Campus Activewear Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

Campus Activewear Ltd trades at ₹236, in a downtrend and 29 weeks into that stage. That is −5.8% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 21% of a 52-week range of ₹224 to ₹283. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (15 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a downtrend — week 29 of stage 4, confirmed. At ₹236 it trades −5.8% versus its 200-day average and sits at 21% of its 52-week range (₹224–₹283).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 4.2 years the stock moved −29% while the NIFTY 500 moved +68% — behind the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (15 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-05-08) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

→ The trend is one thing; the bill is another. Are you paying up for it? Next: the P/E sits at the 0th percentile of its own range.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

Campus Activewear Ltd trades at 48.7× P/E, about the cheapest it has ever traded. Its long-run median P/E is 78.0×, measured across 4.2 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 48.7× is about the cheapest it has ever traded, against a long-run median of 78.0× measured over 4.2 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

One caveat before moving on: margins are the best this company has ever printed — cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap. If profitability mean-reverts, today's multiple is higher than it looks.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved +101.7% against a −21.0% price move — earnings outran the price, pushing the multiple DOWN its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 3y, of the −9.3%/yr price move, ~+0.0%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−9.3 pp from the multiple (compressing). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is low against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

The PEG ratio and its quarterly curve, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 41% on reported income across 4 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Cheap or dear rides on the earnings. Are they actually growing? Next: the fundamental stage — where the business sits in its arc, and how growth has compounded.

Stage: No read Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

Campus Activewear Ltd reads as no read on its fundamental arc. Under eight usable quarters on the growth trio — not enough history for an honest trajectory read. The read is built from 4 quarters across 1 curve, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: with too little history, an honest page says so instead of guessing a trajectory.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Return readings here are annual, not quarterly — read as level and direction only; they can confirm the growth curves but never drive the stage on their own.

Fewer than eight usable quarters on the growth curves — this page will not guess a trajectory from a stub of history.

→ The stage names the trajectory. Next: the revenue line that produces it, quarter by quarter.

4-Factor Sector Score

64.3/100 — rank 5 of 6 in Footwear · 46% evidence confidence · provisional, ranked below fully-evidenced peers

Campus Activewear Ltd scores 64.3 out of 100 against the 6 companies it is compared with in Footwear, ranking 5. Fill the missing evidence before acting; the ranking is deliberately pulled toward neutral.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 20.6 + 17.4 + 13.7 + 12.6 = 64.3. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

Campus Activewear Ltd reported ₹338 Cr of revenue in the Jun 22 quarter, +150.4% year on year. That is the 2nd straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 5 years it has compounded at 259.1% a year. The last full year, FY22, came in at ₹1,194 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹1,259 Cr.

Campus Activewear Ltd reported ₹338 Cr of revenue in the Jun 22 quarter, +150.4% year on year. That is the 2nd straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 5 years it has compounded at 259.1% a year. The last full year, FY22, came in at ₹1,194 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹1,259 Cr.

FY22 revenue came in at ₹1,194 Cr (+67.9% on the year), capping 5 years at 259.1% compound. The latest quarter (Jun 22) printed ₹338 Cr, +150.4% year on year — the 2nd consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +89.2% growth against the decade's 259.1% — the current year is running slower than its own long-run rate.

→ Revenue grew — did margins hold as it scaled? Next: 18.0% this quarter (+7.0 pp YoY).

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

Campus Activewear Ltd's operating margin is 18.0% in the Jun 22 quarter, +7.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across the last four quarters the operating margin has moved −6.0 percentage points. Across 6 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −57.0% to 20.0%.

Campus Activewear Ltd's operating margin is 18.0% in the Jun 22 quarter, +7.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across the last four quarters the operating margin has moved −6.0 percentage points. Across 6 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −57.0% to 20.0%.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 18.0%, +7.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 6 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged −57.0%–20.0%, and FY22's 20.0% is the top of that band — a record year.

🚨 Why the margin moved: operating margin went −5.4 pp year on year while gross margin went +0.8 pp — the loss came mostly below the gross line: operating leverage, with costs spread over a bigger revenue base.

Worth repeating from the valuation section: cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap — a record margin flatters every ratio built on top of it.

→ Margins held — did that reach the bottom line? Next: profit +1,350.0% in the latest quarter.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

Campus Activewear Ltd earned ₹29.0 Cr of net profit in the Jun 22 quarter, +1,350.0% year on year. It is the 2nd consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY22 profit was ₹108 Cr. That is 8.6% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹10.0 Cr.

Campus Activewear Ltd earned ₹29.0 Cr of net profit in the Jun 22 quarter, +1,350.0% year on year. It is the 2nd consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY22 profit was ₹108 Cr. That is 8.6% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹10.0 Cr.

Jun 22 profit was ₹29.0 Cr, +1,350.0% year on year — the 2nd consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY22 printed ₹108 Cr (+300.0%).

→ Profit rose — but did the cash follow? Next: 122% of the last 3 years' profit arrived as cash.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 122% of Campus Activewear Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY22 that was ₹18.0 Cr of operating cash against ₹108 Cr of profit. After ₹121 Cr of capital spending, ₹−103 Cr was left as free cash.

FY22: operating cash of ₹18.0 Cr against reported profit of ₹108 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹−103 Cr after ₹121 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 122% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 122%: the cash cycle tightened 14,251 days between FY17 and FY22 — cash that used to wait in the cycle now reaches the bank sooner.

Router verdict: the bigger cash user is investment — capital spending ran 2.8× depreciation over three years, so the next section's job is to check what that build-out is buying.

→ So follow the cash to where it goes. Next: ₹308 Cr of building over 3 years.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

Campus Activewear Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs 139 days in FY22, down from 14,390 days in FY17. Capital spending ran ₹308 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY22 sales of ₹1,194 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹3.3 Cr, so roughly ₹455 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY22: debtors at 41 days, inventory at 219 days — roughly 7.2 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of 139 days, tighter than FY17's 14,390.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 219 days to sell; customers pay about 41 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 120 days — netting out to the 139-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY22 sales of ₹1,194 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹3.3 Cr — so the 139-day loop keeps roughly ₹455 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹308 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹109 Cr of depreciation — the company is building well ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹2.0 Cr (FY22) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: the cash is going into capacity, not disappearing into the cycle — the question becomes whether the new capacity earns.

→ Does all this activity actually earn its cost of capital? Next: ROCE is 32%.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

Campus Activewear Ltd earns a ROCE of 32% in FY22. That is up from a trough of 10% in FY18. A return-on-invested-capital spread against the cost of capital is not computable from what is held here. The wiring behind it is 9.0% net margin on 1.24× asset turns.

FY22 ROCE is 32%, recovered from a FY18 trough of 10% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY22): 9.0% net margin × 1.24× asset turns × 2.26× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 25.2% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The quarterly return curves and the return-on-invested-capital overlay, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 41% on reported income across 4 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Returns like these — is the balance sheet borrowing to make them? Next: debt-to-equity is 0.68.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings; interest cover says how many times operating profit pays the interest bill. Low and high, respectively, is the safe corner.

Campus Activewear Ltd carries ₹289 Cr of borrowings against ₹427 Cr of equity in FY22, a debt-to-equity of 0.68. Operating profit covers the interest bill 12×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹347 Cr to ₹289 Cr. Capital spending ran ₹308 Cr across the last 3 of those years.

FY22: borrowings of ₹289 Cr against equity of ₹427 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.68. Operating profit covers the interest bill 12×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹347 Cr to ₹289 Cr while capital spending ran ₹308 Cr in just the last 3 — the build-out is being paid for out of cash, not debt.

The total-debt and debt-to-equity series, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 41% on reported income across 4 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Who owns this, and are they adding or leaving? Next: Domestic institutions added 2.0 points over 8 quarters.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

Domestic institutions added 2.0 points of Campus Activewear Ltd over 8 quarters, the biggest move on the register. That takes domestic institutions to 11.4% of the company. Promoters moved −1.8 points over the same window, to 72.1%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Domestic institutions: +2.0 points over 8 quarters to 11.4%; Promoters: −1.8 points over 8 quarters to 72.1%; Foreign institutions: +0.1 points over 8 quarters to 6.0%.

Why the register moved: domestic institutions drove it (+2.0 points), absorbed on the other side by promoters (−1.8 points) — steady accumulation by institutions reading the same numbers this page reads.

→ One last check: does the safety math agree? Next: the balance-sheet safety line.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

Campus Activewear Ltd: the Z-score is withheld — it comes from the second data source this page could not reconcile, and a solvency score is not worth printing on a number two sources dispute. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is withheld — it comes from the second data source this page could not reconcile, and a solvency score is not worth printing on a number two sources dispute.

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