY29 and undermine the revenue expansion thesis.

Lever 14 · A bigger market to sell into — BUILDING. The specialty-fats market has a structural demand-supply gap; hundreds of customer relationships with application-specific formulation lock-in create pricing power independent of commodity cycles. What proves it keeps working: Undersupplied Specialty-Fats TAM with Customer Lock-in. It stops working if CBE pricing starts moving in correlation with cocoa bean prices — which would signal that the lock-in is weaker than presented — or a major competitor adds significant specialty-fats capacity at lower cost.

Sources: our stock research file (22 August 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Manorama Industries Ltd reported ₹404 Cr of revenue in the Jun 26 quarter, +39.3% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 1 years it has compounded at 77.3% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹1,367 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹1,481 Cr.

Why this happened. The forward-growth engine: four pillars, FY27-FY29 deployment, FY28 commissioning target. By the August 2026 call, only the fractionation debottlenecking is partially complete (47,500 MT installed, targeting 52,000 MT around Q3 FY27). Brazil commercial volumes are not established. Burkina land is acquired (approximately 10 hectares) but regulatory approvals remain pending. The August 2026 call guided FY27 capex at ₹225-250 Cr within the ₹460 Cr total. FY27 OCF capacity of approximately ₹300-350 Cr at current revenue run-rate provides adequate internal funding headroom. However, the capex programme has now accumulated a cumulative one-year delay on its simplest component, and none of the…

FY26 revenue came in at ₹1,367 Cr (+77.3% on the year), capping 1 years at 77.3% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹404 Cr, +39.3% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +61.6% growth against the decade's 77.3% — the current year is running slower than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +59.8% over the last 4 quarters against +76.0%/yr over the last 8 — rolling over; TTM profit +80.4% vs +144.9%/yr — rolling over.

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Manorama Industries Ltd's operating margin is 26.0% in the Jun 26 quarter, +0.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago.

Why this happened. OPM moved from a 14-17% underutilization band to 25-27% post-July 2024 and has now held above 25% for seven consecutive quarters, with Q1 FY27 recovering to 26.3% after the Q4 FY26 dip.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 26.0%, +0.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 2 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 24.0%–26.0%.

Why the margin moved: operating margin went +0.5 pp year on year while gross margin went −3.8 pp — the gain came mostly from the gross line: input costs and pricing.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Manorama Industries Ltd earned ₹79.0 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +68.1% year on year. It is the 10th consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹225 Cr. The 1-year compound rate is 104.5%. That is 19.6% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹47.0 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹79.0 Cr, +68.1% year on year — the 10th consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹225 Cr (+104.5%), and the 1-year compound rate is 104.5%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +39.3% and the margin +0.0 pp — the quarter was revenue-led, with the margin roughly flat.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +87.4% vs revenue +61.6%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 2 fiscal years 58% of Manorama Industries Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — a gap worth watching. In FY26 that was ₹250 Cr of operating cash against ₹225 Cr of profit. After ₹59.0 Cr of capital spending, ₹191 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹250 Cr against reported profit of ₹225 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹191 Cr after ₹59.0 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 2 fiscal years the conversion rate is 58% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

🚨 Why conversion sits at 58%: the cash cycle tightened 212 days between FY25 and FY26 — cash that used to wait in the cycle now reaches the bank sooner. Less than 70% of profit arriving as cash is the thing to watch on this page.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 2.3× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Manorama Industries Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 340 days in FY26, down from 552 days in FY25. Capital spending ran ₹59.0 Cr over the last 1 years. At FY26 sales of ₹1,367 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹3.7 Cr, so roughly ₹1,273 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 17 days, inventory at 369 days — roughly 12.1 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 340 days, tighter than FY25's 552.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 369 days to sell; customers pay about 17 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 46 days — netting out to the 340-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹1,367 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹3.7 Cr — so the 340-day loop keeps roughly ₹1,273 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹59.0 Cr over the last 1 fiscal years against ₹26.0 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹18.0 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

Manorama Industries Ltd earns a ROCE of 35% in FY26. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by +16.3 percentage points, so growth here adds value rather than only size. The wiring behind it is 16.5% net margin on 1.14× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 35%.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 16.5% net margin × 1.14× asset turns × 1.76× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 33.1% on equity. Margin is doing the heavy lifting; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: 28.3% − 12.0% = a +16.3 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. A spread this wide means every rupee reinvested creates more than a rupee of value — the engine compounds.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.

