Forbes & Company Ltd (FORBESGOK) — share price & stock analysis
From losses in FY16 and FY18 and FY19 and FY20 and FY21 and FY24 to record profits — the comeback is real, the price knows it.
Forbes & Company Ltd (FORBESGOK) trades at ₹319 as of 27 March 2026, up 9.4% over the past year — trailing NIFTY 500 for 7 weeks. The machine reads this as turnaround: from losses in FY16 and FY18 and FY19 and FY20 and FY21 and FY24 to record profits — the comeback is real, the price knows it. the price is in Stage 4 — declining, 27 weeks in; the business cycle reads DEEP CYCLICAL / EARLY RECOVERY. Fundamentals-momentum score: 38/100 (deteriorating).
Data as of 27 March 2026 · every number traces to its Screener source column · not investment advice.
- Market cap
- ₹412 Cr
- P/E
- 17.9×
- ROE
- 62.4%
- Book value / share
- ₹178
- Revenue (FY25)
- ₹199 Cr
- Profit after tax (FY25)
- ₹123 Cr
- Weinstein stage
- Stage 4 (27 weeks)
- Data as of
- 27 March 2026
Profits swing violently in this business — real losses in FY16 and FY18 and FY19 and FY20 and FY21 and FY24. That is what “deep cyclical” means: the same company looks brilliant at the top of its cycle and broken at the bottom.net_profit
Where the clock stands now: earnings sit at 10% of their historical range, margins are the best ever printed, and valuation history is thin. That reads as EARLY RECOVERY — the sweet spot of the pendulum — the improvement is visible but not yet fully priced.net_profit
2 of the 5 things we track are currently moving the right way — most of the dashboard is red.
Where the levels actually stand: ROCE 16% — decent; effectively no debt; margins at an all-time high. Momentum says which way things are moving; these say where they are.
Read this number for what it is: it measures the DIRECTION of change, not the quality of the business. A mediocre business getting better scores high here; a great one having a soft quarter scores low. Profit, sales and margins count double.
The price is in a downtrend — fighting it is expensive
STAGE 4 · DECLINING · 27 WEEKSEvery stock cycles through the same four seasons — a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Right now this one is in Stage 4: declining, 27 weeks in, confirmed.stage
The price is below its falling 200-day average — history says most of the damage in stocks happens here. Cheap can get cheaper in Stage 4.dma_200
Trailing NIFTY 500 for 7 weeks — relative strength is the market’s live opinion, and right now it is against it.rs_mansfield
What would end it: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the house exit rule — mechanical, no debates.dma_200
Data: Weekly price, moving averages and stage (sampled — full series in the embedded dataset)
| Period | Price (₹) | 200-DMA (₹) | 50-DMA (₹) | Stage |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apr 16 | 35.7 | 42.6 | 38.3 | 4 |
| Jun 16 | 38.4 | 41.6 | 39.8 | 4 |
| Aug 16 | 41.4 | 40.4 | 38.8 | 4 |
| Oct 16 | 50.9 | 43.0 | 47.4 | 2 |
| Dec 16 | 62.7 | 50.3 | 61.5 | 2 |
| Feb 17 | 57.3 | 53.6 | 59.2 | 2 |
| Apr 17 | 53.8 | 53.8 | 55.2 | 2 |
| Jun 17 | 46.9 | 52.7 | 50.9 | 4 |
