Perella Weinberg Partners

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Perella Weinberg Partners trades at $16.1, between stages. That is −12.9% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 15% of a 52-week range of $15 to $23. On relative strength it is currently behind the S&P 500 on a trailing-13-week view (16 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is between stages. At $16.1 it trades −12.9% versus its 200-day average and sits at 15% of its 52-week range ($15–$23).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 1.0 years the stock moved −19% while the S&P 500 moved +19% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (16 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-04-10) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

→ The trend is one thing; the bill is another. Are you paying up for it? Next: how the P/BV reads against its own history.

Valuation For a bank we price the book, not the earnings: P/BV is what the market pays for each $1 of the bank's net worth. A bank below 1× book is priced below the value of what it owns, net of what it owes.

Perella Weinberg Partners trades at 6.6× P/BV, against too little history to rank. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/BV of 6.6× is against too little history to rank. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Put together: the multiple is unremarkable against its own past, so the story rests on the book-value line underneath it, not the multiple.

→ Cheap or dear rides on the earnings. Are they actually growing? Next: the fundamental stage — where the business sits in its arc, and how growth has compounded.

Stage: No read Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Perella Weinberg Partners reads as no read on its fundamental arc. Under eight usable quarters on the growth trio — not enough history for an honest trajectory read. The read is built from 12 quarters across 2 curves, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: with too little history, an honest page says so instead of guessing a trajectory.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Fewer than eight usable quarters on the growth curves — this page will not guess a trajectory from a stub of history.

→ The stage names the trajectory. Next: the revenue line that produces it, quarter by quarter.

4-Factor Sector Score

No sector-relative score — Perella Weinberg Partners is not among the largest members shown in this industry comparison for Capital Markets.

The score is a rank WITHIN a peer set: every metric is scored by percentile against the other members. Without the peer set there is no score to state, so none is invented here.

Revenue For a bank, revenue is everything the franchise earns — interest on the loan book plus fees from its businesses.

Perella Weinberg Partners reported $0.1 B of income in the Mar 26 quarter, −28.6% year on year. Over 4 years it has compounded at −1.6% a year. The last full year, FY25, came in at $0.8 B. The last four reported quarters add to $0.7 B.

Perella Weinberg Partners reported $0.1 B of income in the Mar 26 quarter, −28.6% year on year. Over 4 years it has compounded at −1.6% a year. The last full year, FY25, came in at $0.8 B. The last four reported quarters add to $0.7 B.

FY25 revenue came in at $0.8 B (−14.8% on the year), capping 4 years at −1.6% compound. The latest quarter (Mar 26) printed $0.1 B, −28.6% year on year.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged −29.1% growth against the decade's −1.6% — the current year is running slower than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew −30.3% over the last 4 quarters against +5.5%/yr over the last 8 — rolling over.

→ Revenue slipped — did the net margin hold as it scaled? Next: 0.0% this quarter (−9.5 pp YoY).

Net margin Net margin — what the bank keeps of every $100 of revenue after every cost, provision and tax. With big fee businesses in the mix, it is the cleanest margin we can read for this bank.

Perella Weinberg Partners's net margin is 0.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, −9.5 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across 5 fiscal years the net margin has ranged −16.9% to 6.7%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Perella Weinberg Partners's net margin is 0.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, −9.5 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across 5 fiscal years the net margin has ranged −16.9% to 6.7%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's net margin is 0.0%, −9.5 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 5 fiscal years the net margin has ranged −16.9%–6.7%, and FY25's 6.7% is the top of that band — a record year.

Why: the numbers show the net margin move clearly, but the cost lines behind it sit below what we hold — so we state the move without inventing its driver.

Worth repeating from the valuation section: cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap — a record margin flatters every ratio built on top of it.

→ The net margin slipped — did that reach the bottom line? Next: profit −100.0% in the latest quarter.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Perella Weinberg Partners earned $0.0 B of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, −100.0% year on year. Full-year FY25 profit was $0.1 B. That is 0.0% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned $0.0 B. 5 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Perella Weinberg Partners earned $0.0 B of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, −100.0% year on year. Full-year FY25 profit was $0.1 B. That is 0.0% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned $0.0 B. 5 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Mar 26 profit was $0.0 B, −100.0% year on year. On the full year, FY25 printed $0.1 B (null).

🚨 Why profit moved: revenue contributed −28.6% and the margin −9.5 pp — the quarter was revenue-led despite a thinner margin.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit −77.8% vs revenue −29.1%. Profit is growing slower than sales — costs are eating the growth before it reaches the bottom line.

→ Profit is up — how clean is the loan book behind it? Next: we hold no quarterly loan-book numbers — the section says so plainly.

Asset quality — the ladder Gross NPA is the slice of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what remains after the money already set aside against those loans. Falling is healing; rising is damage arriving.

