Greenlam Industries Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Greenlam Industries Ltd trades at ₹249, in a downtrend and 21 weeks into that stage. That is +3.1% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 73% of a 52-week range of ₹202 to ₹267. On relative strength it has been ahead of the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view for 10 straight weeks.

Today the stock is in a downtrend — week 21 of stage 4. At ₹249 it trades +3.1% versus its 200-day average and sits at 73% of its 52-week range (₹202–₹267).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.3 years the stock moved +424% while the NIFTY 500 moved +274% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock has been ahead for 10 straight weeks — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

→ The trend is one thing; the bill is another. Are you paying up for it? Next: the P/E sits at the 99th percentile of its own range.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

Greenlam Industries Ltd trades at 113.0× P/E, about the priciest it has ever traded. Its long-run median P/E is 39.6×, measured across 10.4 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 113.0× is about the priciest it has ever traded, against a long-run median of 39.6× measured over 10.4 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved −19.4% against a −0.4% price move — the price outran earnings, pushing the multiple UP its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +13.5%/yr price move, ~−7.9%/yr came from earnings growth and ~+21.4 pp from the multiple (expanding); over 10y, of the +14.3%/yr price move, ~+11.0%/yr came from earnings growth and ~+3.3 pp from the multiple (expanding). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is full against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

The PEG ratio and its quarterly curve, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 58% on reported income across 14 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Cheap or dear rides on the earnings. Are they actually growing? Next: the fundamental stage — where the business sits in its arc, and how growth has compounded.

Stage: Turning around Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Greenlam Industries Ltd reads as turning around on its fundamental arc. Turning around — profit growth swung from −100.0% at the trough to +4000.0%, a 2-quarter improving streak (single-quarter readings), ROCE holding at 8.0%. The read is built from 10 quarters across 3 curves, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: growth inflections are where re-ratings start — the curves say a turn is forming, so the question becomes whether the next quarters confirm it.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Return readings here are annual, not quarterly — read as level and direction only; they can confirm the growth curves but never drive the stage on their own.

A partial read: at least one curve is short, or the returns curve is not the computed quarterly series — hold the stage word a little more loosely.

→ The stage names the trajectory. Next: the revenue line that produces it, quarter by quarter.

4-Factor Sector Score

42.4/100 — rank 4 of 5 in Plywood Boards/Laminates · 73% evidence confidence

Greenlam Industries Ltd scores 42.4 out of 100 against the 5 companies it is compared with in Plywood Boards/Laminates, ranking 4. Balanced evidence: keep at normal research priority and require another comparable period before raising conviction.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 20.5 + 6.2 + 5.1 + 10.6 = 42.4. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Greenlam Industries Ltd reported ₹858 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, +25.8% year on year. That is the 10th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 11.5% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹3,046 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹3,046 Cr.

Greenlam Industries Ltd reported ₹858 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, +25.8% year on year. That is the 10th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 11.5% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹3,046 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹3,046 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹3,046 Cr (+18.6% on the year), capping 10 years at 11.5% compound. The latest quarter (Mar 26) printed ₹858 Cr, +25.8% year on year — the 10th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +18.3% growth against the decade's 11.5% — the current year is running faster than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +18.5% over the last 4 quarters against +14.9%/yr over the last 8 — accelerating; TTM profit −17.6% vs −36.3%/yr — accelerating.

→ Revenue grew — did margins hold as it scaled? Next: 13.0% this quarter (+4.0 pp YoY).

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Greenlam Industries Ltd's operating margin is 13.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, +4.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 12 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 10.0% to 14.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

Greenlam Industries Ltd's operating margin is 13.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, +4.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. Across 12 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 10.0% to 14.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 13.0%, +4.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 12 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 10.0%–14.0%.

Why the margin moved: operating margin went +3.2 pp year on year while gross margin went +0.9 pp — the gain came mostly below the gross line: operating leverage, with costs spread over a bigger revenue base.