| Aug 17 | 46.0 | 50.6 | 47.9 | 4 |
| Oct 17 | 55.6 | 51.8 | 53.4 | 2 |
| Dec 17 | 122 | 59.3 | 74.2 | 2 |
| Feb 18 | 99.7 | 80.5 | 108 | 2 |
| Apr 18 | 118 | 88.8 | 108 | 2 |
| Jun 18 | 75.9 | 91.0 | 94.1 | 2 |
| Aug 18 | 75.4 | 86.0 | 80.0 | 4 |
| Nov 18 | 64.5 | 78.9 | 66.3 | 4 |
| Jan 19 | 70.0 | 76.5 | 71.3 | 4 |
| Mar 19 | 65.8 | 71.4 | 63.3 | 4 |
| May 19 | 63.5 | 71.0 | 68.5 | 4 |
| Jul 19 | 52.3 | 66.3 | 58.7 | 4 |
| Sep 19 | 53.0 | 61.3 | 52.7 | 4 |
| Nov 19 | 50.4 | 57.8 | 51.4 | 4 |
| Jan 20 | 53.0 | 56.1 | 52.4 | 4 |
| Mar 20 | 23.0 | 51.2 | 41.5 | 4 |
| May 20 | 28.1 | 44.0 | 32.0 | 4 |
| Jul 20 | 30.9 | 39.3 | 31.3 | 4 |
| Sep 20 | 49.4 | 37.8 | 36.4 | 4 |
| Nov 20 | 47.0 | 41.0 | 44.6 | 2 |
| Jan 21 | 44.6 | 43.3 | 47.2 | 2 |
| Apr 21 | 54.6 | 44.4 | 47.9 | 2 |
| Jun 21 | 59.5 | 47.3 | 51.9 | 2 |
| Aug 21 | 93.5 | 59.1 | 78.7 | 2 |
| Oct 21 | 133 | 78.2 | 112 | 2 |
| Dec 21 | 165 | 106 | 151 | 2 |
| Feb 22 | 169 | 133 | 178 | 2 |
| Apr 22 | 170 | 145 | 172 | 2 |
| Jun 22 | 156 | 151 | 161 | 2 |
| Aug 22 | 340 | 161 | 185 | 2 |
| Oct 22 | 281 | 209 | 275 | 2 |
| Dec 22 | 250 | 233 | 278 | 2 |
| Feb 23 | 260 | 243 | 264 | 2 |
| Apr 23 | 248 | 245 | 252 | 2 |
| Jun 23 | 243 | 245 | 244 | 3 |
| Sep 23 | 270 | 255 | 268 | 2 |
| Nov 23 | 272 | 261 | 271 | 2 |
| Jan 24 | 332 | 277 | 303 | 2 |
| Mar 24 | 517 | 317 | 394 | 2 |
| May 24 | 650 | 390 | 532 | 2 |
| Jul 24 | 633 | 480 | 620 | 2 |
| Sep 24 | 639 | 529 | 625 | 2 |
| Nov 24 | 541 | 578 | 649 | 2 |
| Jan 25 | 415 | 538 | 490 | 4 |
| Mar 25 | 299 | 465 | 351 | 4 |
| May 25 | 380 | 426 | 354 | 4 |
| Jul 25 | 435 | 424 | 415 | 4 |
| Sep 25 | 372 | 420 | 409 | 4 |
| Nov 25 | 335 | 401 | 370 | 4 |
| Feb 26 | 373 | 381 | 359 | 4 |
| Mar 26 | 319 | 369 | 340 | 4 |
Out of the loss years — profitable again, still below its best
Over 11 years, sales went from ₹3,067 Cr to ₹199 Cr (about −22% a year), and profit from ₹50.0 Cr to ₹123 Cr.revenuenet_profit
The books show real losses in FY16 and FY18 and FY19 and FY20 and FY21 and FY24 (worst: ₹−338 Cr). Everything about today’s cheap-looking numbers must be read against that history — the recovery is what you are buying.net_profit
Data: Revenue by year
| Period | Revenue (₹ Cr) |
|---|---|
| FY14 | 3,067 |
| FY15 | 3,546 |
| FY16 | 3,231 |
| FY17 | 2,999 |
| FY18 | 2,822 |
| FY19 | 2,853 |
| FY20 | 2,731 |
| FY21 | 932 |
| FY22 | 515 |
| FY23 | 47 |
| FY24 | 125 |
| FY25 | 199 |
Data: Profit by year
| Period | Profit after tax (₹ Cr) |
|---|---|
| FY14 | 50 |
| FY15 | 37 |
| FY16 | -48 |
| FY17 | 89 |
| FY18 | -32 |
| FY19 | -3 |
| FY20 | -338 |
| FY21 | -117 |
| FY22 | 4,229 |
| FY23 | 192 |
| FY24 | -4 |
| FY25 | 123 |
Data: OPM % by year
| Period | OPM % (%) |
|---|---|
| FY14 | 5.0 |
| FY15 | 3.6 |
| FY16 | 1.1 |
| FY17 | 3.5 |
| FY18 | 4.6 |
| FY19 | 5.0 |
| FY20 | 1.1 |
| FY21 | 11.9 |
| FY22 | 9.5 |
| FY23 | -61.7 |
| FY24 | 4.8 |
| FY25 | 13.1 |
Sales collapsed 56% last quarter
Dec 25 sales were ₹17.8 Cr, down 56% on the same quarter last year.revenue
A shrinking topline puts the burden of the story on margins and one-offs — watch whether this is a pause or a slide.
