Computer Age Management Services Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Computer Age Management Services Ltd trades at ₹708, in a confirmed uptrend and 16 weeks into that stage. That is −6.3% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 36% of a 52-week range of ₹637 to ₹836. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (7 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 16 of stage 2. At ₹708 it trades −6.3% versus its 200-day average and sits at 36% of its 52-week range (₹637–₹836).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 6.0 years the stock moved +153% while the NIFTY 500 moved +137% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (7 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-07-31) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

Story check

Computer Age Management Services Ltd's story is not scored yet against the markers our research file set on 22 August 2026. Where it sits in its own cycle: PEAK_PASSED_STAGE_2_RECOVERY. Still open: MF fee-yield depletion exceeding 4% annualized, equity-AUM share falling below 62%, or non-MF revenue growth falling below 20% YoY.

Our read, 22 August 2026. A capital-light RTA franchise whose valuation is discounted versus its own history but remains absolutely rich on P/B; the investment case depends on automation and non-MF scaling offsetting fee pressure.

From the numbers. The weekly P/B snapshot is 14.7x, 0.833x its 17.65x median and at the 4th percentile. The deterministic curve is peak-passed, in stage 2, and its endpoint is 14.1x. That same engine labels the absolute P/B valuation…

From the price. Price stage 2, week 16 — below its 200-day line, relative strength falling.

From the research. A capital-light RTA franchise whose valuation is discounted versus its own history but remains absolutely rich on P/B; the investment case depends on automation and non-MF scaling offsetting fee pressure.

🚨 Where they disagree. The weekly P/B snapshot is 14.7x, 0.833x its 17.65x median and at the 4th percentile. The deterministic curve is peak-passed, in stage 2, and its endpoint is 14.1x. That same engine labels the absolute P/B valuation rich, so the historical discount is not treated as sufficient evidence of cheapness. The relevant test is whether earnings, automation and non-MF scaling can support the current absolute valuation while KRA and yield pressure are absorbed. FII ownership declined from 56.53% in Sep 2024 to 46.90% in Sep 2025.

What is proven. A capital-light RTA franchise whose valuation is discounted versus its own history but remains absolutely rich on P/B; the investment case depends on automation and non-MF scaling offsetting fee pressure.

What is not proven yet. MF fee-yield depletion exceeding 4% annualized, equity-AUM share falling below 62%, or non-MF revenue growth falling below 20% YoY.

🚨 What would change our mind. MF fee-yield depletion exceeding 4% annualized, equity-AUM share falling below 62%, or non-MF revenue growth falling below 20% YoY.

Layer 1 read, 22 August 2026 — KEEP. Both the 'cheapest ever' and the 'earnings turning' signals are optical — sales flat for two quarters. CAMS keeps the records for India's mutual-fund industry, a fee business with almost no capital tied up. Two things make it look like a bargain and neither survives a close look. Its price-to-book of 14.1x is the lowest in its history, but that measure is meaningless here: price-to-book is simply price-to-earnings multiplied by return on equity, and 37.8 x 36.3% gives 13.7, near enough the reported figure — so the number is forced by a high return on a tiny asset base, not by cheapness. And quarterly profit growth looks like it is accelerating from -5.8% to +17.6%, but that only compares against last year's weak quarters; measured against the quarter before, sales have been stuck at Rs 395…

What would change Layer 1’s mind. Sequential revenue breaking clearly above Rs 395 Cr in Q2 FY27 — say Rs 415 Cr or more — with non-mutual-fund revenue growth staying at or above 20% (the Timeline's own M1 milestone). That would convert the current base-effect optics into a genuine volume inflection on a multiple that has already de-rated, and would take this to P1. What breaks it instead, sharpening the Timeline's own falsifier: mutual-fund fee-yield erosion running above 4% a year while the KRA reset proves to be the 29-30%…

Layer 2 read, 22 August 2026 — BENCH. Automation is real, but flat sales and a wrong valuation lens leave too little external proof. Revenue was unchanged between the last two quarters while PAT barely moved, so the year-on-year acceleration is not yet a fresh volume inflection. Automation and lower headcount support margin protection, and stock social supports the long-term participation theme, but every sector stream is absent. The book-anchored MoS is model output from the wrong lender-style route and is not treated as fact.

What would change Layer 2’s mind. Advance after the context is rebuilt as a fee-based RTA and two consecutive quarters deliver revenue growth above 13%, non-MF growth at or above 20%, operating margin at or above 46%, and a reconciled KRA pricing bridge; DROP only if fee-yield pressure breaks those operating tests.

The test written in advance. MF fee-yield depletion exceeding 4% annualized, equity-AUM share falling below 62%, or non-MF revenue growth falling below 20% YoY. — the thesis as written as stated by the next result.

