Kalyani Investment Company Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd trades at ₹5,519, in a confirmed uptrend and 5 weeks into that stage. That is +10.6% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 71% of a 52-week range of ₹4,235 to ₹6,032. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 10 straight weeks.

Today the stock is in a confirmed uptrend — week 5 of stage 2, confirmed. At ₹5,519 it trades +10.6% versus its 200-day average and sits at 71% of its 52-week range (₹4,235–₹6,032).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.3 years the stock moved +245% while the NIFTY 500 moved +274% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 10 straight weeks — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

→ The trend is one thing; the bill is another. Are you paying up for it? Next: the P/BV sits at the 76th percentile of its own range.

Valuation For a bank we price the book, not the earnings: P/BV is what the market pays for each ₹1 of the bank's net worth. A bank below 1× book is priced below the value of what it owns, net of what it owes.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd trades at 0.2× P/BV, at the pricey end of its own range (76th percentile). Its long-run median P/BV is 0.2×, measured across 10.0 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/BV of 0.2× is at the pricey end of its own range (76th percentile), against a long-run median of 0.2× measured over 10.0 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

The honest context for that discount: a bank earning about 0% on its equity is worth less per rupee of book, and the market has priced that in rather than overlooked it. The discount closes only if the returns themselves improve.

🚨 Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year book value grew while the price moved +8.3% — the price ran ahead of the book, pushing the multiple up its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +21.6%/yr price move, ~+45.2%/yr came from book-value growth and ~−23.6 pp from the multiple (compressing); over 10y, of the +14.9%/yr price move, ~+38.2%/yr came from book-value growth and ~−23.3 pp from the multiple (compressing). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus book-value growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is full against its own past, so the story rests on the book-value line underneath it, not the multiple.

→ Cheap or dear rides on the earnings. Are they actually growing? Next: the fundamental stage — where the business sits in its arc, and how growth has compounded.

Stage: Deteriorating Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd reads as deteriorating on its fundamental arc. Deteriorating — profit and EPS growth are shrinking (profit growth −47.9% latest against +45.1% at its 12-quarter best). The read is built from 12 quarters across 3 curves, on partial evidence.

🚨 Why it matters: falling curves mean every cheap-looking ratio below needs a discount for direction.

A partial read: at least one curve is short, or the returns curve is not the computed quarterly series — hold the stage word a little more loosely.

→ The stage names the trajectory. Next: the revenue line that produces it, quarter by quarter.

4-Factor Sector Score

33.7/100 — rank 15 of 18 in Finance - Holding Company · 72% evidence confidence

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd scores 33.7 out of 100 against the 18 companies it is compared with in Finance - Holding Company, ranking 15. Price leads the evidence: RS versus the benchmark is 10.2%, but earnings trajectory is weak. Wait for revenue and profit confirmation.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 8 + 6 + 5 + 14.7 = 33.7. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if ROA rolls over or gross NPA rises while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Revenue For a bank, revenue is everything the franchise earns — interest on the loan book plus fee and other income.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd reported ₹22.0 Cr of income in the Mar 26 quarter, +4.8% year on year. That is the 2nd straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 7.5% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹78.0 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹79.0 Cr.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd reported ₹22.0 Cr of income in the Mar 26 quarter, +4.8% year on year. That is the 2nd straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 7.5% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹78.0 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹79.0 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹78.0 Cr (+0.0% on the year), capping 10 years at 7.5% compound. The latest quarter (Mar 26) printed ₹22.0 Cr, +4.8% year on year — the 2nd consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +9.3% growth against the decade's 7.5% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +1.3% over the last 4 quarters against +9.4%/yr over the last 8 — rolling over; TTM profit −47.9% vs −27.3%/yr — rolling over.

→ Revenue grew — did the net margin hold as it scaled? Next: 86.4% this quarter (−37.4 pp YoY).

Net margin Net margin — what the bank keeps of every ₹100 of revenue after every cost, provision and tax. It is the cleanest single margin we can read for a lender.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd's net margin is 86.4% in the Mar 26 quarter, −37.4 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 11 fiscal years the net margin has ranged 47.4% to 437.5%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd's net margin is 86.4% in the Mar 26 quarter, −37.4 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 11 fiscal years the net margin has ranged 47.4% to 437.5%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's net margin is 86.4%, −37.4 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 11 fiscal years the net margin has ranged 47.4%–437.5%.

Why: the numbers show the net margin move clearly, but the cost lines behind it sit below what we hold — so we state the move without inventing its driver.