Data: Quarterly sales
| Period | Revenue (₹ Cr) | YoY growth (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 23 | 11.0 | – |
| Jun 23 | 11.0 | – |
| Sep 23 | 16.0 | – |
| Dec 23 | 12.0 | – |
| Mar 24 | 87.0 | 673.4 |
| Jun 24 | 36.0 | 214.8 |
| Sep 24 | 35.0 | 123.0 |
| Dec 24 | 40.0 | 238.4 |
| Mar 25 | 89.0 | 1.8 |
| Jun 25 | 22.0 | -37.3 |
| Sep 25 | 19.0 | -46.0 |
| Dec 25 | 18.0 | -55.8 |
Margins are widening — 9% → 17% in a year
Of every ₹100 of sales, the company keeps ₹17.0 as operating profit (a year ago it kept ₹8.7).opm_pct
Zoom out and this is the page's quiet hero: annual operating margin bottomed at −61.7% in FY23 and has been rebuilt to 13.1% — that recovery, not sales alone, is what powers the profit growth elsewhere on this page.operating_profit
The gross margin moved the same way (32% → 60%), so this is about input costs and pricing power — the raw-material equation improved.gpm_pctopm_pct
Data: Three margins, quarterly
| Period | Gross (%) | Operating (%) | Net (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 23 | 62.0 | -32.7 | -1.6 |
| Jun 23 | 59.8 | 0.6 | 99.3 |
| Sep 23 | 51.2 | -9.7 | 3.2 |
| Dec 23 | 59.9 | 0.7 | 25.1 |
| Mar 24 | 21.1 | 4.0 | 7.8 |
| Jun 24 | 33.5 | 13.4 | 14.8 |
| Sep 24 | 34.4 | 12.2 | 15.4 |
| Dec 24 | 32.2 | 8.7 | 23.6 |
| Mar 25 | 25.4 | 13.0 | 8.6 |
| Jun 25 | 48.1 | 5.1 | 21.7 |
| Sep 25 | 62.5 | 15.4 | 33.9 |
| Dec 25 | 60.3 | 17.0 | 23.5 |
Profit collapsed 56% — mostly from income from outside the core business
Dec 25 profit after tax was ₹4.2 Cr, down 56% year on year.net_profit
A caution: a meaningful slice of this jump came from income outside the core business — that is lower-quality profit and may not repeat.other_income
Data: Quarterly profit after tax
| Period | PAT (₹ Cr) | YoY growth (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 23 | 10.0 | – |
| Jun 23 | 11.0 | – |
| Sep 23 | -23.0 | – |
| Dec 23 | 4.0 | – |
| Mar 24 | 3.0 | -66.9 |
| Jun 24 | 5.0 | -50.9 |
| Sep 24 | 5.0 | 122.6 |
| Dec 24 | 10.0 | 141.7 |
| Mar 25 | 103 | 2,933.6 |
| Jun 25 | 5.0 | -8.0 |
| Sep 25 | 6.0 | 23.2 |
| Dec 25 | 4.0 | -55.9 |
The single biggest driver was income outside the core business.