Manorama Industries Ltd carries total debt of ₹356 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹682 Cr as of Mar 26, a debt-to-equity of 0.52. On the annual view that ratio went from 0.40 in FY22 to 0.52 in FY26. Read the returns elsewhere on this page with that leverage in mind.

Mar 26: total debt of ₹356 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹682 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.52. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 0.40 (FY22) to 0.52 (FY26). Read the returns on this page with that leverage in mind.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Promoters cut 2.9 points of Manorama Industries Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes promoters to 54.3% of the company. Foreign institutions moved +1.1 points over the same window, to 3.2%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Promoters: −2.9 points over 8 quarters to 54.3%; Foreign institutions: +1.1 points over 8 quarters to 3.2%; Domestic institutions: +0.9 points over 8 quarters to 2.6%.

🚨 Why the register moved: promoters drove it (−2.9 points), absorbed on the other side by foreign institutions (+1.1 points) — distribution into the market’s bid.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Manorama Industries Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

Manorama Industries Ltd trades at 48.1× P/E, mid-range by its own standards (67th percentile). Its long-run median P/E is 44.6×, measured across 1.4 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 48.1× is mid-range by its own standards (67th percentile), against a long-run median of 44.6× measured over 1.4 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved +104.5% against a +37.6% price move — earnings outran the price, pushing the multiple DOWN its own range.

Put together: the multiple is full against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

What the price assumes This reading works the multiple backwards. It asks one question: what yearly rate of profit growth is a buyer at the market price already paying for? The number is the growth rate that makes eleven years of profit — six years growing, then five fading — add up to that day's market price, once each year is discounted at 11% a year.

Solved at its 23 August 2026 price, Manorama Industries Ltd was paying for profit growth of about 24.8% a year. Profit itself has compounded 104.5% a year over the past 1 years. Today the market pays 48.1× P/E, the 67th percentile of its own 1-year range.

What the two numbers say together. The multiple is full against its own past, and the growth the price is paying for is below what this company has actually delivered.

How to hold this number: it is a reading of one day's price, taken on 23 August 2026, not a running figure — every other number on this page, the multiple included, is read off the live quote as of 18 September 2026. A higher price is paying for more growth and a lower price for less, so it moves whenever the price does, and this page does not restate it between measurements.

Stage: Mixed Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Manorama Industries Ltd reads as mixed on its fundamental arc. Mixed — growth is normalizing off a hyper-growth base: revenue growth has eased from +90.1% at its peak to +59.8% but is still expanding, ROCE lifting at 56.0%. The read is built from 12 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why it matters: when the curves disagree, the per-curve reads above matter more than any single verdict.

4-Factor Sector Score

84.0/100 — rank 1 of 2 in FMCG - Chocolate · 90% evidence confidence

Manorama Industries Ltd scores 84.0 out of 100 against the 2 companies it is compared with in FMCG - Chocolate, ranking 1. Confirmed research leader: earnings, capital efficiency and relative strength agree. Move to management, catalyst and risk diligence.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 30.8 + 20 + 13.2 + 20 = 84. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What Manorama Industries Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

Dekel/Brazil Operating Status Reversal · 14 August 2026. In May 2026, management said Dekel had begun operating and reported subsidiary revenue and losses. In Aug 2026, management said operations had not yet started and declined to provide revenue from the Dekel entity, creating a material inconsistency about the unit's commercial status and contribution.

Numeric FY27 Growth Guidance No Longer Reaffirmed · 14 August 2026. In Jan 2026, management indicated that FY27 growth should be above 30%, while the Aug 2026 call declined to provide an absolute revenue guide and redirected investors to model results themselves. The latest call still expresses confidence in healthy growth, but removes the earlier quantitative anchor that would affect revenue and valuation models.

Africa Geopolitical Risk Narrative Became Less Categorical · 14 August 2026. In May 2026, management gave a categorical assurance that political uncertainty would not affect the Burkina Faso project or African operations. In Aug 2026, management acknowledged that geopolitical factors could impact the company directly and affect freight, logistics, and other macroeconomic factors; although diversification was cited as mitigation, the latest call did not explain the change in risk assessment.

Working Capital Target Abandoned · 12 May 2026. In Oct 2025, management set an aspirational target of 75 days for the working capital cycle within the next two years, and in Jan 2026 revised that target to 90-100 days citing benefits from the upcoming new capacity. In the May 2026 full-year call, management reported a 125-day working capital cycle for FY26 and guided to simply maintain that level going forward, effectively abandoning both prior commitments without any acknowledgement or explanation of the reversal.

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions