The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd

Price story Before the numbers, the tape. A stock price moves through four repeating seasons: a flat base (stage 1), an advance (2), a top (3), a decline (4). Where the price sits in that cycle frames everything below.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd trades at ₹1,494, in a downtrend and 75 weeks into that stage. That is −10.0% against its own 200-day average. It sits at 17% of a 52-week range of ₹1,375 to ₹2,079. On relative strength it is currently behind the NIFTY 500 on a trailing-13-week view (4 weeks and counting).

Today the stock is in a downtrend — week 75 of stage 4, confirmed. At ₹1,494 it trades −10.0% versus its 200-day average and sits at 17% of its 52-week range (₹1,375–₹2,079).

Against the market, two honest reads. Cumulative: over the last 10.3 years the stock moved +307% while the NIFTY 500 moved +274% — ahead of the index over the full window. Recent form: on a trailing-13-week view the stock is currently behind (4 weeks and counting; last ahead the week of 2026-06-25) — the ribbon below is that same metric, week by week.

What would end the trend, mechanically: two Friday closes in a row below the 200-day line. That is the exit rule — no debates.

→ The trend is one thing; the bill is another. Are you paying up for it? Next: the P/E sits at the 6th percentile of its own range.

Valuation P/E is the price of ₹1 of annual profit: how many rupees the market pays for each rupee the company earns in a year.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd trades at 8.6× P/E, near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 6% of the time. Its long-run median P/E is 15.8×, measured across 10.4 years of weekly readings. This places the multiple against the stock’s own record, and says nothing about what the business is worth.

Today's P/E of 8.6× is near the bottom of its own range — cheaper only 6% of the time, against a long-run median of 15.8× measured over 10.4 years of weekly readings. This is a comparison against the stock's own history — not a claim about what it is worth.

One caveat before moving on: margins are the best this company has ever printed — cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap. If profitability mean-reverts, today's multiple is higher than it looks.

Why the multiple sits where it does: over the past year annual EPS moved +10.7% against a −25.5% price move — earnings outran the price, pushing the multiple DOWN its own range.

The price move, decomposed: over 5y, of the +2.8%/yr price move, ~+26.2%/yr came from earnings growth and ~−23.4 pp from the multiple (compressing); over 10y, of the +13.9%/yr price move, ~+11.9%/yr came from earnings growth and ~+2.0 pp from the multiple (expanding). The split is the honest approximate (price return minus earnings growth); it makes the rally itself visible instead of hiding it behind the percentile.

Put together: the multiple is low against its own past, so the story rests on the earnings line underneath it, not the multiple.

A quarterly PEG curve, which only the second data source carries, is not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 13% on reported income across 13 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Cheap or dear rides on the earnings. Are they actually growing? Next: the fundamental stage — where the business sits in its arc, and how growth has compounded.

Stage: Consistent Every business sits somewhere on a fundamental arc, and this page names the spot before anything else. The last twelve quarters of revenue, profit and EPS growth — plus the return the business earns on its capital — are read as curves: Deteriorating (the curves are falling), Turning around (a trough has just formed and the last few quarters lift off it), Improving (the climb off the trough is sustained), Consistent (steadily positive with healthy returns), Topping out (still high but decelerating from the peak). When the curves genuinely disagree the read is Mixed; too little history is No read. CAGR (compound annual growth rate) is the smooth yearly pace that turns the starting value into the latest one — the fairest way to compare growth across different time spans. Read the columns together: if the 1-year number towers over the 10-year, recent growth is running hotter than the long-run trend. A dash means that window is not held, or the base year was a loss (where a growth rate is not meaningful).

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd reads as consistent on its fundamental arc. Consistent — revenue and profit growth have stayed positive through the window, with ROCE at 33.0% and holding. The read is built from 10 quarters across 3 curves, on partial evidence.

Why it matters: steady curves with healthy returns are the compounding setup — the risk is the price, not the business.

One or more growth curves carry a base-effect spike — a large year-on-year move off a near-zero or loss-making comparable quarter. Those spikes are capped before the classifier reads the trajectory, and shown pinned on the chart, so a single distorted quarter does not drive the stage call.

Return readings here are annual, not quarterly — read as level and direction only; they can confirm the growth curves but never drive the stage on their own.

A partial read: at least one curve is short, or the returns curve is not the computed quarterly series — hold the stage word a little more loosely.

→ The stage names the trajectory. Next: the revenue line that produces it, quarter by quarter.

4-Factor Sector Score

47.1/100 — rank 4 of 6 in FMCG - Foods · 73% evidence confidence

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd scores 47.1 out of 100 against the 6 companies it is compared with in FMCG - Foods, ranking 4. Cheap but unconfirmed: require improving earnings before treating the valuation as an opportunity.