Data: Where the profit change came from (Dec 24 → Dec 25)
| Component | Effect (₹ Cr) |
|---|---|
| PAT Dec 24 | 10 |
| More sales | −2 |
| Fatter margins | +2 |
| Other income | −8 |
| Depreciation | −0 |
| Interest | 0 |
| Tax | +3 |
| PAT Dec 25 | 4 |
Profits on paper, cash lagging behind
Over the last 3 profitable years, the business reported ₹4,544 Cr of profit and collected ₹245 Cr of operating cash — about 5% conversion (2 loss years excluded — a negative denominator would flatter the ratio).operating_cash_flownet_profit
The wrinkle is the latest year: FY25 collected ₹−11.0 Cr against ₹123 Cr of reported profit — about -9%. One year isn’t a trend, but it is the line to watch.operating_cash_flownet_profit
Data: Cash collected vs profit reported (annual)
| Period | Operating cash flow (₹ Cr) | Profit after tax (₹ Cr) |
|---|---|---|
| FY14 | 114 | 50.0 |
| FY15 | 98.0 | 37.0 |
| FY16 | 120 | -48.0 |
| FY17 | 67.0 | 89.0 |
| FY18 | 170 | -32.0 |
| FY19 | 207 | -3.0 |
| FY20 | 229 | -338 |
| FY21 | 366 | -117 |
| FY22 | 201 | 4,229 |
| FY23 | 55.0 | 192 |
| FY24 | -20.0 | -4.0 |
| FY25 | -11.0 | 123 |
The cash cycle is tightening — money comes home faster
One rupee now takes about -13 days to go out the door as materials and come back as collected cash — down from 695 days the year before.cash_conversion_cycle
The biggest mover: inventory moving faster off the shelf (892 → 43 days).inventory_days
Data: Days of cash locked up (annual)
| Period | Customers owe (debtor days) (days) | Stock on shelf (inventory days) (days) | We owe suppliers (payable days) (days) |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY14 | 66.0 | 131 | 192 |
| FY15 | 60.0 | 102 | 162 |
| FY16 | 59.0 | 98.0 | 140 |
| FY17 | 56.0 | 138 | 115 |
| FY18 | 54.0 | 155 | 142 |
| FY19 | 60.0 | 220 | 151 |
| FY20 | 54.0 | 284 | 162 |
| FY21 | 47.0 | 188 | 99.0 |
| FY22 | 62.0 | 533 | 214 |
| FY23 | 61.0 | – | – |
| FY24 | 20.0 | 892 | 217 |
| FY25 | 15.0 | 43.0 | 71.0 |
No big build-out underway — growth must come from what already exists
The productive asset base has gone from ₹878 Cr (FY14) to ₹27.0 Cr.fixed_assetscwip
The build is self-funded: the last 3 years' investing outflow (₹−224 Cr) fits inside the operating cash the business generated (₹24.0 Cr).investing_cash_flowoperating_cash_flow
Data: Assets in place vs under construction (annual)
| Period | Fixed assets (₹ Cr) | Under construction (CWIP) (₹ Cr) |
|---|---|---|
| FY14 | 878 | 29.0 |
| FY15 | 1,140 | 51.0 |
| FY16 | 997 | 72.0 |
| FY17 | 1,036 | 74.0 |
| FY18 | 1,139 | 94.0 |
| FY19 | 1,134 | 87.0 |
| FY20 | 1,027 | 29.0 |
| FY21 | 598 | 4.0 |
| FY22 | 158 | 1.0 |
| FY23 | 29.0 | 0.0 |
| FY24 | 27.0 | 0.0 |
| FY25 | 27.0 | 0.0 |
Almost no debt — this company cannot be killed by a bad year
For every ₹100 shareholders have put in (and left in), the company has borrowed ₹2 — total borrowings have shrunk from ₹918 Cr to ₹5.0 Cr over the window.borrowings
Data: Total borrowings (annual)
| Period | Borrowings (₹ Cr) |
|---|---|
| FY14 | 918 |
| FY15 | 1,180 |
| FY16 | 1,140 |
| FY17 | 1,164 |
| FY18 | 1,189 |
| FY19 | 1,070 |
| FY20 | 1,137 |
| FY21 | 523 |
| FY22 | 288 |
| FY23 | 9.0 |
| FY24 | 5.0 |
| FY25 | 5.0 |
Data: Debt vs shareholders’ money (annual)