Loan-book quality history is not available for Perella Weinberg Partners, so this section names the gap rather than estimating a ratio. No gross or net non-performing-asset series is filed in a form this page can read, and none is inferred from the profit line. The income, margin and return sections above carry the evidence this business does report.

We do not hold quarterly loan-book quality numbers for this bank, so this section states that plainly rather than working around it.

Why: loan-book quality is the engine room of a bank, and its drivers — slippages, recoveries, provisioning — sit below what we hold for this name; the sections around it carry the reads we can stand behind.

→ Behind the profits — is the book itself still growing? Next: revenue grew −14.8% in FY25.

The loan book We read the loan book through revenue — when the book and the businesses grow, revenue grows with them. It is a rough proxy, and we say so: rate moves and fee swings can shift it a few points in any one year.

Perella Weinberg Partners's revenue grew −14.8% in FY25 to $0.8 B, so the book is flat. The latest quarter ran −28.6% year on year. The net margin on that income is 0.0%, −9.5 percentage points against a year ago. Interest income is a proxy for the book; rate moves can shift it a few points in any one year.

FY25 revenue was $0.8 B, −14.8% on the year, and the latest quarter ran −28.6% year on year. The net margin on that revenue is 0.0% this quarter (−9.5 pp YoY) — growth with a narrowing margin on it.

The synthesis: a lender compounds when the book grows while the margin holds and the loan book stays clean — with quarterly loan-quality numbers missing here, revenue growth and margin are the two we watch.

→ Does all of this actually earn its keep on equity? Next: ROE is 13%.

Returns on equity and assets Two numbers rate a bank: ROE — what it earns on shareholder money — and ROA — what it earns on everything it deploys. ROE above ~13–15% earns its keep; below that, growth builds book slowly.

Perella Weinberg Partners earns a return on equity of −39% in FY25. Its trough over the ladder below was −41% in FY23. On the asset side every $100 of the balance sheet earned about $4.44, which is the return before leverage is applied.

FY25 ROE came in at −39%, recovered from a FY23 trough of −41%. On assets, the latest reading is about 4.44% — every $100 the bank deploys earns roughly $4.44 a year. That return is below the bar a bank must clear to compound book value quickly — which is also the honest reason the stock trades where it does.

Why: the ROE ladder shows the move; the deposit-cost and provisioning drivers behind it sit below what we hold.

→ Who owns this bank, and are they adding or leaving? Next: short interest is 11.6% of the float.

Dividend A dividend is cash paid out per share. Dividend per share is the declared amount for the period; the trailing twelve-month total is the four most recent quarters added together.

Perella Weinberg Partners paid $0.28 per share over the last four reported quarters. The most recent declaration was $0.07 for Mar 26. Against the current price of $16.1 that is a trailing yield of 1.74%, measured on dividends already paid rather than on a forecast.

Perella Weinberg Partners paid $0.28 per share over the last four reported quarters. The most recent declaration was $0.07 for Mar 26. Against the current price of $16.1 that is a trailing yield of 1.74%, measured on dividends already paid rather than on a forecast.

Perella Weinberg Partners paid $0.28 per share across the last four reported quarters, most recently $0.07 for Mar 26. Against the current price of $16.1 the trailing twelve months work out to 1.74% — trailing dividends measured against today's price, not a forward estimate.

→ A payout is cash leaving the business. Next: what the balance sheet looks like behind it.

Debt

For a bank, borrowings are raw material, not a warning sign — solvency is read through the returns and the loan book. A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits, so the debt-to-equity lens that works everywhere else misleads on a lender and is not applied here.

A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits; a bank’s borrowings are its inventory — money taken in to be lent out. The debt lens that works everywhere else misleads here, so this page does not apply it. The solvency questions for a bank — is the loan book sound, is the equity earning — are read through the loan-book and returns sections above.

→ Who owns this, and are they adding or leaving? Next: short interest is 11.6% of the float.

Ownership There is no quarter-by-quarter holder register to read here, so we read the crowd through short interest — the slice of tradable shares currently sold short, positioned for a fall.

11.6% of Perella Weinberg Partners's tradable float is currently sold short — a large bloc is positioned against it. At typical trading volumes those positions would take about 6.1 days to buy back. There is no quarter-by-quarter holder register to read for this filer, so the crowd is read through short interest instead.

The latest reading: 11.6% of the float is sold short, and at typical trading volumes it would take about 6.1 days to buy those positions back. A large bloc is positioned against it. This is a single point-in-time reading — we do not yet hold its history, so we show no trend chart.

Why it sits there: who is doing the shorting, and why, does not travel with the number — the level is shown without inventing its story.

→ One last check: does the safety math agree? Next: the balance-sheet safety line.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Perella Weinberg Partners: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre. The Z-score was built for manufacturers and is not applied to banks and lenders, so solvency here is read from the capital and asset-quality lines instead.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre.

Frequently asked questions