The four contributions add to the total exactly: 9.7 + 16 + 14.8 + 6.6 = 47.1. This is the SAME number shown on the sector comparison — it is computed once, for the whole peer set, and read here.

What would change it: The read weakens if profit growth turns negative or margin improvement reverses while sector-relative strength deteriorates.

Revenue Revenue is the top line: everything the company billed its customers in the period.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd reported ₹4,818 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, +6.6% year on year. That is the 10th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 8.4% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹19,539 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹19,539 Cr.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd reported ₹4,818 Cr of revenue in the Mar 26 quarter, +6.6% year on year. That is the 10th straight quarter of year-on-year growth. Over 10 years it has compounded at 8.4% a year. The last full year, FY26, came in at ₹19,539 Cr. The last four reported quarters add to ₹19,539 Cr.

FY26 revenue came in at ₹19,539 Cr (+6.8% on the year), capping 10 years at 8.4% compound. The latest quarter (Mar 26) printed ₹4,818 Cr, +6.6% year on year — the 10th consecutive quarter of year-over-year growth.

Pace check: the last four quarters averaged +6.8% growth against the decade's 8.4% — the current year is running slower than its own long-run rate.

Acceleration check: trailing-twelve-month revenue grew +6.8% over the last 4 quarters against +6.9%/yr over the last 8 — stabilising; TTM profit +13.6% vs +19.2%/yr — rolling over.

→ Revenue grew — did margins hold as it scaled? Next: 17.0% this quarter (−1.0 pp YoY).

Operating margin Operating margin is what is left of every ₹100 of sales after running the business, before interest and tax. It is the cleanest read on pricing power and cost control.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd's operating margin is 17.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, −1.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 9.0% to 18.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd's operating margin is 17.0% in the Mar 26 quarter, −1.0 percentage points against the same quarter a year ago. That is the widest this company has ever printed on a full-year basis. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 9.0% to 18.0%. The current quarter sits inside that band.

The latest quarter's operating margin is 17.0%, −1.0 pp against the same quarter a year ago. Across 13 fiscal years the operating margin has ranged 9.0%–18.0%, and FY26's 18.0% is the top of that band — a record year.

🚨 Why the margin moved: operating margin went −0.6 pp year on year while gross margin went +2.0 pp — the loss came mostly from the gross line: input costs and pricing.

Worth repeating from the valuation section: cheap against its own history on record margins is not the same thing as cheap — a record margin flatters every ratio built on top of it.

→ Margins slipped — did that reach the bottom line? Next: profit +33.5% in the latest quarter.

Net profit Net profit is what survives every cost, interest and tax — the number EPS, dividends and book value all grow from.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd earned ₹781 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, +33.5% year on year. It is the 5th consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹2,499 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 12.2%. That is 16.2% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹585 Cr.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd earned ₹781 Cr of net profit in the Mar 26 quarter, +33.5% year on year. It is the 5th consecutive quarter of growth. Full-year FY26 profit was ₹2,499 Cr. The 10-year compound rate is 12.2%. That is 16.2% of the quarter's revenue. The same quarter a year earlier earned ₹585 Cr.

Mar 26 profit was ₹781 Cr, +33.5% year on year — the 5th consecutive quarter of growth. On the full year, FY26 printed ₹2,499 Cr (+13.6%), and the 10-year compound rate is 12.2%.

Why profit moved: revenue contributed +6.6% and the margin −1.0 pp — the quarter was revenue-led, with the margin roughly flat.

Pace comparison, last four quarters: profit +13.3% vs revenue +6.8%. Profit is growing faster than sales — fixed costs are being spread over a bigger base, and each extra rupee of revenue drops more to the bottom line.

→ Profit rose — but did the cash follow? Next: 103% of the last 3 years' profit arrived as cash.

Cash flow — the router The P&L says what was earned; the cash-flow statement says what actually arrived. Operating cash flow (CFO) against profit is the cleanest lie detector in the accounts.

Over the last 3 fiscal years 103% of The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd's reported profit arrived as operating cash — the cash follows the profit. In FY26 that was ₹2,419 Cr of operating cash against ₹2,499 Cr of profit. After ₹238 Cr of capital spending, ₹2,181 Cr was left as free cash.

FY26: operating cash of ₹2,419 Cr against reported profit of ₹2,499 Cr, leaving free cash of ₹2,181 Cr after ₹238 Cr of capital spending. Across the last 3 fiscal years the conversion rate is 103% of profit.

Cash-flow readings here are annual — that is the resolution our series carries, so this section moves once a year.

Why conversion sits at 103%: the cash cycle held roughly steady between FY21 and FY26 — so conversion tracks profitability rather than the cycle.

Router verdict: no single sink dominates — the next section checks both the working-capital cycle and the capital spending.

→ So follow the cash to where it goes. Next: a −8-day cycle and ₹1,101 Cr of building.

Where the cash goes Working capital is the cash tied up between paying suppliers and getting paid: debtor days (customers owe), inventory days (stock waits), and the cash conversion cycle (the whole loop, in days of sales).

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd's cash conversion cycle runs −8 days in FY26, down from 1 days in FY21. Capital spending ran ₹1,101 Cr over the last 3 years. At FY26 sales of ₹19,539 Cr each day of that cycle holds about ₹53.5 Cr, so roughly ₹−428 Cr sits inside the business at any moment.

FY26: debtors at 10 days, inventory at 45 days — roughly 1.5 months of stock waiting to sell; that is where the cash sits while it waits — for a full cycle of −8 days, tighter than FY21's 1.

The full loop: cash goes out to suppliers and production on day 0; stock waits 45 days to sell; customers pay about 10 days after that; and suppliers themselves are paid at 63 days — netting out to the −8-day cycle.

In money terms: at FY26 sales of ₹19,539 Cr, each day of the cycle holds about ₹53.5 Cr — so the −8-day loop keeps roughly ₹−428 Cr sitting inside the business at any moment.

On the investment side: capital spending of ₹1,101 Cr over the last 3 fiscal years against ₹991 Cr of depreciation — building somewhat ahead of wear-and-tear. Capital work-in-progress stands at ₹42.0 Cr (FY26) — capacity paid for but not yet earning.

The synthesis: neither the cycle nor the build-out is hoarding the cash — the machine is reasonably clean.

→ Does all this activity actually earn its cost of capital? Next: ROCE is 33%.

Return on capital Return on capital employed (ROCE) is the profit the whole business earns on all the money in it — equity and debt together. It is the single best test of whether growth creates value or just size.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd earns a ROCE of 33% in FY26. That is up from a trough of 16% in FY22. A return-on-invested-capital spread against the cost of capital is not computable from what is held here. The wiring behind it is 12.8% net margin on 1.34× asset turns.

FY26 ROCE is 33%, recovered from a FY22 trough of 16% — the full ladder below shows the fall and the climb, undoctored.

Why the return is what it is — the wiring (FY26): 12.8% net margin × 1.34× asset turns × 2.06× balance-sheet leverage ≈ 35.3% on equity. Margin does its share; leverage is a meaningful part of the equation.

The quarterly return curves and the return-on-invested-capital overlay, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 13% on reported income across 13 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Returns like these — is the balance sheet borrowing to make them? Next: debt-to-equity is 0.23.

Debt Debt-to-equity says how much of the business is funded by borrowings; interest cover says how many times operating profit pays the interest bill. Low and high, respectively, is the safe corner.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd carries ₹1,590 Cr of borrowings against ₹7,042 Cr of equity in FY26, a debt-to-equity of 0.23. Operating profit covers the interest bill 25×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹2,670 Cr to ₹1,590 Cr. Capital spending ran ₹1,101 Cr across the last 3 of those years.

FY26: borrowings of ₹1,590 Cr against equity of ₹7,042 Cr — a debt-to-equity of 0.23. Operating profit covers the interest bill 25×. Over 5 years borrowings went from ₹2,670 Cr to ₹1,590 Cr while capital spending ran ₹1,101 Cr in just the last 3 — the build-out is being paid for out of cash, not debt.

The total-debt and debt-to-equity series, which only the second data source carries, are not drawn on this page: its two data sources disagree by up to 13% on reported income across 13 comparable periods. A figure two sources cannot agree on is not drawn — the gap is a decision, not missing data.

→ Who owns this, and are they adding or leaving? Next: the register is quiet.

Ownership Who owns the stock, quarter by quarter: promoters (the controlling owners), foreign and domestic institutions, and the public. Steady accumulation by people close to the numbers is a signal; a quiet register is also an answer.

No holder of The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd moved a full percentage point over the last two years — the register is quiet. Domestic institutions moved −0.4 points over the same window, to 1.0%. The register is read on the four disclosed classes only; nothing is inferred between filings.

The register over the last two years — Foreign institutions: +0.6 points over 8 quarters to 9.5%; Domestic institutions: −0.4 points over 8 quarters to 1.0%; Promoters: +0.0 points over 8 quarters to 74.0%.

→ One last check: does the safety math agree? Next: the balance-sheet safety line.

Safety line The Z-score estimates how far a company sits from balance-sheet distress — above roughly 3 is safe, below roughly 1.8 is the danger zone. It was built for manufacturers, so it is not applied to banks and lenders.

The Bombay Burmah Trading Corporation Ltd: the Z-score is withheld — it comes from the second data source this page could not reconcile, and a solvency score is not worth printing on a number two sources dispute. It is a distance-to-distress estimate from the balance sheet, not a forecast of failure.

The safety line in one sentence: the Z-score is withheld — it comes from the second data source this page could not reconcile, and a solvency score is not worth printing on a number two sources dispute.

Frequently asked questions