| Period | Debt ÷ equity (x) |
|---|---|
| FY14 | 2.2 |
| FY15 | 2.7 |
| FY16 | 5.2 |
| FY17 | 3.7 |
| FY18 | 3.8 |
| FY19 | 4.1 |
| FY20 | -12.9 |
| FY21 | -3.7 |
| FY22 | 3.4 |
| FY23 | 0.0 |
| FY24 | 0.0 |
| FY25 | 0.0 |
Every ₹100 kept in the business earns ₹16 — decent, not special
Return on capital employed is 16.0% (a year ago: 5.0%). This is the single best test of business quality: what the company earns on the money it keeps.roce_pct
Rising returns on capital while growing is the rarest combination in investing — it means the new projects earn more than the old ones.roce_pct
Data: Returns on capital (annual)
| Period | ROCE (%) |
|---|---|
| FY14 | 14.0 |
| FY15 | 11.0 |
| FY16 | 3.0 |
| FY17 | 5.0 |
| FY18 | 5.0 |
| FY19 | 7.0 |
| FY20 | -2.0 |
| FY21 | 14.0 |
| FY22 | 12.0 |
| FY23 | -9.0 |
| FY24 | 5.0 |
| FY25 | 16.0 |
Institutions have been lightening up
Promoters hold 73.8%, essentially unchanged. Foreign funds own 8.2%, domestic funds 0.2%.promoters_pctfiis_pctdiis_pct
Meanwhile foreign funds have been the sellers — from 11.5% to 8.2% over the window. Someone on the other side of the table disagrees; both sides count.fiis_pct
Data: Who holds the shares, quarterly
| Period | Promoters (%) | Foreign funds (%) | Domestic funds (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mar 23 | 73.9 | 11.5 | 0.1 |
| Jun 23 | 73.9 | 11.5 | 0.1 |
| Sep 23 | 73.9 | 11.5 | 0.1 |
| Dec 23 | 73.9 | 11.6 | 0.1 |
| Mar 24 | 73.9 | 11.6 | 0.1 |
| Jun 24 | 73.9 | 11.5 | 0.1 |
| Sep 24 | 73.9 | 11.3 | 0.1 |
| Dec 24 | 73.9 | 10.2 | 0.1 |
| Mar 25 | 73.9 | 8.2 | 0.2 |
| Jun 25 | 73.9 | 8.2 | 0.2 |
| Sep 25 | 73.9 | 8.2 | 0.2 |
| Dec 25 | 73.9 | 8.2 | 0.2 |
- Promoters are not selling. Their stake has moved 0.1 points or less in 8 quarters — it sits at 73.8%.promoters_pct
A turnaround that stuck — the question is what’s left to re-rate
The numbers are genuinely mixed, and the price is roughly fair to the delivery so far.
Best thing in the data: returns on capital rising (5.0% → 16.0%).roce_pct
Biggest worry: profit falling (₹9.5 Cr → ₹4.2 Cr).net_profit
Machine-written research from Screener data — every number traces to its source column. Sector Alpha is not a SEBI-registered investment adviser; nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell. Not investment advice.
Straight answers from the data
What does Forbes & Company Ltd do?
Incorporated in 1919, Forbes & Company Ltd. It has a market capitalisation of ₹412 Cr.
What is Forbes & Company Ltd's share price?
As of 27 March 2026, Forbes & Company Ltd trades at ₹319, up 9.4% over the past year, with a market capitalisation of ₹412 Cr. Trailing NIFTY 500 for 7 weeks. Prices are weekly closes from Screener data; this page refreshes with each weekly update.
What is Forbes & Company Ltd's share price target?
Sector Alpha does not publish broker-style price targets. Our discounted-cash-flow model estimates Forbes & Company Ltd's intrinsic value at ₹886 per share under base assumptions (bear ₹624, bull ₹1,213), against the current price of ₹319 — a 178% margin of safety. The current price already implies roughly -10% annual earnings growth. These are model estimates, not forecasts — treat them as one input alongside the valuation history below, not as a target.