→ The net margin slipped — did that reach the bottom line? Next: profit −26.9% in the latest quarter.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd earned ₹19.0 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, −26.9% year on year. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹37.0 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 0.0%. That is 86.4% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹26.0 Cr. 1 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd earned ₹19.0 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, −26.9% year on year. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹37.0 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 0.0%. That is 86.4% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹26.0 Cr. 1 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Mar 26 profit was ₹19.0 Cr, −26.9% year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹37.0 Cr (−48.6%), and the 10-year compound rate is 0.0%.

🚨 Why profit moved: revenue contributed +4.8% and the margin −37.4 pp — the quarter was revenue-led despite a thinner margin.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit −71.3% vs revenue +9.3%. Profit is growing slower than sales — costs are eating the growth before it reaches the bottom line.

→ Profit is up — how clean is the loan book behind it? Next: we hold no quarterly loan-book numbers — the section says so plainly.

Asset quality — the ladder Gross NPA is the slice of the loan book where repayments have stopped. Net NPA is what remains after the money already set aside against those loans. Falling is healing; rising is damage arriving.

Loan-book quality history is not available for Kalyani Investment Company Ltd, so this section names the gap rather than estimating a ratio. No gross or net non-performing-asset series is filed in a form this page can read, and none is inferred from the profit line. The income, margin and return sections above carry the evidence this business does report.

We do not hold quarterly loan-book quality numbers for this bank, so this section states that plainly rather than working around it.

Why: loan-book quality is the engine room of a bank, and its drivers — slippages, recoveries, provisioning — sit below what we hold for this name; the sections around it carry the reads we can stand behind.

→ Behind the profits — is the book itself still growing? Next: revenue grew +0.0% in FY26.

The loan book We read the loan book through revenue — when the book grows, revenue grows with it. It is a rough proxy, and we say so: rate moves and fee swings can shift it a few points in any one year.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd's revenue grew +0.0% in FY26 to ₹78.0 Cr, so the book is flat. The latest quarter ran +4.8% year on year. The net margin on that income is 86.4%, −37.4 percentage points against a year ago. Interest income is a proxy for the book; rate moves can shift it a few points in any one year.

FY26 revenue was ₹78.0 Cr, +0.0% on the year, and the latest quarter ran +4.8% year on year. The net margin on that revenue is 86.4% this quarter (−37.4 pp YoY) — growth with a narrowing margin on it.

The synthesis: a lender compounds when the book grows while the margin holds and the loan book stays clean — gross NPA is the loan-quality read we carry here.

→ Does all of this actually earn its keep on equity? Next: ROE is 0%.

Returns on equity and assets Two numbers usually rate a lender: ROE — what it earns on shareholder money — and ROA — what it earns on everything it deploys.

A clean annual return-on-equity ladder is not held for Kalyani Investment Company Ltd. For an insurer especially the standard bank ratios are not the right lens, so this page does not force them onto the filings rather than estimating a series it cannot support. The revenue, margin and ownership sections above and below are the reads this page stands behind.

We do not hold a clean annual return-on-equity series for Kalyani Investment Company Ltd — for an insurer especially, the standard bank ratios are not the right lens, so this page does not force them. The revenue, margin and ownership sections above and below are the reads we stand behind.

→ Who owns Kalyani Investment Company Ltd, and are they adding or leaving? Next: the register is quiet.

Debt

For a bank, borrowings are raw material, not a warning sign — solvency is read through the returns and the loan book. A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits, so the debt-to-equity lens that works everywhere else misleads on a lender and is not applied here.

A manufacturer’s debt is a claim against its profits; a bank’s borrowings are its inventory — money taken in to be lent out. The debt lens that works everywhere else misleads here, so this page does not apply it. The solvency questions for a bank — is the loan book sound, is the equity earning — are read through the loan-book and returns sections above.

→ Who owns this, and are they adding or leaving? Next: the register is quiet.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

No holder of Kalyani Investment Company Ltd moved a full percentage point over the last two years — the register is quiet. Domestic institutions moved +0.4 points over the same window, to 0.6%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Foreign institutions: −0.6 points over 8 quarters to 0.6%; Domestic institutions: +0.4 points over 8 quarters to 0.6%; Promoters: +0.0 points over 8 quarters to 75.0%.

→ One last check: does the safety math agree? Next: the balance-sheet safety line.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Kalyani Investment Company Ltd: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre. The Z-score was built for manufacturers and is not applied to banks and lenders, so solvency here is read from the capital and asset-quality lines instead.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is omitted — it was built for manufacturers, not banks, and applying it here would be theatre.

Frequently asked questions