The test written in advance. Regulatory Fee Yield Compression and Passive Mix — Regulatory Fee Yield Compression and Passive Mix Quarterly MF revenue growth relative to AUM growth and yield commentary. by the next result.

The test written in advance. KRA Price Reset and Revenue Recovery — KRA Price Reset and Revenue Recovery KRA revenue and margin in Q2 FY27 and subsequent calls. by the next result.

What the company does. June 2026 revenue was Rs 395 Cr and PAT was Rs 127 Cr, up 11.6% and 17.6% YoY respectively, while OPM remained 46%. The weekly P/B snapshot is 14.7x versus a 17.65x median and 4th percentile, but the deterministic valuation lens also labels the absolute P/B level rich. Non-MF revenue grew over 28% YoY and neared 15% of revenue; payments and Alternatives led while KRA absorbed its April pricing reset.

The dot is where the company is now; the dashed line is the level that would settle the question; a tinted band is where management says it is heading.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: FY26 revenue was Rs 1,516 Cr. The research reads it further: Annual revenue growth was positive but modest relative to the strategic growth narrative, so FY27 delivery matters.

🚨 What the surface reading misses. The surface reading is: FY26 PAT growth was 1.5% YoY. The research reads it further: The small annual PAT increase means a higher FY27 forecast relies on the post-price-reset quarterly trajectory rather than FY26 annual momentum alone.

Lever 1 · Operating leverage — BUILDING. AI-based acceptance handles approximately 10% of gross payload; management guides headcount down 4-5% and employee-cost growth of approximately 5%. What proves it keeps working: Platform Re-Architecture and AI Automation Leverage. It stops working if Cloud, software and AI-talent costs exceed processing-cost savings.

Lever 2 · Value-added mix — BUILDING. Non-MF revenue grew over 28% YoY and neared 15% of revenue, with payments and Alternatives leading. What proves it keeps working: Non-Mutual-Fund Revenue Diversification Scale. It stops working if Payments economics weaken or Alternative-investment mandates and asset growth slow.

Lever 3 · Management change — BUILDING. MF AUM was approximately Rs 56 lakh Cr, up just under 15% YoY, and SIP collections held at just under Rs 60,000 Cr. What proves it keeps working: Mutual Fund AUM and SIP Flow Support. It stops working if AUM growth slows materially while yield depletion remains at or above the 2.5-3% annual framework.

Lever 4 · Paying down debt — BUILDING. Insurance-repository market share expanded to 40% and Bima Central's active user base doubled during Q4 FY26. What proves it keeps working: Insurance Repository Scale. It stops working if Repository revenue does not scale enough to absorb its fixed operating costs.

Sources: our stock research file (22 August 2026) · quarterly results through Jun 26 · the company’s own earnings calls. The story check is re-scored every results season; the record below never changes.

Revenue For a bank, revenue is everything the franchise earns — interest on the loan book plus fee and other income.

Computer Age Management Services Ltd reported ₹395 Cr of income in the Jun 26 quarter, +11.6% year on year. That is the 12th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 8 years it has compounded at 11.0% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹1,516 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹1,557 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹1,516 Cr (+6.6% on the year), capping 8 years at 11.0% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 26) printed ₹395 Cr, +11.6% year on year — the 12th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +7.8% growth against the decade's 11.0% — the current year is running slower than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +7.8% over the last 4 quarters against +13.6%/yr over the last 8 — rolling over; TTM profit +5.4% vs +13.2%/yr — rolling over.

FY26-Q4. revenue ₹395 Cr and profit ₹125 Cr as reported.

FY27-Q1. revenue ₹395 Cr and profit ₹127 Cr as reported.

Why-sources: our stock research file (22 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net margin Net margin — what the bank keeps of every ₹100 of revenue after every cost, provision and tax. It is the cleanest single margin we can read for a lender.

Computer Age Management Services Ltd's net margin is 32.2% in the Jun 26 quarter, +1.7 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 9 fiscal years the net margin has ranged 18.4% to 32.7%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Why this happened. Re-Arch is intended to reduce processing workload, but cloud, data-centre, hardware and specialist hiring costs remain offsets. The driver is validated by sustained margin delivery rather than by a single automation statistic.

The latest quarter's net margin is 32.2%, +1.7 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 9 fiscal years the net margin has ranged 18.4%–32.7%.

Why: the numbers show the net margin move clearly, but the cost lines behind it sit below what we hold — so we state the move without inventing its driver.

FY26-Q4. revenue ₹395 Cr and profit ₹125 Cr as reported.

FY27-Q1. revenue ₹395 Cr and profit ₹127 Cr as reported.