What did Forbes & Company Ltd report in its latest quarterly results?
In its most recent reported quarter (Q3 FY26, quarter ended December 2025): Dec 25 sales were ₹17.8 Cr, down 56% on the same quarter last year. Dec 25 profit after tax was ₹4.2 Cr, down 56% year on year. Figures are from Screener-scraped quarterly filings; the page updates when the next quarter is filed.
Is Forbes & Company Ltd growing?
Sales collapsed 56% last quarter. Dec 25 sales were ₹17.8 Cr, down 56% on the same quarter last year.
Are Forbes & Company Ltd's profits growing?
Profit collapsed 56% — mostly from income from outside the core business. Dec 25 profit after tax was ₹4.2 Cr, down 56% year on year.
What are Forbes & Company Ltd's operating margins?
Margins are widening — 9% → 17% in a year. In the most recent quarter, of every ₹100 of sales, the company keeps ₹17.0 as operating profit (a year ago it kept ₹8.7).
What is Forbes & Company Ltd's long-term growth record?
Revenue grew from ₹3,067 Cr in FY14 to ₹199 Cr in FY25 — a -22.0% compound annual growth rate over 11 years. Profit after tax compounded at 8.5% over the same period (₹50 Cr → ₹123 Cr).
Is Forbes & Company Ltd stock in an uptrend?
The price is in a downtrend — fighting it is expensive. Forbes & Company Ltd is in Stage 4 — declining, 27 weeks in (confirmed). Stages follow Stan Weinstein's four-phase read of weekly price against the 200-day average: basing (1), advancing (2), topping (3), declining (4).
Is Forbes & Company Ltd beating the NIFTY 500?
No — trailing NIFTY 500 for 7 weeks, as of 27 March 2026. Relative strength is measured weekly against the NIFTY 500 (Mansfield RS): a positive reading means the stock has outperformed the index over the trailing window, week after week.
Where is Forbes & Company Ltd in its business cycle?
The data reads Forbes & Company Ltd as a deep cyclical business currently in its early recovery phase — earnings at 10% of their own historical range. Profits swing violently in this business — real losses in FY16 and FY18 and FY19 and FY20 and FY21 and FY24. That is what “deep cyclical” means: the same company looks brilliant at the top of its cycle and broken at the bottom.
Who owns Forbes & Company Ltd — what is the promoter holding?
Promoters hold 73.8%, essentially unchanged. Foreign funds own 8.2%, domestic funds 0.2%. Meanwhile foreign funds have been the sellers — from 11.5% to 8.2% over the window. Someone on the other side of the table disagrees; both sides count. Shareholding is from Screener's quarterly filings data.
Does Forbes & Company Ltd have too much debt?
Almost no debt — this company cannot be killed by a bad year. For every ₹100 shareholders have put in (and left in), the company has borrowed ₹2 — total borrowings have shrunk from ₹918 Cr to ₹5.0 Cr over the window.
What is the bull case for Forbes & Company Ltd?
From losses in FY16 and FY18 and FY19 and FY20 and FY21 and FY24 to record profits — the comeback is real, the price knows it. Best thing in the data: returns on capital rising (5.0% → 16.0%). Sales collapsed 56% last quarter.
What is the bear case for Forbes & Company Ltd — what could break the story?
Biggest worry: profit falling (₹9.5 Cr → ₹4.2 Cr). Two quarters of margins reversing would kill this story. The nearest-term thing to watch: two consecutive quarters of margin decline would break this trend. This falsification condition is stated up front so the thesis can be checked against incoming quarters, not defended after the fact.
Is Forbes & Company Ltd a stock worth studying right now?
Sector Alpha does not publish buy or sell recommendations — this is a research read, not advice. What the data says: a turnaround that stuck — the question is what’s left to re-rate. The numbers are genuinely mixed, and the price is roughly fair to the delivery so far. This is machine-written research compiled from Screener data — every number traces to its source — and it is not investment advice. Do your own diligence.