Everest Industries Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Everest Industries Ltd trades at ₹488, in a downtrend and 34 weeks into that stage. That is +6.0% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 45% of a 52-week range of ₹299 to ₹715. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 5 straight weeks.

Today the stock is in a downtrend — week 34 of stage 4, confirmed. At ₹488 it trades +6.0% versus its 200-day average and sits at 45% of its 52-week range (₹299–₹715).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.4 years the stock moved +133% while the NIFTY 500 moved +280% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 5 straight weeks — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

→ The trend is one thing; the bill is another. Are you paying up for it? Next: the P/E sits at the 83rd percentile of its own range.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

Everest Industries Ltd trades at 128.6× P/E, at the pricey end of its own range (83rd percentile). Its long-run median P/E is 18.1×, measured across 8.9 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 128.6× is at the pricey end of its own range (83rd percentile), against a long-run median of 18.1× measured over 8.9 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +3.2%/yr price move, ~−24.0%/yr came from earnings growth and ~+27.2 pp from the multiple (expanding). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is full against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

A quarterly PEG curve, which only the second data source carries, is not drawn on this page: its two data sources do not share enough overlapping reported history to be compared. A figure nobody could check is not used to price growth — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Cheap or dear rides on the earnings. Are they actually growing? Next: the fundamental stage — where the business sits in its arc, and how growth has compounded.

Stage: No read Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Everest Industries Ltd reads as no read on its fundamental arc. Under eight usable quarters on the growth trio — not enough history for an honest trajectory read. The read is built from 10 quarters across 2 curves, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: with too little history, an honest page says so instead of guessing a trajectory.

The latest quarter’s profit carries a one-off item larger than the operating base, so the profit curve is shown but does not vote in the stage call.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Return readings here are annual, not quarterly — read as level and direction only; they can confirm the growth curves but never drive the stage on their own.

Fewer than eight usable quarters on the growth curves — this page will not guess a trajectory from a stub of history.

→ The stage names the trajectory. Next: the revenue line that produces it, quarter by quarter.

4-Factor Sector Score

24.2/100 — rank 5 of 5 in Pre-Engineering Buildings · 77% evidence confidence

Everest Industries Ltd scores 24.2 out of 100 against the 5 companies it is compared with in Pre-Engineering Buildings, ranking 5. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 2.4 + 3.3 + 10 + 8.5 = 24.2. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Everest Industries Ltd reported ₹327 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, −27.8% year on year. Over 10 years it has compounded at 0.8% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹1,417 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹1,417 Cr.

Everest Industries Ltd reported ₹327 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, −27.8% year on year. Over 10 years it has compounded at 0.8% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹1,417 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹1,417 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹1,417 Cr (−17.8% on the year), capping 10 years at 0.8% compound. The latest quarter (Mar 26) printed ₹327 Cr, −27.8% year on year.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged −18.6% growth against the decade's 0.8% — the current year is running slower than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew −17.8% over the last 4 quarters against −5.2%/yr over the last 8 — rolling over.

→ Revenue slipped — did margins hold as it scaled? Next: −8.0% this quarter (−10.0 pp YoY).

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Everest Industries Ltd's operating margin is −8.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, −10.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −3.0% to 9.0%. The current quarter is running below every full year in that window.

Everest Industries Ltd's operating margin is −8.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, −10.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −3.0% to 9.0%. The current quarter is running below every full year in that window.

The latest quarter's operating margin is −8.0%, −10.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −3.0%–9.0%.

🚨 Why the margin moved: operating margin went −10.3 pp year on year while gross margin went −4.3 pp — the loss came mostly below the gross line: operating leverage, with costs spread over a bigger revenue base.