Why-sources: our stock research file (22 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Computer Age Management Services Ltd earned ₹127 Cr of net profit in the Jun 26 quarter, +17.6% year on year. It is the 3rd consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹472 Cr. The 8-year compound rate is 15.8%. That is 32.2% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹108 Cr.

Jun 26 profit was ₹127 Cr, +17.6% year on year — the 3rd consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹472 Cr (+1.5%), and the 8-year compound rate is 15.8%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +11.6% and the margin +1.7 pp — the quarter was revenue-led, with the margin roughly flat.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +5.8% vs revenue +7.8%. Profit and revenue are moving roughly in step.

FY26-Q4. revenue ₹395 Cr and profit ₹125 Cr as reported.

FY27-Q1. revenue ₹395 Cr and profit ₹127 Cr as reported.

Why-sources: our stock research file (22 August 2026) and the company’s own results for those quarters.

Asset quality — the ladder Gross NPA is the slice of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what remains after the money already set aside against those loans. Falling is healing; rising is damage arriving.

Loan-book quality history is not available for Computer Age Management Services Ltd, so this section names the gap rather than estimating a ratio. No gross or net non-performing-asset series is filed in a form this page can read, and none is inferred from the profit line. The income, margin and return sections above carry the evidence this business does report.

We do not hold quarterly loan-book quality numbers for this bank, so this section states that plainly rather than working around it.

Why: loan-book quality is the engine room of a bank, and its drivers — slippages, recoveries, provisioning — sit below what we hold for this name; the sections around it carry the reads we can stand behind.

The loan book We read the loan book through revenue — when the book grows, revenue grows with it. It is a rough proxy, and we say so: rate moves and fee swings can shift it a few points in any one year.

Computer Age Management Services Ltd's revenue grew +6.6% in FY26 to ₹1,516 Cr, so the book is growing. The latest quarter ran +11.6% year on year. The net margin on that income is 32.2%, +1.7 percentage points against a year ago.

FY26 revenue was ₹1,516 Cr, +6.6% on the year, and the latest quarter ran +11.6% year on year. The net margin on that revenue is 32.2% this quarter (+1.7 pp YoY) — growth with a widening margin on it.

The synthesis: a lender compounds when the book grows while the margin holds and the loan book stays clean — gross NPA is the loan-quality read we carry here.

Returns on equity and assets Two numbers usually rate a lender: ROE — what it earns on shareholder money — and ROA — what it earns on everything it deploys.

A clean annual return-on-equity ladder is not held for Computer Age Management Services Ltd. For an insurer especially the standard bank ratios are not the right lens, so this page does not force them onto the filings rather than estimating a series it cannot support.

We do not hold a clean annual return-on-equity series for Computer Age Management Services Ltd — for an insurer especially, the standard bank ratios are not the right lens, so this page does not force them. The revenue, margin and ownership sections above and below are the reads we stand behind.

Debt

For a bank, borrowings are raw material, not a warning sign — solvency is read through the returns and the loan book. A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits, so the debt-to-equity lens that works everywhere else misleads on a lender and is not applied here.

Why this happened. Management expects CAMS Repository to become EBITDA-positive by the final quarter of FY27. The contribution remains dependent on commercial scale rather than current reported profit.

A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits; a bank’s borrowings are its inventory — money taken in to be lent out. The debt lens that works everywhere else misleads here, so this page does not apply it. The solvency questions for a bank — is the loan book sound, is the equity earning — are read through the loan-book and returns sections above.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Foreign institutions cut 11.6 points of Computer Age Management Services Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes foreign institutions to 44.9% of the company. Domestic institutions moved +4.1 points over the same window, to 23.5%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

Why this happened. AUM and SIP growth provide volume support against fee-yield depletion, but this support must exceed contractual yield compression to translate into MF revenue growth.

The register over the last two years — Foreign institutions: −11.6 points over 8 quarters to 44.9%; Domestic institutions: +4.1 points over 8 quarters to 23.5%; Promoters: +0.0 points over 8 quarters to 0.0%. Note the structure: promoters hold under 20% — this is a widely-held company where institutions, not a family, set the direction.

Why the register moved: rotation — foreign institutions −11.6 points against domestic institutions +4.1 points over 8 quarters, with promoters holding steady — one class of institutions handing the register to the other, not a verdict change by the people closest to the numbers.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Computer Age Management Services Ltd: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre. The Z-score was built for manufacturers and is not applied to banks and lenders, so solvency here is read from the capital and asset-quality lines instead.

Why this happened. Both businesses are early-stage additions to the non-MF portfolio. Their revenue conversion and timing are not guided with sufficient precision to carry the base case.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre.