→ Margins held — did that reach the bottom line? Next: profit +4,000.0% in the latest quarter.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Greenlam Industries Ltd earned ₹41.0 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, +4,000.0% year on year. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹56.0 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 4.0%. That is 4.8% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹1.0 Cr. 2 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Greenlam Industries Ltd earned ₹41.0 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, +4,000.0% year on year. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹56.0 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 4.0%. That is 4.8% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹1.0 Cr. 2 of the last 12 reported quarters were loss-making.

Mar 26 profit was ₹41.0 Cr, +4,000.0% year on year. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹56.0 Cr (−17.6%), and the 10-year compound rate is 4.0%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +25.8% and the margin +4.0 pp — the quarter was margin-led: most of the profit growth came from keeping more of each sale.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +926.6% vs revenue +18.3%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

→ Profit rose — but did the cash follow? Next: 266% of the last 3 years' profit arrived as cash.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 266% of Greenlam Industries Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY26 that was ₹292 Cr of operating cash against ₹56.0 Cr of profit. After ₹84.0 Cr of capital spending, ₹208 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹292 Cr against reported profit of ₹56.0 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹208 Cr after ₹84.0 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 266% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 266%: the cash cycle tightened 43 days between FY21 and FY26 — cash that used to wait in the cycle now reaches the bank sooner.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 3.4× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

→ So follow the cash to where it goes. Next: ₹1,176 Cr of building over 3 years.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Greenlam Industries Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 92 days in FY26, down from 135 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹1,176 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹3,046 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹8.3 Cr, so roughly ₹768 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 26 days, inventory at 197 days — roughly 6.5 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 92 days, tighter than FY21's 135.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 197 days to sell; customers pay about 26 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 131 days — netting out to the 92-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹3,046 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹8.3 Cr — so the 92-day loop keeps roughly ₹768 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹1,176 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹343 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹10.0 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

→ Does all this activity actually earn its cost of capital? Next: ROCE is 8%.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

Greenlam Industries Ltd earns a ROCE of 8% in FY26. That is up from a trough of 7% in FY25. A return-on-invested-capital spread against the cost of capital is not computable from what is held here. The wiring behind it is 1.8% net margin on 1.02× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 8%, recovered from a FY25 trough of 7% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 1.8% net margin × 1.02× asset turns × 2.54× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 4.7% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The quarterly return curves and the return-on-invested-capital overlay, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 58% on reported income across 14 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Returns like these — is the balance sheet borrowing to make them? Next: debt-to-equity is 0.98.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings; interest cover says how many times operating profit pays the interest bill. Low and high, respectively, is the safe corner.

Greenlam Industries Ltd carries ₹1,160 Cr of borrowings against ₹1,180 Cr of equity in FY26, a debt-to-equity of 0.98. Operating profit covers the interest bill 3×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹307 Cr to ₹1,160 Cr. Capital spending ran ₹1,176 Cr across the last 3 of those years.

FY26: borrowings of ₹1,160 Cr against equity of ₹1,180 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.98. Operating profit covers the interest bill 3×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹307 Cr to ₹1,160 Cr while capital spending ran ₹1,176 Cr in just the last 3 — part of the build-out is riding on borrowed money.

The total-debt and debt-to-equity series, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 58% on reported income across 14 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Who owns this, and are they adding or leaving? Next: Domestic institutions cut 4.7 points over 8 quarters.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Domestic institutions cut 4.7 points of Greenlam Industries Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes domestic institutions to 10.9% of the company. Foreign institutions moved −0.3 points over the same window, to 1.5%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Domestic institutions: −4.7 points over 8 quarters to 10.9%; Foreign institutions: −0.3 points over 8 quarters to 1.5%; Promoters: +0.0 points over 8 quarters to 51.0%.

🚨 Why the register moved: domestic institutions drove it (−4.7 points) — distribution into the market’s bid.

→ One last check: does the safety math agree? Next: the balance-sheet safety line.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Greenlam Industries Ltd: the Z-score is withheld — it comes from the second data source this page could not reconcile, and a solvency score is not worth printing on a number two sources dispute. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is withheld — it comes from the second data source this page could not reconcile, and a solvency score is not worth printing on a number two sources dispute.

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