→ Margins slipped — did that reach the bottom line? Next: profit −687.5% in the latest quarter.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Everest Industries Ltd posted a net loss of ₹47.0 Cr in the Mar 26 quarter. The full FY26 year was a loss of ₹102 Cr. That loss is 14.4% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹8.0 Cr. 6 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Everest Industries Ltd posted a net loss of ₹47.0 Cr in the Mar 26 quarter. The full FY26 year was a loss of ₹102 Cr. That loss is 14.4% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹8.0 Cr. 6 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Mar 26 profit was ₹−47.0 Cr, −687.5% year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹−102 Cr (null).

→ Profit rose — but did the cash follow? Next: 44% of the last 3 years' profit arrived as cash.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 44% of Everest Industries Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — a gap worth watching. In FY26 that was ₹109 Cr of operating cash against ₹−102 Cr of profit. After ₹21.0 Cr of capital spending, ₹88.0 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹109 Cr against reported profit of ₹−102 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹88.0 Cr after ₹21.0 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 44% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

🚨 Why conversion sits at 44%: the cash cycle stretched 29 days between FY21 and FY26 — more of each rupee of profit waits inside the cycle before arriving. Less than 70% of profit arriving as cash is the thing to watch on this page.

Router verdict: conversion is below par and the cash cycle has stretched 29 days — the next section's job is to find where the cash is stuck.

→ So follow the cash to where it goes. Next: the 97-day cycle, in money terms.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Everest Industries Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 97 days in FY26, up from 68 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹252 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹1,417 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹3.9 Cr, so roughly ₹377 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 28 days, inventory at 139 days — roughly 4.6 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 97 days, looser than FY21's 68.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 139 days to sell; customers pay about 28 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 71 days — netting out to the 97-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹1,417 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹3.9 Cr — so the 97-day loop keeps roughly ₹377 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹252 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹112 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹12.0 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the working-capital loop is the cash sink the router flagged — watch the cycle, not the P&L.

→ Does all this activity actually earn its cost of capital? Next: ROCE is −8% and the ROIC − WACC spread is −22.2 pp.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.⚠ unverified

Everest Industries Ltd earns a ROCE of −8% in FY26. Return on invested capital clears the cost of that capital by −22.2 percentage points, so growth here is not yet paying for the capital it uses. The wiring behind it is −7.2% net margin on 1.17× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is −8%.

🚨 Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): −7.2% net margin × 1.17× asset turns × 2.45× balance-sheet leverage ≈ −20.6% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The capstone test — ROIC − WACC: −10.2% − 12.0% = a −22.2 pp spread. The 12.0% is a standing assumption for the cost of capital in India, not a per-stock estimate — read the sign and the size of the spread, not the decimals. Negative — growth at these returns destroys value until the returns recover.

→ Returns like these — is the balance sheet borrowing to make them? Next: debt-to-equity is 0.46.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings. Low is the safe corner; the trend matters as much as the level.⚠ unverified

Everest Industries Ltd carries total debt of ₹227 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹495 Cr as of Mar 26, a debt-to-equity of 0.46. On the annual view that ratio went from 0.10 in FY22 to 0.46 in FY26. Read the returns elsewhere on this page with that leverage in mind.

Mar 26: total debt of ₹227 Cr against shareholder equity of ₹495 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.46. On the annual view, debt-to-equity went from 0.10 (FY22) to 0.46 (FY26). Read the returns on this page with that leverage in mind.

→ Who owns this, and are they adding or leaving? Next: the register is quiet.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

No holder of Everest Industries Ltd moved a full percentage point over the last two years — the register is quiet. Promoters moved +0.0 points over the same window, to 50.2%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Foreign institutions: −0.3 points over 8 quarters to 10.1%; Promoters: +0.0 points over 8 quarters to 50.2%; Domestic institutions: +0.0 points over 8 quarters to 0.0%.

→ One last check: does the safety math agree? Next: the balance-sheet safety line.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Everest Industries Ltd: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure. The debt, cash-flow and return sections above carry the balance-sheet evidence this page does hold, and each of them states its own reporting date.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is not available for this stock, so we say so rather than invent one.

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