Valuation For a bank we price the book, not the earnings: P/BV is what the market pays for each ₹1 of the bank's net worth. A bank below 1× book is priced below the value of what it owns, net of what it owes.

Computer Age Management Services Ltd trades at 13.3× P/BV, about the cheapest it has ever traded. Its long-run median P/BV is 17.6×, measured across 5.6 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/BV of 13.3× is about the cheapest it has ever traded, against a long-run median of 17.6× measured over 5.6 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year book value grew while the price moved −13.6% — price and book moved together, holding the multiple in its range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the −0.4%/yr price move, ~+20.3%/yr came from book-value growth and ~−20.7 pp from the multiple (compressing). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus book-value growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is low against its own past, so the story rests on the book-value line underneath it, not the multiple.

What the price assumes This reading works the multiple backwards. It asks one question: what yearly rate of profit growth is a buyer at the market price already paying for? The number is the growth rate that makes eleven years of profit — six years growing, then five fading — add up to that day's market price, once each year is discounted at 11% a year.

Solved at its 24 August 2026 price, Computer Age Management Services Ltd was paying for profit growth of about 21.2% a year. Profit itself has compounded 15.8% a year over the past 8 years. Today the market pays 13.3× P/BV, the 1st percentile of its own 6-year range.

What the two numbers say together. The multiple is low against its own past, and the growth the price is paying for is above what this company has actually delivered. A multiple that looks low because earnings fell is not the same thing as a low bar to clear.

How to hold this number: it is a reading of one day's price, taken on 24 August 2026, not a running figure — every other number on this page, the multiple included, is read off the live quote as of 18 September 2026. A higher price is paying for more growth and a lower price for less, so it moves whenever the price does, and this page does not restate it between measurements.

Stage: Mixed Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Computer Age Management Services Ltd reads as mixed on its fundamental arc. Mixed — no clean majority across the growth curves, ROE slipping at 35.7% — the per-curve reads carry the story. The read is built from 12 quarters across 4 curves, on full evidence.

Why it matters: when the curves disagree, the per-curve reads above matter more than any single verdict.

4-Factor Sector Score

35.7/100 — rank 2 of 2 in Finance - Capital Markets - RTA · 80% evidence confidence

Computer Age Management Services Ltd scores 35.7 out of 100 against the 2 companies it is compared with in Finance - Capital Markets - RTA, ranking 2. Strong business, demanding price: keep it on the quality list, but require either earnings upgrades or valuation compression.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 8.3 + 21.5 + 4 + 1.9 = 35.7. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if ROA rolls over or gross NPA rises while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Said versus delivered

What Computer Age Management Services Ltd's management promised, set against what actually arrived — 4 tracked promises on the record. Read straight from the company’s own earnings calls. A promise that slipped stays on this page after it is met.

KRA Price Reset Larger Than Previously Expected · 4 August 2026. In May 2026, management described the April KRA reset as a uniform 20% price reduction and projected flat FY27 KRA revenue after an approximately INR8 crores price impact. In August 2026, management instead described the same April reset as a 29-30% decline and reported Q1 KRA weakness, without explaining the materially larger reduction or reconciling it with the earlier flat-revenue expectation.

🚨 Non-MF EBITDA Margin 25% Target Deferred Indefinitely · 5 May 2026. In the Oct 2025 call, management was highly confident that non-MF EBITDA margins would reach 25% within a couple of years, implying a target of approximately FY28. In the May 2026 call, the 25% milestone has been reclassified as an "eventual" goal with no stated timeline, while only 20% is now targeted for FY28 - a material slippage in the non-MF margin roadmap offered without explanation.

KRA Pricing Stability Assurance Contradicted by 20% Industry Price Cut · 5 May 2026. In the Oct 2025 call, management explicitly described KRA rates as very stable and stated there was no big concern on pricing. Within approximately six months, a 20% voluntary industry price reduction was implemented from April 1 generating an INR8 crore revenue headwind and causing management to guide flat KRA revenue for FY27 in the May 2026 call - a direct and material contradiction of the prior pricing comfort level.

Non-MF Revenue Growth Aspiration Reduced from 25% to 20% Plus Without Explanation · 5 May 2026. In the Jan 2026 call, management explicitly stated 25% as the medium-term aspiration for non-MF revenue growth, positioning 20% as only the near-term achievable figure given a weak Q1 FY26. In the May 2026 call, following a Q4 FY26 where non-MF growth reached 24.5% year-on-year - nearly touching the 25% aspiration - management has reset the forward target to 20% plus with no mention of the 25% aspiration and no explanation for the downward revision.

Every quote above is taken word for word from the company’s own earnings calls.

Frequently asked questions